Do Changes in Regulation Affect Employment Duration in Temporary Work Agencies? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.1, 2007

Over the past three decades Germany has repeatedly deregulated the law on temporary agency work by stepwise increasing the maximum period for hiring-out employees and allowing temporary work agencies to conclude fixed-term contracts. These reforms should have had an effect on employment duration within temporary work agencies. Based on an informative administrative data set we use a mixed proportional hazard rate model to examine whether employment duration has changed in response to these reforms. We find that the repeated prolongation of the maximum period for hiring-out employees significantly increased average employment duration while the authorization of fixed-term contracts reduced employment tenure.

La Direttiva 2008/104/CE relativa al lavoro tramite agenzia interinale: aspetti problematici e modelli di implementazione = Directive 2008/104/EC relating to temporary agency work: problematic aspects and implementation models. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 101/2013

The problematic gestation of the Directive on temporary agency work shows the presence of several criticalities that there are also in the national transposition in relation to the principle of equal treatment and to the mechanisms for preventing abuse during successive assignments. From a first analysis it can be said that in some EU Member States only the derogations have been implemented and not the general principle of equal treatment. At the same time, the obligation of the Member States, contained in the Directive on temporary agency work, to establish mechanisms for preventing abuse during successive assignments is crucial, especially in the light of the recent case law of the EU Court of Justice in which the Court does not apply to the temporary agency workers the protective rules of the Directive on fixed-term contracts (see C-290/12 , Della Rocca).

The Fundamental Rights Agency and Civil Society: Reminding the Gardeners of their Plants' Roots. EDAP 02/2012, 2012

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the EU body responsible for advising EU institutions on fundamental rights, is equipped with a Fundamental Rights Platform (FRP) to ensure an on-going and structured exchange of information and feedback between the FRA and Civil Society. When the FRA was founded in 2007, there was little pre-existing knowledge on how to design such a Platform; hence, the development of the relationship between the FRA and Civil Society over the first five years proved an interesting experiment. Although the Platform was never intended as a mechanism of democratic co-decision making, it is far more than a loose marketplace where Civil Society actors across the spectrum of fundamental rights themes gather. The Platform offers channels of consultation and exchange not only among the participants but also with the FRA. It allows for cross-pollination, ensuring informed grassroots input into FRA work and FRA expertise flow to Civil Society actors. This synergetic relationship builds upon both the self-organising forces of Civil Society and the terms of references of the FRP as defined by the FRA. The Platform allows to find a certain unity in the remarkable diversity of fundamental rights voices. To what degree, however, the Platform’s dynamics allow the transformation of sometimes ‘compartmentalised’ single human rights discussions into wider trans-sectoral and transnational debates within the Human Rights Community depends on the motivation and the interest(s) of the different Civil Society players.

Electricity without borders: a plan to make the internal market work. Bruegel Blueprint Series 20, 5 September 2013

The most straightforward European single energy market design would entail a European system operator regulated by a single European regulator. This would ensure the predictable development of rules for the entire EU, significantly reducing regulatory uncertainty for electricity sector investments. But such a first-best market design is unlikely to be politically realistic in the European context for three reasons. First, the necessary changes compared to the current situation are substantial and would produce significant redistributive effects. Second, a European solution would deprive member states of the ability to manage their energy systems nationally. And third, a single European solution might fall short of being well-tailored to consumers’ preferences, which differ substantially across the EU. To nevertheless reap significant benefits from an integrated European electricity market, we propose the following blueprint: First, we suggest adding a European system-management layer to complement national operation centres and help them to better exchange information about the status of the system, expected changes and planned modifications. The ultimate aim should be to transfer the day-to-day responsibility for the safe and economic operation of the system to the European control centre. To further increase efficiency, electricity prices should be allowed to differ between all network points between and within countries. This would enable throughput of electricity through national and international lines to be safely increased without any major investments in infrastructure. Second, to ensure the consistency of national network plans and to ensure that they contribute to providing the infrastructure for a functioning single market, the role of the European ten year network development plan (TYNDP) needs to be upgraded by obliging national regulators to only approve projects planned at European level unless they can prove that deviations are beneficial. This boosted role of the TYNDP would need to be underpinned by resolving the issues of conflicting interests and information asymmetry. Therefore, the network planning process should be opened to all affected stakeholders (generators, network owners and operators, consumers, residents and others) and enable the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to act as a welfare-maximising referee. An ultimate political decision by the European Parliament on the entire plan will open a negotiation process around selecting alternatives and agreeing compensation. This ensures that all stakeholders have an interest in guaranteeing a certain degree of balance of interest in the earlier stages. In fact, transparent planning, early stakeholder involvement and democratic legitimisation are well suited for minimising as much as possible local opposition to new lines. Third, sharing the cost of network investments in Europe is a critical issue. One reason is that so far even the most sophisticated models have been unable to identify the individual long-term net benefit in an uncertain environment. A workable compromise to finance new network investments would consist of three components: (i) all easily attributable cost should be levied on the responsible party; (ii) all network users that sit at nodes that are expected to receive more imports through a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line extension cost through their network charges; (iii) the rest of the cost is socialised to all consumers. Such a cost-distribution scheme will involve some intra-European redistribution from the well-developed countries (infrastructure-wise) to those that are catching up. However, such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a much more efficient way than the Connecting Europe Facility’s ad-hoc disbursements to politically chosen projects, because it would provide the infrastructure that is really needed.

Can the new refugee relocation system work? Perils in the Dublin logic and flawed reception conditions in the EU. CEPS Policy Brief No. 332, October 2015 Thursday, 1 October 2015

This Policy Brief argues that the newly adopted EU temporary relocation (quota) system constitutes a welcome yet timid step forward in addressing a number of central controversies of the current refugee debate in Europe. Two main challenges affect the effective operability of the new EU relocation model. First, EU member states’ asylum systems show profound (on-the-ground) weaknesses in reception conditions and judicial/administrative capacities. These prevent a fair and humane processing of asylum applications. EU states are not implementing the common standards enshrined in the EU reception conditions Directive 2013/33. Second, the new relocation system constitutes a move away from the much-criticised Dublin system, but it is still anchored to its premises. The Dublin system is driven by an unfair and unsustainable rule according to which the first EU state of entry is responsible for assessing asylum applications. It does not properly consider the personal, private and family circumstances or the preferences of asylum-seekers. Policy Recommendations In order to respond to these challenges, the Policy Brief offers the following policy recommendations: The EU should strengthen and better enforce member states’ reception capacities, abolish the current Dublin system rule of allocation of responsibility and expand the new relocation distribution criteria to include in the assessment (as far as possible) asylum-seekers’ preferences and personal/family links to EU member states. EU member countries should give priority to boosting their current and forward-looking administrative and judicial capacities to deal and welcome asylum applications. The EU should establish a permanent common European border and asylum service focused on ensuring the highest standards through stable operational support, institutional solidarity across all EU external borders and the practical implementation of new distribution relocation criteria.

An Analysis of the Schengen Area in the Wake of Recent Developments. 30 June 2016. CEPS researchers’ work published externally

This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee, analyses the Schengen area in the wake of the European ‘refugee crisis’ and other recent developments. With several Member States reintroducing temporary internal border controls over recent months, the study assesses compliance with the Schengen governance framework in this context. Despite suggestions that the end of Schengen is nigh or arguments that there is a need to get ‘back to Schengen’, the research demonstrates that Schengen is alive and well and that border controls have, at least formally, complied with the legal framework. Nonetheless, better monitoring and democratic accountability are necessary.