Reflections on the institutional balance, the Community Method and the interplay between jurisdictions after Lisbon. Research Papers in Law, 04/2012

[Introduction.] Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the “renationalisation of European politics.” Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such a renationalisation: “If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why would this not strengthen it?” He took the view that not a renationalisation of European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation states.1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.

Russia's position on the events in Kyrgyzstan (April-June 2010). OSW Commentary No. 38, 2010-07-27

Russia was the first state in the world to de facto recognise the regime change in Kyrgyzstan that took place on 7 April 2010. This recognition, along with a previous campaign by the Russian media against the then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has given rise to suspicion that the events of April were provoked by Russia. However, it seems no more than reasonable to say that Russia provided some inspiration and lobbying in that direction. Russia offered support to the new Kyrgyz government almost immediately, albeit conditionally. Russia’s relations with Roza Otunbayeva’s government have been changing in nature; they are currently much cooler than they had been immediately after the coup. There are many indications that this change was a reaction to the extension of the lease agreement for the American military base in the Manas airport. At the same time, Moscow remains in contact with the political rivals to the current regime, which suggests that the Kremlin is preparing for different developments, and does not regard the current crisis as having been fully resolved. Despite the interim government’s plea for help, Russia refused to undertake military intervention in southern Kyrgyzstan, which plunged into ethnic unrest in June. This shows that Russia is wary of being dragged into a long-standing and bloody conflict in the region, which could entail considerable expenses and jeopardise Russia’s authority. It should be expected that after the October parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, Russia will return to its plans to establish a second military base in this country (in addition to the Kant base) to reinforce its dominant position in the region. This is the first time that Russia has had a real chance to play a stabilising role in the CIS area. How Russia copes with this challenge may decide its position in post-Soviet Central Asia – and in a wider context, its relations with NATO, the USA and China.

The nuclear deal with Iran: Le moment suprême? CEPS Commentary, 16 July 2015

More than two years in the making, the agreement concluded by China, the EU, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US with Iran to prevent the ‘weaponisation’ of the latter’s nuclear programme is a big deal. But, cautions Steven Blockmans in this CEPS Commentary, it is not the silver bullet to the normalisation of relations. Implementation will be a tortuous process, fraught with suspicion and friction. Although Europe has been called upon to seize the moment and to shift to a relationship with Iran based on engagement, not containment, the EU and its member states would be better advised not to move beyond their nuclear focus too quickly, but rather to show a sense of duty and loyal cooperation with their international partners by supporting the effective execution of the accord.

Brexit – lessons from four referenda on the European Union (EU) in Denmark. EU Centre, Policy Brief No. 8, June 2015

From 1972 to 1993 Denmark staged four referenda on the EU. Two of them in particular hold valuable lessons for Britain seeking new terms - in June 1992 on the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the Danes voted “NO” with a slim majority; this was followed by another vote on the treaty in May 1993 on the Edinburgh Agreement with a “YES” vote. Joergen Oerstroem Moeller was directly involved in all four referenda and served 1989-1997 as State-Secretary in the Royal Danish Foreign Ministry. The result of a referendum may and often will be decided by policy decisions shaping the electorates’ perception long before the voting takes place. The majority votes according to instinct and intuition and is often guided by emotions. The Danish case highlights the importance of defining clearly specific exceptions, working hard to explain the case (at home and abroad), establishing good-will, and conveying that exceptions are in principle temporary and do not require treaty changes. The objectives laid out at the start of the process must be achievable. The member state in question should not manoeuvre itself into humiliating back-pedalling at the final negotiation round: if so it arouses suspicion among the electorate that it is being manipulated and deceived. During the campaign media attention will primarily focus on dissent and scepticism presenting the establishment with the tedious task of confuting accusations of all kinds. The YES camp will be pushed into the defensive by the NO camp setting the agenda. Time and effort and political capital needed to be invested for the positive outcome.