18 resultados para strategic voting
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
Voters try to avoid wasting their votes even in PR systems. In this paper we make a case that this type of strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems. Contrary to the literature we do not see weak institutional incentive structures as indicative of a hopeless endeavor for studying strategic voting. The crucial question for strategic voting is how institutional incentives constrain an individual’s decision-making process. Based on expected utility maximization we put forward a micro-logic of an individual’s expectation formation process driven by institutional and dispositional incentives. All well-known institutional incentives to vote strategically that get channelled through the district magnitude are moderated by dispositional factors in order to become relevant for voting decisions. Employing data from Finland – because of its electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we find considerable evidence for observable implications of our theory.
Resumo:
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a de facto regional power in the Arab world. Its role has been crucial in some of the outcomes of the Arab Spring. The GCC countries have been very pragmatic in dealing with the uprisings, avoiding any revolutionary spill-over throughout the Gulf region. This paper examines to what extent the policies of the European Union (EU) in the Gulf have changed since the beginning of the Arab Spring. It argues that despite the calls by the European Parliament and by the High Representative Baroness Ashton to improve the relationship, the EU’s support for a new policy in the Gulf after the Arab Spring is stalling, and little new or concrete has been achieved. The paper concludes that the Union needs a reinforced partnership that merges the various EU policies in the region into a single strategic partnership with the Arab countries.
