The Theory of Interhybridity: Socio-political Dimensions and Migration Experiences of Post-communist Western Balkan States

The Western Balkans integration within the EU has started a legal process which is the rejection of former communist legal/political approaches and the transformation of former communist institutions. Indeed, the EU agenda has brought vertical/horizontal integration and Europeanization of national institutions (i.e. shifting power to the EU institutions and international authorities). At this point, it is very crucial to emphasize the fact that the Western Balkans as a whole region has currently an image that includes characteristics of both the Soviet socialism and the European democracy. The EU foreign policies and enlargement strategy for Western Balkans have significant effects on four core factors (i.e. Schengen visa regulations, remittances, asylum and migration as an aggregate process). The convergence/divergence of EU member states’ priorities for migration policies regulate and even shape directly the migration dynamics in migrant sender countries. From this standpoint, the research explores how main migration factors are influenced by political and judicial factors such as; rule of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society score and citizenship rights in Western Balkan countries. The proposal of interhybridity explores how the hybridization of state and non-state actors within home and host countries can solve labor migration-related problems. The economical and sociopolitical labor-migration model of Basu (2009) is overlapping with the multidimensional empirical framework of interhybridity. Indisputably, hybrid model (i.e. collaboration state and non-state actors) has a catalyst role in terms of balancing social problems and civil society needs. Paradigmatically, it is better to perceive the hybrid model as a combination of communicative and strategic action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is precondition for significant functionality. This will shape social and industrial relations with moral meanings of communication.

Programming EU External Action Post-Lisbon: New Opportunities or Business as Usual?

Over 90% of the external relations budget of the EU is processed through its external financial instruments. With the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the new European External Action Service (EEAS), the institutional architecture of these instruments was significantly reformed. This contribution analyses strategic programming both pre- and post-Lisbon, identifies ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and examines the potential of the new provisions to increase the coherence of EU external action. The examination shows that the instruments can be categorised into three groupings: ‘the big three’ comprising the bulk of funding characterised by joint programming and responsibilities; the ‘Commission-only’ instruments where all powers remain with the Commission; and the ‘EEAS-led rest’ in which the High Representative and the EEAS play a strong role but only have limited financial resources available. The new system calls for strong coordination of all involved actors in order to make it work. Findings of a case study on the Instrument for Stability reveal, however, that so far the establishment of the EEAS has not made a substantial impact on strategic programming in its first two years.

Priorities for the Next Legislature: EU external action. CEPS Commentary, 29 September 2014

At a time when the European Union’s strategic and geopolitical environment is more troubled and unpredictable than it has been for decades, the European Council is calling for stronger EU engagement in international affairs. The rest of the rapidly changing world is not going to wait for the EU to get its act together to defend its own values and interests. This CEPS Commentary sets out four priorities for High Representative/Vice-President-designate Federica Mogherini as she takes up her role as leader of the European External Action Service and the next 'RELEX' Group of Commissioners.

Estonia in the eurozone - a strategic success. OSW Commentary No. 53, 2011-06-20

The adoption of the euro in January 2011 topped off Estonia’s integration policy. In the opinion of Estonian politicians, this country has never been so secure and stable in its history. Tallinn sees the introduction of the euro primarily in the political context as an entrenchment of the Estonian presence in Europe. The process of establishing increasingly close relations with Western European countries, which the country has consistently implemented since it restored independence in 1991, has been aimed at severing itself its Soviet past and at a gradual reduction of the gap existing between Estonia and the best-developed European economies. The Estonian government also prioritises the enhancement of co-operation as part of the EU and NATO as well as its principled fulfilment of the country’s undertakings. It sees these as important elements for building the country’s international prestige. The meeting of the Maastricht criteria at the time of an economic slump and the adoption of the euro during the eurozone crisis proved the determination and efficiency of the government in Tallinn. Its success has been based on strong support from the Estonian public for the pro-European (integrationist) policy of Estonia: according to public opinion polls, approximately 80% of the country’s residents declare their satisfaction with EU membership, while support for the euro ranges between 50% and 60%. Since Estonia joined the OECD in 2010 and adopted the euro at the beginning of 2011, it has become the leader of integration processes among the Baltic states. The introduction of the euro has reinforced Estonia’s international image and made it more attractive to foreign investors. The positive example of this country may be used as a strong argument by the governments in Lithuania and Latvia when they take action to meet the Maastricht criteria. Vilnius and Riga claim they want to adopt the euro in 2014. The improving economic situation in the Baltic states will contribute to the achievement of this goal, while an excessively high inflation rate, as in 2007, may be the main impediment1.

The Cultural Construction of Political Action: The Case of the European Community's Single Market Program. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.3, December 1993

Explaining the emergence of the European Community's Single Market Program requires making sense of how that institutional project carne onto the political agenda. I suggest that there are two features of the political process that have been not well understood. First, large-scale institutional projects usually require political opportunities to come to fruition. Second, they require strategic actors who can frame such projects in broad ways in order to attract a wide variety of groups. My basic argument is that the European Commission is an organization whose function is primarily to solve the bargaining game that characterizes interaction within the Community and act as a strategic actor. This does not suggest that they are always successful or are the only source of ideas, but instead that they are the collective actor responsible for trying to frame collective interests in new cultural ways. To illustrate this point, I document how the; Single Market program evolved within the Commission and how other important Community actors carne to sign on to its goals over time.