7 resultados para social science research methods
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, social scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration during de Gaulle's presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Foucher Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence-speeches, memoirs, or government documents-suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interesred in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations--even in the "least likely" case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader's geopolitical ideology--even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary-source research.
Resumo:
The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, political scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by the four major decisions toward European integration taken under de Gaulle's Presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in Luxembourg Compromise. In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence speeches, memoirs, or government documents suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interested in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations even in the least likely case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leaders geopolitical ideology even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary source research.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. The main difficulty of Theology lies in the fact that the very existence of its subject-matter, God, may be put into question. Talking about Social Europe has something of a theological dimension. The aim of this article is to contribute into the debate, by putting into perspective some of the latest manifestations of social Europe. The need for the pursuance of social policies at the European level is now more pressing than ever (para 2). The EU, however, as it now stands, is the direct evolutionary result of the predominantly economic entity created back in 1957. This explains that the social policies pursued at the European level are piecemeal and often impregnated with market concerns (para. 3). From an instrumental point of view, EU social policy is being pursued concomitantly by secondary legislation (hard law) in the fields where the EU does have the relevant competences and by softer means of cooperation (soft law) in several other fields. Hard law has given the occasion to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in a series of recent judgments, of putting to the fore the concept of a ‘social market’ (para. 4). Soft cooperation has been formalised into the infamous Lisbon Strategy and has been the main object of experimentation with the open method of coordination (OMC) (para. 5). The advances achieved in the above ways, however, do not offer firm answers to basic questions concerning the future development of the European social identity (para. 6)