8 resultados para separation mechanism
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
Introduction. Following the June 2012 European Council decision to place the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM) within the European Central Bank, the general presumption in the policy discussions has been that there should be ‘Chinese walls’ between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal, in fact, is explicit on this account. On the contrary, however, this paper finds that there is no need to impose a strict separation between these two functions. The authors argue, in fact, that a strict separation of supervision and monetary policy is not even desirable during a financial crisis when the systemic stability of the financial system represents the biggest threat to a monetary policy that aims at price stability. In their view, the key problem hampering the ECB today is that it lacks detailed information on the state of health of the banking system, which is often highly confidential. Chinese walls would not solve this problem. Moreover, in light of the fact that the new, proposed Supervisory Board will be composed to a large extent of representatives of the same institutions that also dominate the Governing Council, the paper finds that it does not make sense to have Chinese walls between two boards with largely overlapping memberships. In addition, it recommends that some members of the Supervisory Boards should be “independents” in order to reduce the tendency of supervisors to unduly delay the recognition of losses.
Resumo:
Problems in the banking system are at the core of the current crisis. The establishment of a banking union is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for eventual crisis resolution that respects the integrity of the euro. The European Commission’s proposal for the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism and related reform of the European Banking Authority (EBA) do not and cannot create a fully-fledged banking union, but represent a broadly adequate step on the basis of the leaders’ declaration of 29 June 2012 and of the decision to use Article 127(6) of the treaty as legal basis. The proposal rightly endows the European Central Bank (ECB) with broad authority over banks within the supervisory mechanism’s geographical perimeter; however, the status of non-euro area member states willing to participate in this mechanism, and the governance and decision-making processes of the ECB in this respect, call for further elaboration. Further adjustments are also desirable in the proposed reform of the EBA, even though they must probably retain a stopgap character pending the more substantial review planned in 2014.
Resumo:
The clean development mechanism (CDM) has been through a long and complex growing process since it was approved as part of the Kyoto Protocol. It was designed within the framework of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and reflected the political and economic realities of that time. To ensure its continued effectiveness in contributing to future global climate action and to reflect on how best to position the CDM to respond to future challenges, a high-level panel (HLP) was formed at the Durban climate change conference in 2011. Following extensive consultations, the panel published its report in September 2012. Through this Special Report, the CEPS Carbon Market Forum offers its reflections on findings and recommendations of the HLP, as well as, by extension, its own views on the future of the CDM. In the context of the latter, it explores the following questions: Is there a need for an instrument such as the CDM in the future? What ‘demand’ can it fill? In the roles identified under the first question, what can be done to adapt it and also continue to increase its efficacy?
