Changing Banking Supervision in the Eurozone: the ECB as a Policy Entrepreneur. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 38, December 2014

In 2012, the European Union adopted a transformational change to its banking policy for the Eurozone. It dropped the model of decentralized supervision and regulatory competition between countries, and replaced it with a single supervisor and harmonization. Transferring banking supervision to the ECB also alters the existing constitutional order. The policy process leading to this transformational change was rapid and highly political, which was different compared to earlier incremental changes to banking policy. Kingdon's model, whereby policy entrepreneurs seize opportunities at times when the independent streams of solutions, problems and politics converge, partly explains this transformation. The study of EU banking policy suggests, however, that the multiple streams framework should pay more attention to the way in which entrepreneurs engineer fluctuations within the streams and thereby contribute to creating opportunities for change. This paper identifies the ECB as an effective entrepreneur which also played an active role in political bargaining.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most recent practice. Research Papers in Law 03/2012

[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.

Reflections on the institutional balance, the Community Method and the interplay between jurisdictions after Lisbon. Research Papers in Law, 04/2012

[Introduction.] Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the “renationalisation of European politics.” Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such a renationalisation: “If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why would this not strengthen it?” He took the view that not a renationalisation of European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation states.1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.

The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for the Union? Research Paper in Law 8/2003

[Introduction]. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.1 Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks.

Meeting Competition: Why it is not an Abuse under Article 82. Research Papers in Law, 3/2004.

Introduction. Meeting competition occurs when an undertaking lowers its prices in response to the entry of a competitor. Despite accepting that meeting competition can be compatible with Article 82, the Commission2 and the Court of justice3 have repeatedly condemned the practice due to the modalities of implementation or “particular circumstances”.4 However, existing precedent on the subject remains obscurely reasoned and contradictory, such that it is at the present time impossible to give clear advice to undertakings on the circumstances in which meeting competition is compatible with Article 82. Not only is such legal uncertainty in itself damaging but, in so far as it discourages meeting competition, it appears to us to be harmful to competition. As concerns the latter point, it will be seen that some of the most powerful arguments against prohibiting meeting competition are based on the counterproductive nature of the remedies. The present article does not, however, aim to propose a simple solution to distinguish abusive and non-abusive meeting competition.5 Nor does the article aim to give a comprehensive overview of the existing case law in this area.6 Instead, it takes a more economic approach and aims to lay out in a (brief but) systematic fashion the competitive concerns that might potentially be raised by the practice of meeting competition and in doing so to try to identify the main flaws in the Court and Commission’s approach.

Subsidiarity between Law and Economics. Research Papers in Law, 1/2005

From the Introduction. The present contribution is an attempt to raise awareness between the 'trenches' by juxtaposing the two approaches to subsidiarity. Subsequently, I shall set out why, in economics, subsidiarity is embraced as a key principle in the design and working of the Union and how a functional subsidiarity test can be derived from this thinking. Throughout the paper, a range of illustrations and examples is provided in an attempt to show the practical applicability of a subsidiarity test. This does not mean, of course, that the application of the test can automatically "solve" all debates on whether subsidiarity is (not) violated. What it does mean, however, is that a careful methodology can be a significant help to e.g. national parliaments and the Brussels circuit, in particular, to discourage careless politicisation as much as possible and to render assessments of subsidiarity comparable throughout the Union. The latter virtue should be of interest to national parliaments in cooperating, within just six weeks, about a common stance in the case of a suspected violation of the principle. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a flavour of very different approaches and appreciation of the subsidiarity principle in European law and in the economics of multi-tier government. Section 3 elaborates on the economics of multi-tier government as a special instance of cost / benefit analysis of (de)centralisation in the three public economic functions of any government system. This culminates in a five-steps subsidiarity test and a brief discussion about its proper and improper application. Section 4 applies the test in a non-technical fashion to a range of issues of the "efficiency function" (i.e. allocation and markets) of the EU. After showing that the functional logic of subsidiarity may require liberalisation to be accompanied by various degrees of centralisation, a number of fairly detailed illustrations of how to deal with subsidiarity in the EU is provided. One illustration is about how the subsidiarity logic is misused by protagonists (labour in the internal market). A slightly different but frequently encountered aspect consists in the refusal to recognize that the EU (that is, some form of centralisation) offers a better solution than 25 national ones. A third range of issues, where the functional logic of subsidiarity could be useful, emerges when the boundaries of national competences are shifting due to more intense cross-border flows and developments. Other subsections are devoted to Union public goods and to the question whether the subsidiarity test might trace instances of EU decentralisation: a partial or complete shift of a policy or regulation to Member States. The paper refrains from an analysis of the application of the subsidiarity test to the other two public functions, namely, equity and macro-economic stabilisation.2 Section 5 argues that the use of a well-developed methodology of a functional subsidiarity test would be most useful for the national parliaments and even more so for their cooperation in case of a suspected violation of subsidiarity. Section 6 concludes.

From Structure to Substance: Has the Constitutional Treaty improved the Chances for a Common Foreign and Security Policy? Research Papers in Law, 6/2005

From the Introduction. A common foreign and security policy for the European Union is an issue of the day. While most academic and many political observers believe that it would be in the interest of the Union to have a common policy, there is quite some disagreement as to how this is to be achieved and whether it should be accomplished in an assured and regular manner or whether it should come about on an ad hoc basis only when it is in the clear interest of all member states at any particular time. In other words, is a common foreign policy to be a fundamental characteristic of the Union or is it to be an occasional occurrence when advantageous and convenient, the ‘C’ in CFSP – as one observer has sarcastically commented – standing not for ‘Common’ but for ‘Convenient’?2

With or without you...judging politically in the field of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Research Papers in Law, 3/2007

From the Introduction. The study of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law of the regarding the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) is fascinating in many ways.1 First, almost the totality of the relevant case law is extremely recent, thereby marking the first ‘foundational’ steps in this field of law. This is the result of the fact that the AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999.2 Second, as the AFSJ is a new field of EU competence, it sets afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its member states, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) measure of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions beg for answers which should take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.3 Third, and as a consequence of the above, the vast majority of the ECJ’s judgments relating to the AFSJ are a) delivered by the Full Court or, at least, the Grand Chamber, b) with the intervention of great many member states and c) often obscure in content. This is due to the fact that the Court is called upon to set the foundational rules in a new field of EU law, often trying to accommodate divergent considerations, not all of which are strictly legal.4 Fourth, the case law of the Court relating to the AFSJ, touches upon a vast variety of topics which are not necessarily related to one another. This is why it is essential to limit the scope of this study. The content of, and steering for, the AFSJ were given by the Tampere European Council, in October 1999. According to the Tampere Conclusions, the AFSJ should consist of four key elements: a) a common immigration and asylum policy, b) judicial cooperation in both civil and penal matters, c) action against criminality and d) external action of the EU in all the above fields. Moreover, the AFSJ is to a large extent based on the Schengen acquis. The latter has been ‘communautarised’5 by the Treaty of Amsterdam and further ‘ventilated’ between the first and third pillars by decisions 1999/435 and 1999/436.6 Judicial cooperation in civil matters, mainly by means of international conventions (such as the Rome Convention of 1981 on the law applicable to contractual obligations) and regulations (such as (EC) 44/20017 and (EC) 1348/20008) also form part of the AFSJ. However, the relevant case law of the ECJ will not be examined in the present contribution.9 Similarly, the judgments of the Court delivered in the course of Article 226 EC proceedings against member states, will be omitted.10 Even after setting aside the above case law and notwithstanding the fact that the AFSJ only dates as far back as May 1999, the judgments of the ECJ are numerous. A simple (if not simplistic) categorisation may be between, on the one hand, judgments which concern the institutional setting of the AFSJ (para. 2) and, on the other, judgments which are related to some substantive AFSJ policy (para. 3).

Casual but Smart: The Court’s new clothes in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty. Research Papers in Law, 2/2008

Introduction. Unintended as it was, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court, the Court of the EU) has played an extremely important role in the construction of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999. The fact that this is a new field of EU competence, poses afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its Member States, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) extent of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions have prompted judicial solutions which take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.1 The ECJ is the body whose institutional role is to benefit most from this upcoming ‘depilarisation’, possibly more than that of the European Parliament. This structure is on the verge of being abandoned, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.2 However spectacular this formal boost of the Court’s competence, the changes in real terms are not going to be that dramatic. This apparent contradiction is explained, to a large extent, by the fact that the Court has in many ways ‘provoked’, or even ‘anticipated’, the depilarisation of its own jurisdictional role, already under the existing three-pillar structure. Simply put, under the new – post Treaty of Lisbon – regime, the Court will have full jurisdiction over all AFSJ matters, as those are going to be fully integrated in what is now the first pillar. Some limitations will continue to apply, however, while a special AFSJ procedure will be institutionalised. Indeed, if we look into the new Treaty we may identify general modifications to the Court’s structure and jurisdiction affecting the AFSJ (section 2), modifications in the field of the AFSJ stemming from the abolition of the pillar structure (section 3) and, finally, some rules specifically applicable to the AFSJ (section 4).

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.

Environmental judgements by the Court of Justice and their duration. Research Papers in Law, 4/2008

From the Introduction. Little attention is paid, until now, to the duration of environmental procedures under Articles 226 and 228 EC Treaty, though these procedures are the only instrument at the disposal of the European Commission to enforce the application of EC environmental law1. Indeed, the Commission itself has no possibility to impose a fine or a penalty payment against a Member State, or to withhold sums under the Structural Funds, where a Member State persistently infringes Community environmental law. Rather, the Commission is obliged to first issue a Letter of Formal Notice against a Member State which infringes Community law. Where the infringement is not repaired, the Commission may issue a Reasoned Opinion against the Member State, and if also this does not lead to the compliance with EC law, it may appeal to the Court of Justice2.

Competition law proceedings before the European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform? Research Papers in Law, 5/2008

From the Introduction. This paper will thus show that, given the rapid "criminalisation" of competition law proceedings, sanctions should in principle be imposed at first instance I. Sanctions imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the conditions of Article 6 ECHR (part I). Or at the very least, these sanctions should be subject to full jurisdictional review by an independent and impartial tribunal in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR and to cure the defects of the administrative procedure (part II). It is doubtful however whether such a full jurisdictional review, as it is understood by the ECtHR, is available at Community-level in antitrust cases.

The importance of International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order. Research Papers in Law, 1/2009

From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

Patenting Strategies of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry -Crossroad between Patent Law and Competition Policy. Research Papers in Law, 1/2011

From the Introduction. The pharmaceutical sector inquiry carried out by the European Commission in 2008 provides a useful framework for assessing the relationship between the patent system on the one hand and competition policy and law on the other hand. The pharmaceutical market is not only specifically regulated. It is also influenced by the special characteristics of the patent system which enables pharmaceutical companies engaged in research activities to enter into additional arrangements to cope with the competitive pressures of early patent application and the delays in drug approval. Patents appear difficult to reconcile with the need for sufficient and adequate access to medicines, which is why competition expectations imposed on the pharmaceutical sector are very high. The patent system and competition law are interacting components of the market, into which they must both be integrated. This can result in competition law taking a very strict view on the pharmaceutical industry by establishing strict functional performance standards for the reliance on intellectual property rights protection granted by patent law. This is in particular because in this sector the potential welfare losses are not likely to be of only monetary nature. In brief, the more inefficiencies the patent system produces, the greater the risk of an expansive application of competition law in this field. The aim of the present study is to offer a critical and objective view on the use or abuse of patents and defensive strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. It shall also seek to establish whether patents as presently regulated offer an appropriate degree of protection of intellectual property held by the economic operators in the pharmaceutical sector and whether there is a need or, for that matter, scope for improvement. A useful starting point for the present study is provided by the pharmaceutical sector competition inquiry (hereafter “the sector inquiry”) carried out by the European Commission during the first half of 2008. On 8 July 2008, the Commission adopted its Final Report pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC, revealing a series of “antitrust shortcomings” that would require further investigation1.