Can Europe recover without credit? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/03, 15 February 2013

• Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. • However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons: • First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored.Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery andthere has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. • Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

The Russian economy under Putin: Growth factors and impediments to economic development. OSW Study 20/2005

After a dramatic economic decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial breakdown of 1998, the Russian economy has begun to emerge from its deep crisis. The years 1999-2004 were a period of dynamic development in all sectors of Russian economy, and saw a rapid growth in GDP of over 7 per cent per year. Russia owed the excellent macroeconomic results of that period to a combination of favourable factors. The key factors were: high hydrocarbon prices on the global markets; an increase in Russia's international competitiveness thanks to the "rouble devaluation effect" (following the 1998 financial crash); and the market reforms carried out within that period. In 2004, despite very high oil and gas prices on world markets, a slowdown of the GDP growth took place. Even though the economy is still developing fairly rapidly, we are able to say that Russia is exhausting those traditional mechanisms (apart from oil and gas prices) which have hitherto stimulated GDP growth. Moreover, there are no new mechanisms which could replace the old ones. In the longer term, these unsolved structural problems may seriously impede Russia's economic growth.

Latvia and Greece: Less is more. CEPS Hi-level Brief, 12 February 2014

Despite considerable differences, there were also many similarities in economic performance between Latvia and Greece before their respective adjustment crises. After the immediate crisis, however, economic activity rebounded sharply in Latvia but continued to contract in Greece. This paper argues that this difference was due primarily to developments in credit. In Latvia credit growth fell sharply, and the economy was deleveraging aggressively by 2009. When the pace of deleveraging started to stabilise, the rebound in the credit impulse caused domestic demand growth to recover. Real GDP has increased about 20% since reaching its trough in the third quarter of 2009.

Measuring the intermittent synchronicity of macroeconomic growth in Europe. ACES Cases No. 2010.1

Synchronization of growth rates are an important feature of international business cycles, particularly in relation to regional integration projects such as the single currency in Europe. Synchronization of growth rates clearly enhances the effectiveness of European Central Bank monetary policy, ensuring that policy changes are attuned to the dynamics of growth and business cycles in the majority of member states. In this paper a dissimilarity metric is constructed by measuring the topological differences between the GDP growth patterns in recurrence plots for individual countries. The results show that synchronization of growth rates were higher among the Euro area member states during the second half of the 1980s and from 1997 to roughly 2002. Apart from these two time periods, Euro area member states do not appear to be more synchronized than a group of major international countries, signifying that globalization was the major cause of international business cycle synchronization.

Is there a need for additional monetary stimulus? Insights from the original Taylor Rule. CEPS Policy Brief No. 342, April 2016

Central banks in the developed world are being misled into fighting the perceived dangers of a ‘deflationary spiral’ because they are looking at only one indicator: consumer prices. This Policy Brief finds that while consumer prices are flat, broader price indices do not show any sign of impending deflation: the GDP deflator is increasing in the US, Japan and the euro area by about 1.2-1.5%. Nor is the real economy sending any deflationary signals either: unemployment is at record lows in the US and Japan, and is declining in the euro area while GDP growth is at, or above potential. Thus, the overall macroeconomic situation does not give any indication of an imminent deflationary spiral. In today’s high-debt environment, the authors argue that central banks should be looking at the GDP deflator and the growth of nominal GDP, instead of CPI inflation. Nominal GDP growth, as forecasted by the major official institutions, remains robust and is in excess of nominal interest rates. They conclude that if the ECB were to set the interest rate according to the standard rules of thumb for monetary policy, which take into account both the real economy and price developments of broader price indicators, it would start normalising its policy now, instead of pondering over additional measures to fight deflation, which does not exist. In short, economic conditions are slowly normalising; so should monetary policy.

An Italian job: the need for collective wage bargaining reform. Bruegel Policy Brief ISSUE 2016/11 - JULY 2016

Highlights: Since the mid-1990s, Italy has been characterised by a lack of labour productivity growth, combinedwith a 60 percent growth in labour costs, 20 percentage points above euro-area average consumer price growth. As a consequence, Italy has become less competitive compared to its euro-area partners, the profitability of its firms has dropped and real GDP-per-capita has flatlined. • At the root of the substantial discrepancy between wages and productivity is Italy’s system of centralised wage bargaining which, in many ways, is designed without regard for the underlying industrial structure and geographical heterogeneity of the Italian economy.This has fostered perverse incentives and imbalances within Italy. • Collective wage bargaining, and in particular the determination of base salaries, should be moved from the national to the regional level for all contracts, in the public and private sectors.The Mezzogiorno,which might superficially be seen as losing out from this policy, would actually gain the most in competitiveness terms. • Furthermore, measures should be taken so that, in the long run, the Italian industrial structure evolves into a less fragmented small-company-based economy. This firm consolidation would likely expand the use of firm-level agreements and performance payments, and would improve Italy’s productivity and competitiveness overall.

A sovereign wealth fund to lift Germany's curse of excess savings. CEPS Policy Brief No. 280, 28 August 2012

As an alternative to the present system of intermediation of the German savings surplus, this paper suggests that the risk-adjusted rate of return could be improved by creating a sovereign wealth fund for Germany (designated DESWF), which could invest excess German savings globally. Such a DESWF would offer German savers a secure vehicle paying a guaranteed positive minimum real interest rate, with a top-up when real investment returns allowed. The vehicle would invest the funds in a portfolio that is highly diversified by geography and asset classes. Positive real returns can be expected in the long run based on positive real global growth. Since, in this case, a significant amount of funds would flow outside the euro area, the euro would depreciate, which would help crisis countries presently struggling to revive growth through exports and to close their external deficits so as to recoup their international credit-worthiness. Target imbalances would gradually disappear and German claims abroad would move from nominal claims on the ECB to diversified real and nominal claims on various private and public foreign entities in a variety of asset classes.

The euro area's tightrope walk: debt and competitiveness in Italy and Spain. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/11, September 2013

Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

The Legacy of Austerity in the Eurozone. CEPS Commentary, 4 October 2013

The recent slight improvement in the GDP growth rates in the eurozone has led European policy-makers to proclaim victory and assert that the austerity programmes imposed within the eurozone are paying off. But is this really the case? In this Commentary Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji argue that the improvement in the eurozone business cycle is the result of the ECB’s announcement of its Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) programme, and that austerity has left a legacy of unsustainable debt that will test the political resilience of the debtor countries.

The transformation of agriculture in Ukraine: From collective farms to agroholdings. OSW Commentary No. 127, 06.02.2014

In recent years, Ukraine’s agriculture has been consistently improving and has been the only part of the country’s economy to buck the recession. According to preliminary estimates, in 2013 agricultural production increased by 13.7% - in contrast to a 4.7% decline in the industrial sector. According to official statistics, Ukraine’s industrial production was up 40% in the final months of 2013 when compared to the same period of 2012. This translated into an unexpected gain in fourth-quarter GDP growth (+3.7%) and prevented an annual drop in GDP. Crop production, and particularly the production of grain, hit a record high: in 2013, Ukraine produced 63 million tonnes of grain, outperforming its best ever harvest of 2011 (56.7 million tonnes). The value of Ukraine’s agricultural and food exports increased from US$4.3 billion in 2005 to US$17.9 billion in 2012, and currently accounts for a quarter of Ukraine’s total exports. Economic forecasts suggest that in the current marketing year (July 2013 - June 2014) Ukraine will sell more than 30 million tonnes of grain to foreign markets, making it the world’s second biggest grain exporter, after the United States.

Can Policy Make Us Happier? Individual characteristics socioeconomic factors, and life satisfaction in Central and Eastern Europe. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 22/November 2011

In the last decade, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have witnessed a rapid economic convergence vis-à-vis Western Europe. However, this rapid growth has not been matched by a similarly rapid increase in life satisfaction, which has remained low in the European context. This paper sets out to address this conundrum, by looking at the individual and macro-level determinants of individual life satisfaction in ten CEE countries. The results highlight that while Central and Eastern Europeans share the same individual determinants of happiness as people in the West (despite some significant cross-country variation), macroeconomic and institutional differences are the key factors behind the lack of convergence in life satisfaction. On the macroeconomic side, GDP growth is still a source of increasing well-being, but the happiness bonus associated with it is becoming smaller. The different levels of individual happiness in CEE are therefore mostly determined by institutional factors such as corruption, government spending and decentralisation, making policies aimed at enhancing institutional quality capable of bringing about substantial improvements in the overall life satisfaction of the people in the region.

EMU Convergence: Reason for Encouragement. ACES Working Paper (Report) No. 6, 2007

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether convergence is actually occurring within Europe, which groups of countries are converging, and the macroeconomic indicators for which such convergence is apparent. Free trade and a single currency should lead to convergence in rates of inflation, but perhaps not in unemployment rates or in GDP growth. These latter aspects of economic performance are politically important, because the voters become decidedly displeased if unemployment is high and growth slow, as has been the case in France, Germany, and Italy during recent years.

Getting the most from public R&D spending in times of budgetary austerity. Bruegel Working Paper 2016/01, February 2016

This working paper reviews the evidence on the impact of public R&D spending. The authors first look at the evidence from micro-analysis of the impact of public intervention on private R&D and innovation, with a focus on the latest results from crosscountry micro-research performed within SIMPATIC. To analyse the impact of public R&D on growth, the micro-results on private R&D investment effects are complemented with a macro-perspective. To this end, the authors look at how public R&D performs in affecting GDP growth and jobs in applied macro-models most commonly used in EU policy analysis. They focus particularly on the NEMESIS model in development within the SIMPATIC project. The authors conclude with some policy recommendations from the reviewed micro and macro SIMPATIC evidence for designing public R&D projects and programmes.

Europe’s Sustainability Strategy - A Casualty of the Euro Crisis or an Ambitious Restart?. Policy Brief #2013/06

Europe’s economy should not just grow, it should also target social inclusion and the responsible use of resources. The goal of sustainability may be embedded in the Treaty on European Union and the EU’s economic strategies, but the emphasis on GDP growth and competitiveness in battling the crisis threatens to undermine efforts to establish a common approach for sustainable economic activity. This may be unavoidable during an acute crisis. But in the long term, the EU must show the way forward.

Europe's Sustainability Strategy - A Casualty of the Euro Crisis or an Ambition Restart? Bertelsmann Policy Brief #2013/06, 30.11.2013

Europe’s economy should not just grow, it should also target social inclusion and the responsible use of resources. The goal of sustainability may be embedded in the Treaty on European Union and the EU’s economic strategies, but the emphasis on GDP growth and competitiveness in battling the crisis threatens to undermine efforts to establish a common approach for sustainable economic activity. This may be unavoidable during an acute crisis. But in the long term, the EU must show the way forward.