5 resultados para quality requirements

em Archive of European Integration


Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the common organization of the market in wine; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) laying down special provisions relating to quality wines produced in specified regions; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) laying down general rules for fixing the reference price and levying the countervailing charge for wine; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) defining certain products falling within headings Nos 20.07, 22.04 and 22.05 of the Common Customs Tariff and originating in non-member countries; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on general rules for the classification of vine varieties; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) concerning the addition of alcohol to products in the wine sector; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) laying down general rules for the description and presentation of wines and grape musts; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on sparkling wines produced in the Community and defined in item 13 of Annex II to Regulation (EEC) No --- ; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on measures designed to adjust wine-growing potential to market requirements; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the granting of a conversion premium in the wine sector; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) laying down general rules for the import of wines, grape juice and grape must; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) laying down general rules governing the distillation of wines provided for in Articles 11,12, 39 and 40 of Regulation (EEC) (submitted to the Council by the Commission). COM (78) 387 final, 2 October 1979

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In this paper the authors construct a theory about how the expansion of higher education could be associated with several factors that indicate a decline in the quality of degrees. They assume that the expansion of tertiary education takes place through three channels, and show how these channels are likely to reduce average study time, lower academic requirements and average wages, and inflate grades. First, universities have an incentive to increase their student body through public and private funding schemes beyond a level at which they can keep their academic requirements high. Second, due to skill-biased technological change, employers have an incentive to recruit staff with a higher education degree. Third, students have an incentive to acquire a college degree due to employers’ preferences for such qualifications; the university application procedures; and through the growing social value placed on education. The authors develop a parsimonious dynamic model in which a student, a college and an employer repeatedly make decisions about requirement levels, performance and wage levels. Their model shows that if i) universities have the incentive to decrease entrance requirements, ii) employers are more likely to employ staff with a higher education degree and iii) all types of students enrol in colleges, the final grade will not necessarily induce weaker students to study more to catch up with more able students. In order to re-establish a quality-guarantee mechanism, entrance requirements should be set at a higher level.