La disoccupazione giovanile in tempo di crisi: un monito all’Europa (continentale) per rifondare il diritto del lavoro? = Youth Unemployment in Recessionary Times: a Caveat to (Continental) Europe to Reconstruct its Labour Law. WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT - 91/2012

The current debate taking place in continental Europe on the need to reform labour law to reduce the duality between labour market insiders and outsiders, thus giving new employment opportunities to young people seems to be, at its best, a consequence of the crisis, or at its worst, an excuse. The considerable emphasis placed on the power of legislation to reduce youth unemployment prevents real labour market problems from being clearly identified, thus reducing the scope to adopt more effective measures. Action is certainly required to help young people during the current crisis, yet interventions should not be exclusively directed towards increased flexibility and deregulation. This paper questions the “thaumaturgic power” wrongly attributed to legislative interventions and put forward a more holistic approach to solve the problem of youth employment, by focusing on the education systems, school-to-work transition and industrial relations. As a comparative analysis demonstrates, in order to effectively tackle the issue of youth employment, it is not enough to reform labour law. High quality education systems, apprenticeship schemes, efficient placement and employment services, cooperative industrial relations and flexible wage determination mechanisms are the key to success when it comes to youth employment, not only in times of recession.

European Policy Uses of International Comparisons of Academic Achievement. ACES Working Papers, 2012

International large-scale assessments (ILSAs) and the resulting ranking of countries in key academic subjects have become increasingly significant in the development of global performance indicators and national level reforms in education. As one of the largest international surveys, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) has had a considerable impact on the world of international comparisons of education. Based on the results of these assessments, claims are often made about the relative success or failure of education systems, and in some cases, such as Germany or Japan, ILSAs have sparked national level reforms (Ertl, 2006; Takayama, 2007, 2009). In this paper, I offer an analysis of how PISA is increasingly used as a key reference both for a regional2 entity like the European Union (EU) and for national level performance targets in the example of Spain (Breakspear, 2012). Specifically, the paper examines the growth of OECD and EU initiatives in defining quality education, and the use of both EU benchmarks and PISA in defining the education indicators used in Spain to measure and set goals for developing quality education. By doing so, this paper points to the role of the OECD and the EU in national education systems. It therefore adds to a body of literature pointing to the complex relationship between international, regional, and national education policy spaces (cf. Dale & Robertson, 2002; Lawn & Grek, 2012; Rizvi & Lingard, 2009).

Does the growth in higher education mean a decline in the quality of degrees? CEPS Working Document No. 405/March 2015

In this paper the authors construct a theory about how the expansion of higher education could be associated with several factors that indicate a decline in the quality of degrees. They assume that the expansion of tertiary education takes place through three channels, and show how these channels are likely to reduce average study time, lower academic requirements and average wages, and inflate grades. First, universities have an incentive to increase their student body through public and private funding schemes beyond a level at which they can keep their academic requirements high. Second, due to skill-biased technological change, employers have an incentive to recruit staff with a higher education degree. Third, students have an incentive to acquire a college degree due to employers’ preferences for such qualifications; the university application procedures; and through the growing social value placed on education. The authors develop a parsimonious dynamic model in which a student, a college and an employer repeatedly make decisions about requirement levels, performance and wage levels. Their model shows that if i) universities have the incentive to decrease entrance requirements, ii) employers are more likely to employ staff with a higher education degree and iii) all types of students enrol in colleges, the final grade will not necessarily induce weaker students to study more to catch up with more able students. In order to re-establish a quality-guarantee mechanism, entrance requirements should be set at a higher level.