The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

The roots of economic challenges facing Egypt in the aftermath of the 25th January revolution. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 9/2014

Introduction. Since the 25th of January 2011 revolution the Egyptian economy has been suffering on all fronts. Almost all the economic indicators have been pointing towards a deteriorating situation, and in many cases have reached the trough. Yet, the economy is still surviving. This is mainly due to the unprecedented support of some of Arab Gulf countries, whose unconditional aid has helped to mitigate the deteriorating economic conditions. The economic challenges facing Egypt have been exacerbated after the 20th of January revolution mainly because of the deteriorating political and security conditions which have interrupted the functioning of the economy. Yet, this is not to say that revolution has caused these challenges. In fact, the challenges that the Egyptian has been facing have deep roots in its socio-political-economic context, which this paper aims to explain. The revolution and its aftermath have brought to the forefront challenges which have always been mitigated by short-term solutions that never dealt seriously with their roots. Moreover, the revolution has brought additional problems associated with the macroeconomic imbalances. As a result, the challenges became more complex especially in light of the need to balance the social and economic aspects. The paper proceeds as follows; in section one we pinpoint the main challenges faced by Egypt where we identify the symptoms and causes of such challenges. In section two we discuss the roots of such challenges. Finally, we conclude and provide our understanding of how Egypt is expected to face its challenges in the near future.

Is the "Dubai model" a new paradigm for growth and investment strategies for oil-based economies? Case study: Eurasia. ACES Working Papers No. 8, 2008

The first part of the paper addresses the theoretical background of economic growth and competitive advantage models. Although there is a whole set of research on a relationship between foreign direct investments and economic growth, little has been said on foreign direct investments and national competitive advantage with respect to economic growth of oil and gas abundant countries of Middle East and Central Asia. The second part of our paper introduces the framework of the so-called "Dubai Model" in detail and outlines the key components necessary to develop sustainable comparative advantage for the oil-rich economies. The third part proceeds with the methodology employed to measure the success of the "Dubai Model" in the UAE and in application to other regions. The last part brings the results and investigates the degree to which other oil and gas countries in the region (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran) have adopted the so-called "Dubai Model". It also examines if the Dubai Model is being employed in the Eurasian (Central Asian) oil and gas regions of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The objective is to gauge if the Eurasian economies are employing the traditional growth strategies of oil-rich non-OECD countries in managing their natural resources or are they adopting the newer non-traditional model of economic growth, such as the "Dubai Model."

Restoring Order in Global Health Governance: Do Metagovernance Norms Affect Interorganizational Convergence? CES Open Forum Series #23, 2014-2015

This paper theorizes about the convergence of international organizations in global health governance, a field of international cooperation that is commonly portrayed as particularly hit by institutional fragmentation. Unlike existing theories on interorganizationalism that have mainly looked to intra- and extraorganizational factors in order to explain why international organizations cooperate with each other in the first place, the paper is interested in the link between causes and systemic effects of interorganizational convergence. The paper begins by defining interorganizational convergence. It then proceeds to discuss why conventional theories on interorganizational- ism fail to explain the aggregate effects of convergence between IOs in global (health) governance which tend to worsen rather than cushion fragmentation — so-called "hypercollective action" (Severino & Ray 2010). In order to remedy this explanatory blind-spot the paper formulates an alternative sociological institutionalist theory on interorganizational convergence that makes two core theoretical propositions: first that emerging norms of metagovernance are a powerful driver behind interorganizational convergence in global health governance, and secondly that IOs are engaged in a fierce meaning-struggle over these norms which results in hypercollective action. In its empirical part, the paper’s core theoretical propositions are corroborated by analyzing discourses and practices of interorganizational convergence in global health. The empirical analysis allows drawing two far-reaching conclusions. On the one hand, interorganizational harmonization has emerged as a largely undisputed norm in global health which has been translated into ever more institutionalized forms of interorganizational cooperation. On the other, discourses and practices of interorganizational harmonization exhibit conflicts over the ordering principles according to which the policies and actions of international organizations with overlapping mandates and missions should be harmonized. In combination, these two empirical findings explain why interorganizational convergence has so far failed to strengthen the global health architecture.

Who profits most from globalization? Policy Brief #2014/01

Globalization, understood as the economic, political and social interconnection of countries, leads to increased economic growth. On average, the more a country proceeds its interconnection with the rest of the world, the greater its economic growth will be. If real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is chosen as the reference index for the economic benefits of globalization, Finland can point to the largest gain from globalization from 1990 to 2011. Ranked according to this perspective, Germany holds fourth place out of a total of 42 economies evaluated.