Bundeswehr 3.0: The political, military and social dimensions of the reform of the German armed forces. OSW Point of View Number 28, May 2012

This reform of the Bundeswehr, launched in 2011, is the latest of the three decisive stages in the post-war transformation of the German armed forces. The reform aims at “constructing” the armed forces anew in the political, military and social dimensions.The present paper presents the evolution of the role of the armed forces in German foreign and security policy and the ongoing process of “constructing” a new Bundeswehr. It analyses the process of redefining the objectives and principles of: the Bundeswehr’s participation in international operations, its current military transformation, and changes in its image and social identity. It also presents the implications of this broader transformation for political and military.

MODEL COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS. Is Turkey a Model for State-Building in the Arab World? Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 10/2014

This study analyzes the Turkish case as a model country for the state-building processes in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab revolts that took place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. To this end, it deals with the Turkish case in three phases: the founding of the Turkish Republic, political developments until 2002, and the post-2002 Justice and Development Party period. The study focuses on state-society relations manifested in the form of a secular-religious cleavage intertwined with problematic civil-military relations. Each phase of Turkey’s history is compared to cleavages and civil-military relations in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. After analyzing the constitution-making processes in the latter three countries following the Arab revolts, the study concludes by discussing the viability of the Turkish model in the light of Turkey’s search for a new constitution.

Closing the gap? Military co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. OSW Report, December 2012

The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.

Belarus-Russia: Whither Integration? OSW Point of View (unspecified), May 2003

Of the re-integration processes currently taking place in the former Soviet Union, the formation of a Russian-Belarusian so-called 'Union State' is one of the most advanced. A customs union was formally announced between the two countries as early as 1995 and the process of constructing the Union State itself was launched in December 1999. However, both events were largely driven by the perceived need to match societal demands, without much concrete action and the Union State remained largely 'virtual'. Only in the last few years has the Russian initiative allowed for moving from symbolic gestures to political action and since late 2002 debate and policy have intensified on specific issues of economic and political co-operation. However, despite such advances in the integration process, its objectives remain vague and there is little or no agreement on the principles that should govern the process. Furthermore, current bilateral relations questions still dominate the dialogue. The project seems at present to be driven mainly by the political interests of both countries' presidents and also, to a lesser extent, by the interests of business, political, military and security elites, each apparently motivated by self- and group-interest in the emerging dialogue of integration. In contrast to EU integration, the societies of the two countries involved appear to have had little or no say in the process. Thus, several questions naturally arise. What is the real nature of such integration? What motivates the parties involved? What stage has the process reached? What likely future course will it take? What might be the consequences of it for Belarusian independence? Answers to these questions should ultimately determine the stance and policies of the enlarged EU in this area.

The current state, problems and future of Germany's air and missile defence. OSW Commentary No. 105, 2013-04-10

From German point of view, air and missile defence systems are of little relevance for the protection of Germany’s territory. However, they are seen as important for conducting ‘out of area’ operations, providing military assistance to allies, and for Germany’s political and military- technical position within NATO. The Bundeswehr has been modernising its air and missile defence systems for several years. The modernisation of very short-range and short-range systems is slightly behind schedule. Plans to modernise the medium-range air and missile defence have been encountering problems since the United States decided to refrain from buying the jointly developed MEADS system. Therefore Germany is currently considering using the results of the MEADS program in the development of its own medium-range air and missile defence system, possibly in co-operation with France and Italy. Such a system would ensure protection against short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1000 km) and might become part of NATO’s ballistic missile defence, replacing the Patriot batteries which Germany is currently operating. Furthermore, Germany could expand its involvement in NATO’s ballistic missile defence in the future by buying or developing system to intercept medium- and intermediate- range ballistic missiles (up to 3000 km and 5500 km). The final decision on this matter has not yet been taken, and will be left for the successive governments of Germany to resolve. It will depend on a number of political, military and financial factors.

A weak link? Germany in the Euro-Atlantic security system. OSW Point of View Number 47, January 2015

The political, military and economic parameters of German power influence the vision of the international order that Berlin favours. Politically, Germany is a regional power in the EU with considerable diplomatic potential. Economically, it is the world's third largest power with growing global trade and investment links. At the same time, Germany's military potential is limited and the German strategic culture makes the country sceptical about the use of military instruments. Berlin is thus essentially interested in maintaining peace and stability, both in Europe and globally, and in developing diplomatic mechanisms to manage regional and global crises and conflicts. The German preference for dialogue and compromise in conflict situations in the regional and global dimensions may increasingly pose a risk to maintaining the cohesion and credibility of NATO – both from the perspective of the USA and Germany’s allies from Central-Eastern and Northern Europe.

NATO’s presence in the Baltic states – reassurance of allies or deterrence for Russia? OSW COMMENTARY Number 169, 29.04.2015 2015-04-29

In late March and early April, the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) held an exercise in Estonia, during which US F-16s destroyed ground targets in an Estonian firing range. Around the same time the Americans held a drill with the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces over the Baltic Sea. The United States has been playing a leading role in the process of strengthening NATO’s presence in the Baltic states. As far as the Western European allies are concerned, Germany will follow in the footsteps of Denmark and the United Kingdom, both of which made significant military contributions to the strengthening of the allied presence in 2014, and will deploy the largest number of troops in 2015. Non-aligned Sweden and Finland, key for the performance of NATO operations in the Baltic states, have been emphasising their military and political readiness to co-operate with NATO in the event of potential crises or conflicts. Comparing NATO ‘s military presence in the Baltic states before and after the outbreak of the Russian intervention in Ukraine, it is clear that NATO has stepped up its engagement considerably. However, its scope is still relatively small, given the much larger military potential and mobilisation capacity of Russia. Moreover, the message sent by NATO’s actions may be diminished by the political, military and financial constraints faced by the allies and Sweden and Finland. It seems that the greatest risk to the military security of the Baltic states currently appears to be the possibility that Russia could wrongly assess the reliability of NATO’s security guarantees.

Russia's interest in the Mistral: the political and military aspects. OSW Commentary No. 41, 2010-10-11

The negotiations over Russia’s purchase of French Mistral-class multipurpose assault ships, which were intensified in 2010, have gained a significant political dimension. The prospects of such a spectacular acquisition of large and expensive assault ships from one of NATO’s member states are being used by Russia to demonstrate that it has opened a new stage of relations with Western Europe. Paris has welcomed Russia’s desire to embark on military cooperation; for France, the Mistral deal has become a convenient tool to prove that relations with Russia are becoming increasingly normal, and that Russia poses no threat to the European security.

The International Conference Education and Creativity for a Knowledge–based Society – Social and Political Scinces, Communication, Foreign Languages and Public Relations. Vienna, Osterreichish Rumanischer Akademischer Verein, 2012. VIth edition

No abstract.