Do Institutional Changes Make a Difference? A veto player analysis of how institutional changes in the Council of the EU influence legislative efficiency and outputs. Brugges Political Research Paper No. 31, October 2013

A driving argument behind recent EU treaty reforms was that more qualified majority voting (QMV) was required to reduce the potential dangers of legislative paralysis caused by enlargement. Whilst existing literature on enlargement mostly focuses on the question of what changed in the legislative process after the 2004 enlargement, the question of why these changes occurred has been given far less attention. Through the use of a single veto player theoretical model, this paper seeks to test and explain whether enlargement reduces the efficiency of the legislative process and alters the type of legislation produced, and whether QMV can compensate for these effects. In doing this, it offers a theoretical explanation as to why institutional changes that alter the level of cohesion between actors in the Council have an influence over both the legislative process and its outcomes.

Society – the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? Bertelsmann Policy Brief, 17.02.2014

This study is first in a series of policy briefs on Europe and its neighbours in the east and south. In this series we will publish papers commissioned or produced by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in the framework of its work in this field. This policy brief is the product of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s cooperation with the Warsaw-based Institute of Public Affairs. The text was completed on 17 of February 2014.