Is Withdrawal from the European Union a Manageable Option? A Review of Economic and Legal Complexities. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 28/2013

Withdrawal from the EU is no more a taboo subject. However, the process by which it can happen is unclear and potentially complex. The purpose of this paper is to show that a withdrawing Member State will not only rid itself from the constraints and obligations of EU rules, but it will also have to re-invent many policies and institutions to fill the gap left by the non-application of EU rules. The paper examines closely the case of the UK and Scotland and concludes that outright exit is not the best option for a withdrawing Member State. The best, but possibly the least feasible, option is an intermediate arrangement falling between full membership and complete separation from the EU. The exact position between the two extremes can only be determined by the exit negotiations and will be influenced by the political climate that will prevail at that time. While the final destination of an acceding country is well known [full adoption of the obligations of EU membership], the exiting country will be embarking on a trip with unknown destination and full of surprises.

The EU power sector needs long-term price signals. CEPS Special Report No. 135/April 2016

By 2030, half of the EU’s electricity demand will be covered by renewables and will need to be accompanied by flexible conventional back-up resources. Due to the high upfront costs inherent to renewables and the progressively lower running times associated with back-up capacity, the cost of capital will have a proportionately greater impact on total costs than today. This report examines how electricity markets can be designed to provide long-term price signals, thereby reducing the cost of capital for these technologies and allowing for a more efficient transition. It finds that current market arrangements are unable to provide long-term price signals. To address this issue, we argue that a system for long-term contracts with a regulated counterparty could be implemented. A centralised system where capacity or energy or a combination of both is contracted, could be introduced for conventional and renewable capacity, based on a regional adequacy assessment and with a competitive bidding system in place to ensure cost-effectiveness. Member states face a number of legislative barriers while implementing these types of systems, however, which could be reduced by merging legislation and setting EU framework rules for the design of these contractual agreements.