Helping Moldova stay on the EU course. Proposals for a real 'more for more' approach. EPC Policy Brief, 11 December 2013

At the Vilnius Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit in November, Moldova initialled its Association Agreement including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU and became the first EaP country to meet all the requirements of their Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. 2014 may prove to be a make or break year for Moldova, with Chisinau facing a number of serious challenges. From the EU’s point of view, it could also prove to be a make or break year for the Eastern Partnership. The period following Vilnius should be a soul-searching time for the EU. Of the three pillars (AA, DCFTA, visa regime) of the Eastern Partnership, two are now being openly challenged by Russia. While the EU should not engage in a populist competition with Russia, it does need to adapt its actions to the realities on the ground. In this Policy Brief, Cristian Ghinea, Amanda Paul and Victor Chirila argue that the EU should work for greater visibility, better public diplomacy and deliver visible, tangible benefits to the Moldovan population as rapidly as possible. Not only will this help counter Russian activities, but it will also help shore up support for pro-EU reformers in the country.

The long-term EU budget: size or flexibility? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/20, November 2012

The EU is in the process of negotiating its 2014-20 financial framework. Failure to reach an agreement would imply a delay in the preparation of the strategic plans each member state puts together to explain how it will use Structural and Cohesion Funds. Even if solutions are found – for example annual renewals of the budget based on the previous year's figures – there will be political and institutional costs. EU leaders have too often and too forcefully advocated the use of the EU budget for growth to be able to drop the idea without consequences. • The overwhelming attention paid to the size of the budget is misplaced. EU leaders should instead aim to make the EU budget more flexible, safeguard it from future political power struggles, and reinforce assessment of the impact of EU funded growth policies. • To improve flexibility a commitment device should be created that places the EU budget above continuous political disagreement. We suggest the creation of a European Growth Fund, on the basis of which the European Commission should be allowed to borrow on capital markets to anticipate pre-allocated EU expenditure, such as Structural and Cohesion Funds. Markets would thus be a factor in EU budget policymaking, with a potentially disciplining effect. Attaching conditionality to this type of disbursement appears legitimate, as capital delivered in this way is a form of assistance.

Making or Breaking the Republic of Moldova? The Autonomy of Gagauzia. EDAP 02/2013

This article describes the process of self-determination and the creation of a territorial autonomy of the Gagauz people in the Republic of Moldova. It also analyses the situation in the autonomy after the change of government in Chisinau in 2009 and evaluates the current status of accommodation of the Gagauz’ interests in the country. Aspects of state-building and the influence of external actors are explored as well. Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) is one of the first post-Soviet autonomies. Since its establishment in 1994, no violent conflict has taken place there. However, the Gagauz language and culture remain relatively unprotected, and incentives as well as support for the integration of the Gagauz are low. The article outlines the potential for future disputes between the central government and local authorities, due to continuous attempts to limit Gagauzia’s self-governance and conflicting interpretations of how the autonomy should work. Furthermore, struggles between Gagauz political leaders and other local realities hamper the successful realization of Gagauz Yeri. With respect to Moldova’s efforts to resolve the Transnistrian conflict and to integrate with the European Union, compromises and cooperation through an ongoing dialogue between the centre and autonomy are clearly due. Resolving the remaining stumbling blocks could make Gagauzia a living, rather than symbolic autonomy.

Programming EU External Action Post-Lisbon: New Opportunities or Business as Usual?

Over 90% of the external relations budget of the EU is processed through its external financial instruments. With the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the new European External Action Service (EEAS), the institutional architecture of these instruments was significantly reformed. This contribution analyses strategic programming both pre- and post-Lisbon, identifies ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and examines the potential of the new provisions to increase the coherence of EU external action. The examination shows that the instruments can be categorised into three groupings: ‘the big three’ comprising the bulk of funding characterised by joint programming and responsibilities; the ‘Commission-only’ instruments where all powers remain with the Commission; and the ‘EEAS-led rest’ in which the High Representative and the EEAS play a strong role but only have limited financial resources available. The new system calls for strong coordination of all involved actors in order to make it work. Findings of a case study on the Instrument for Stability reveal, however, that so far the establishment of the EEAS has not made a substantial impact on strategic programming in its first two years.

To Be or Not to Be a Normative Power: The EU’s Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in Russia. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 2/2013

The ‘Normative Power Europe’ debate has been a leitmotif in the academic discourse for over a decade. Far from being obsolete, the topic is as relevant as when the term was first coined by Ian Manners in 2002.1 ‘To be or not to be a normative power’ is certainly one of the existential dilemmas in the foreign policy of the European Union. This paper, however, intends to move beyond the black-and-white debate on whether the European Union is a normative power and to make it more nuanced by examining the factors that make it such. Contrary to the conventional perception that the European Union is a necessarily ‘benign’ force in the world, it assumes that it has aspirations to be a viable international actor. Consequently, it pursues different types of foreign policy behaviour with a varying degree of normativity in them. The paper addresses the question of under what conditions the European Union is a ‘normative power’. The findings of the study demonstrate that the ‘normative power’ of the European Union is conditioned upon internal and external elements, engaged in a complex interaction with a decisive role played by the often neglected external elements.

The Treaty of Lisbon or intergovernmental temptation?

From the Introduction. This question goes to the very heart of the European project: it is fundamental for the future of the European Union and its role in the world. The Treaty of Lisbon emerged from the ashes of the European Constitution. Driven forward by Angela Merkel, as President of the European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy and José Manuel Barroso, the main advances made in the Constitution were preserved at the expense of a few concessions and symbolic sacrifices in order to make the Union more effective and more democratic.

Brexit or not? Time for the EU to move. EPC Commentary, 8 September 2014

The deteriorating relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and the rest of the EU, including the prospect of a referendum on EU membership, would have dominated the Union’s agenda had it not been for the economic/financial crisis, followed by the external crisis which we are now facing in the East. Precisely because of these crises, it is now time for the incoming European Commission to take the bull by the horns and ensure that the EU can move on from a potential referendum and its possible outcomes. The June European Council noted that “the UK raised some concerns related to the future development of the EU. These concerns will need to be addressed. In this context, the European Council noted that the concept of ever closer union allows for different paths of integration for different countries, allowing those that want to deepen integration to move ahead, while respecting the wish of those who do not want to deepen any further.” While the EU has, arguably, successfully developed at different speeds for decades, to address the UK’s (fundamental) concerns, it is now time to work out whether and how the UK can be accommodated, and what this would mean in practice. UK membership is desirable but not at any price, so the aim should be to keep the UK in, while also ensuring that the principles on which the EU is built are protected. There will need to be a modus operandi which enables the EU and in particular, the Eurozone, to continue to make progress in addressing the shortcomings of European integration and European Monetary Union (EMU) in particular, while at the same time offering a reform package that can satisfy the UK. This does not necessarily mean that all EMU reforms have to be within the EU framework: additional intergovernmental arrangements could also be a possibility. However, this could add to the complexity and inefficiency of the system, as well as sidelining the supranational element of EU governance which will be needed to make EMU function.

Humanitarian Visas: Option or obligation?. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 68, 27 October 2014

Third-country nationals seeking protection have no EU-wide legal channels at present for entering EU territory and triggering protection mechanisms under the Common European Asylum System. As a result, many embark on hazardous journeys, with concomitant risks and loss of human life. The absence of ‘protection-sensitive’ mechanisms for accessing EU territory, along with EU external and extraterritorial border and migration management and control, undermine Member States' refugee and human rights obligations. Humanitarian visas may offer a remedy in this regard by enabling third-country nationals to apply in situ for entry to EU territory on humanitarian grounds or because of international obligations. This study asks whether the existing Visa Code actually obliges Member States to issue humanitarian visas. It also examines past implementation of humanitarian visa schemes by Member States and considers whether more could be done to encourage them to make use of existing provisions in EU law. Finally, with a Commission proposal for Visa Code reform on the table, it asks whether there is now an opportunity to lay down clear rules for humanitarian visa schemes.

Gazprom's expansion in the EU - co-operation or domination? OSW Report, April 2008

The energy sector, especially with regard to natural gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the character of this co-operation has given rise to increasing doubts both in Brussels and among the EU member states. The questions have emerged whether this co-operation does not make the EU excessively dependent on Russian energy supplies, and whether Gazprom's presence in the EU will not allow Moscow to interfere in the proces of devising the EU energy policy. This report is intended to present the factual base and data necessary to provide accurate answers to the foregoing questions. The first part of the report presents the scope and character of Gazprom's economic presence in the EU member states. The second part shows the presence of the EU investors in Russia. The data presented has been provided by the International Energy Agency, European Commission, the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. Some of the data is the result of calculations made by the Centre for Eastern Studies' experts who were basing on the data provided by energy companies, the specialist press and news agencies.

Die Europäische Union und das Rahmenübereinkommen zum Schutz nationaler Minderheiten: ignorieren, parallell “umsetzen“ oder gar beitreten? = The European Union and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: ignore, "implement" or even join? EDAP Paper 04/2014

This paper looks at the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) through the lense of European Union law. It does so by posing four major questions: does the fact that 24 of 28 Member States of the EU ratified the FCNM have any legal implications for the European Union itself? Secondly, turning to the national level, does it make a difference for the implementation of the FCNM whether or not a state that has ratified the FCNM is also a member to the European Union? Thirdly, returning to the European Union itself, can and should the EU accede to the FCNM? Or are there, finally, any means beside ratification that would allow the European Union to implement the objectives and obligations as enshrined in the FCNM? These four questions are analysed in detail before the paper concludes on the potential role of the European Union in managing diversity and protecting (persons belonging to) minorities.

Kyiv's gas strategy: closer cooperation with Gazprom or a genuine diversification. OSW Commentary No. 110, 2013-07-16

In recent months Kyiv has been intensifying its efforts to diversify Ukraine’s gas supply routes with a view to reducing the country’s dependence on imports from Russia. One of the steps which Kyiv has taken has been to make the unprecedented decision to start importing gas from its Western neighbours. In November 2012, Ukraine’s state-owned Naftogaz began importing gas through Poland under a two-month contract with RWE (the imports continued into 2013 under a separate deal), while in the spring of 2013 Ukraine started importing gas from Hungary. Kyiv is also currently looking into the possibility of purchasing gas from Slovakia. Furthermore, since 2010 the Ukrainian government has been working on the construction of an LNG terminal near Odesa. The authorities have declared that this will allow Ukraine to import up to 5 billion m3 of LNG a year by 2015. The government has also taken measures to increase domestic production, including from non-traditional sources, and it plans to replace gas-based with coal-based technologies in local power stations. Finally, in January 2013, the government signed a 50-year production sharing agreement with Shell. This paves the way for the development of Ukraine’s shale gas deposits.

Lukashenka has to choose: reforms or concessions to Russia. OSW Commentary No. 42, 2010-10-27

The most serious crisis in the history of Russian-Belarusian relations has been taking place over the past few months. In 2007 Russia started the process of depriving Belarus of subsidies in the form of supplies of fuels at low prices, which have for more than a decade guaranteed the stability of the Belarusian economic model, and is continuing this process now at an accelerated rate. At the same time, the Russian media started attacks on Alyaksandr Lukashenka from the middle of this year. This toughening up of Russia’s measures indicates that the Kremlin is determined to implement its goals regarding Belarus, including first of all taking over its strategic economic assets, which would result in a significant weakening of Lukashenka’s position. The Belarusian government has been consistently avoiding meeting Russian demands, while at the same time insisting on the reinstatement of preferential conditions of co-operation. If the Belarusian leader continues resisting Russian demands, the crisis in Russian- -Belarusian relations will be aggravated, and a conflict over energy issues around the turn of 2011 cannot be ruled out. The reduction in preferences offered by Russia in the energy sector has significantly impaired the condition of the Belarusian economy, and may lead to its breakdown in a year or two. As his country comes under increasing pressure from Russia, Alyaksandr Lukashenka will soon have to make a strategic choice between yielding to the Kremlin’s demands and embarking upon an at least partial restructuring of the economy.

Macroeconomic Conditionality in Cohesion Policy: Added Value or Unnecessary Burden? European Policy Brief No. 13, November 2012

Macroeconomic conditionality has become one of the major elements in discussions on the future of EU cohesion policy. Such conditional-ity would make the cohesion budget dependent on EU economic governance rules. This would have advantages for economic governance and, to a lesser extent, the efficiency of cohesion policy and the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations. Yet, conditionality also risks entailing serious disadvantages for the end beneficiaries and cohesion policy itself. If the EU decides to put macroeconomic conditionality in place, it needs to reconsider the design and agree on an ample cohesion budget.

spotlight europe #2015/03 — August 2015: Money or Democracy? Greece and the Euro Dilemma

The negotiations on the third bailout package for Greece are still going on, but the euro area has already paid a high price for it. The compromise on which it is based is clearly very controversial. Some of its critics believe that it does not make sense in economic terms, whereas others point out that it may have an adverse political effect. But what in fact is Greece actually supposed to be doing, and what does all this mean with regard to sovereignty and democracy?

Brexit: a new beginning for the EU or the beginning of the end? EPC Commentary, 24 June 2016

Despite all the evidence presented by a range of respected figures and institutions, and the paucity of the arguments on the Brexit side, which failed to set out the alternative to EU membership, the emotional appeal for ‘independence’ has won. This is a bad day for Europe. The Bremain campaign has not connected with enough voters, with the perceived need to limit migration, the wish to make decisions independent of the EU and a vote against ‘the establishment’ all seemingly playing a role.