The New EU Foreign Policy Architecture: Reviewing the first two years of the EEAS. CEPS Paperbacks. February 2013

This CEPS book examines two interrelated questions: 1) How has the European External Action Service (EEAS) functioned in the EU institutional architecture in the first two years of its existence? 2) What improvements can be made through the 2013 review and the 2014 revision of the EEAS’ mandate? The study contributes to the current debate through an in-depth examination of the EEAS’ relations with the EU member states, the European Commission, the European Parliament and its Delegations. The analysis is complemented by in-depth interviews conducted with senior officials from the relevant institutions. The authors put forward specific recommendations, organised around three basic roles that the EEAS plays in the EU’s external relations: a) leader, b) coordinator and c) information hub.

The New European Commission Presidency and the Advent of European Democracy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 17, August 2014

On June 15, 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate of the European People’s Party, was elected President of the European Commission, with the support of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. Amid unprecedented Euroscepticism, the media and many pundits predicted a record-low voter turnout and record-high results for Europhobic parties. The aforementioned parties then decided that the political outcome of these 2014 European elections would also be unprecedented. For the first time in EU history, the European political parties agreed to nominate candidates to chair the institution, which they justified by putting forward Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament has often characteristically used political discourse - the logos, to influence the EU’s institutional framework, even though it entails grappling with Member States. It took the form of reports and resolutions, like the official use of the phrase “European Parliament” in 1962, direct universal suffrage elections in 1975 and a European Union in 1984. Nominating contenders to chair the European Commission is no exception. It requires a specific political discourse whose origins can be traced back to the early years of the European Parliament, when it was still the “Common Assembly”. This political discourse is one of the elements thanks to which the European Parliament acquired visibility and new prerogatives, in pursuit of its legitimacy. However, the executive branch in all member states is not intent on yielding such prerogatives to the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has often ended up strengthening the heads of state and governments, since MEPs are forced to resort to self-discipline. The symbolic significance of its logos and, consequently, its own politicisation as a source of legitimacy, is thus undermined. For instance, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s election actually strengthened German Chancellor Angela Merkel. First she questioned the fact that the candidate whose party holds the parliamentary majority after the election should be appointed President of the Commission. Then she seemed strongly intent on democratising the Union, when she confronted David Cameron, who openly opposed Juncker, believed to be too federalist and old-fashioned a candidate. By doing so, she eventually reduced the symbolic dimension of the European Parliament’s initiative, and Juncker’s election. She also unquestionably embodied EU leadership. This paper aims at analysing Juncker’s election to the Presidency of the European Commission, as well as other questions it raises. In the first part, I lay out some thoughts about the sociohistorical context of voting in European elections in order to make the readers understand why the European Parliament should be bolder. Secondly, I try to explain how the European Parliament has used the logos as a weapon to grapple with member states for more power, as was the case during the 2014 European elections. Last but not least, I seek to show how Angela Merkel got hold of that weapon and took advantage of it, thus proving that despite MEPs’ best efforts, Juncker’s task will be all the more complicated as he was not the consensual candidate of all the governments.

Thessaloniki ten years on: Injecting momentum into the enlargement process for the Western Balkans. CEPS Commentary, 16 May 2013.

Ten years have passed since the EU-Western Balkans summit was held in Thessaloniki in June 2003. In this new CEPS Commentary, CEPS Associate Senior Fellow Erwan Fouéré exhorts the EU to mark the occasion by reaffirming with greater determination the European perspective for the countries of the region in the hope of keeping the Balkan ghosts at bay.

The European Citizen's Initiative: next big thing or new false good idea? Egmont Paper No. 59, July 2013

From the Introduction. One innovative element of the Lisbon Treaty was the creation of a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). At the time, this was sometimes hailed as a fundamental change in the European institutional system. A few years after the entry into force of the Treaty, however, much less is heard about this “first truly transnational instrument of modern direct democracy”, this “revolution in disguise”, this “very innovative and symbolic” provision. This could seem surprising at first sight. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, the implementation of this provision has been remarkably rapid. Meanwhile, new arguments have risen concerning the lack of democratic legitimacy of the European Union, and the lack of connection between the European institutions and the citizens.

Programming EU External Action Post-Lisbon: New Opportunities or Business as Usual?

Over 90% of the external relations budget of the EU is processed through its external financial instruments. With the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the new European External Action Service (EEAS), the institutional architecture of these instruments was significantly reformed. This contribution analyses strategic programming both pre- and post-Lisbon, identifies ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and examines the potential of the new provisions to increase the coherence of EU external action. The examination shows that the instruments can be categorised into three groupings: ‘the big three’ comprising the bulk of funding characterised by joint programming and responsibilities; the ‘Commission-only’ instruments where all powers remain with the Commission; and the ‘EEAS-led rest’ in which the High Representative and the EEAS play a strong role but only have limited financial resources available. The new system calls for strong coordination of all involved actors in order to make it work. Findings of a case study on the Instrument for Stability reveal, however, that so far the establishment of the EEAS has not made a substantial impact on strategic programming in its first two years.

Liberalising trade in services: creating new migration opportunities? Research Paper in Law, 1/2010

Introduction. It is quite uncommon to associate migration with the rules on services trade. Indeed, all economic definitions of services insist on their immaterial nature and on the increased possibility of trading them ‘virtually’ over networks or else, without any physical movement of the parties involved. Somehow this ‘immaterial’ nature of services reflects on their providers/recipients which seem to be ‘invisible’. Even though most services still require the physical contact of the provider with the recipient1 and, when provided over national borders, do entail migration, service providers and/or recipients are rarely thought of as ‘immigrants’. This may be due to the fact that they enter the foreign territory with a specific aim and, once this aim accomplished, move back to their state of origin; technically they only qualify as short term non-cyclical migrants and are of little interest to policy-makers. A second reason may be that both service providers and recipients are economically desirable: the former are typically highly skilled and trained professionals and the latter are well-off ‘visitors’, increasing consumption in the host state. The legal definition of services in Article 57 TFEU (ex Art. 50 EC) further nourishes this idea about service providers/recipients not being migrants: the relevant Treaty rules only apply when the provisions on free movement of workers and freedom of establishment – themselves clearly linked to migration – do not apply. This distinction has been fleshed up by the ECJ which has consistently held that the distinction between the rules on establishment, on the one hand, and the rules on services, on the other, lies on duration.2 Indeed, all EC manuals state four types of service provision falling under the EC Treaty: a) where the service provider moves to the recipient’s state, for a short period of time (longer stay would amount to establishment), b) where the service recipients themselves move to the state where the service is offered (eg for medical care, education, tourism etc), c) where both service providers and recipients move together in another member state (eg a tourist guide accompanying a group travelling abroad) and d) where the service itself is provided across the borders (typically through the use of ICTs). None of these situations would typically qualify as migration. The above ‘dissociation’ between services and migration has been gradually weakened in the recent years. Indeed, migration is increasingly connected to the transnational provision of services. This is the result of three kinds of factors: developments in the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law; legislative initiatives in the EU; and the GATS. Each one of these is considered in some detail below. The aim of the analysis which follows is to show the extent to which (legislative and judicial) policies aimed at the free provision of services actively affect migration conditions within the EU. The EC rules on the provision of services primarily affect the movement of EU nationals. As it will be shown below, however, third country nationals (TCNs) may also claim the benefits of the rules on services, either as recipients thereof or as employees of some EC undertaking which is providing services in another member state (posted workers).

Rule of law or rule of thumb? A new Copenhagen mechanism for the EU. CEPS Policy Brief No. 303, 20 November 2013

This Policy Brief synthesises the main research findings and policy recommendations presented in the CEPS e-book entitled The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law: Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism” (http://www.ceps.eu/book/triangular-relationship-between-fundamental-righ...). The authors examine the ways in which the European Union could strengthen and develop its competences in the assessment of member states’ fundamental rights, democracy and rule of law commitments. They argue that a strong political impetus is needed at Union level in order to set up a new supervisory “Copenhagen Mechanism” that would effectively and periodically evaluate member states’ compliance with democratic rule of law with fundamental rights on the basis of independent academic expertise, and by ensuring a high level of democratic accountability and judicial oversight at European levels. The Policy Brief also aims at summarising CEPS’ contribution to the upcoming Conference “Assises de la Justice: Shaping Justice Policies in Europe for the Years to Come” organised by the European Commission in Brussels on 21-22 November 2013.

Impact of the ‘Big bang’ enlargement on EU foreign policy – 10 years on. CEPS Commentary, 5 May 2014

The tendency within the EU today to blur distinctions between internal and external policies and between hard and soft security demands a more holistic and inclusive approach in tackling challenges and seizing opportunities if the EU is to make good on its foreign policy objectives. In his assessment of the impact of the ‘big bang’ enlargement on EU foreign policy a decade later, Steven Blockmans finds that the experience and expertise of the (by now not so) new member states has been and will continue to be indispensable for the European Union.

Towards a new constitutional blueprint for Bosnia and Herzegovina. CEPS Commentary, 20 June 2014

Bosnia-Herzegovina's provisional constitutional system, as created by the Dayton Agreement, has outlived its purpose by more than ten years. Economic and political governance are now even more deadlocked by corruption, political recriminations and institutional failure. Fouéré and Blockmans argue the need for more robust engagement by both the EU and the US and for a constitutional convention to spur reform. This should facilitate the transition from the country’s current status as international protectorate to sustainable self-government, guided by the EU pre-accession process.

A Financial Markets Policy for the next 5 years. CEPS Commentary, 1 October 2014

Karel Lannoo prefaces his survey of the priorities for the new European Commission in the area of financial markets with a warning that the hangover from the past five years is huge and that public opinion on the role of the financial sector will continue to be critical for some time to come. Implementation and enforcement will need to be followed-up carefully, as any flaws could rapidly attract negative headlines. In this commentary, he finds that three themes stand out: moving back to normal in financial markets regulation, adequate implementation and enforcement, and access to finance. The latter, in particular, should be the overarching theme, in all its dimensions -- access to credit for SMEs, access to capital markets for new ventures and access to finance for households.

The New Juncker Commission: The Digital Agenda. CEPS Commentary, 26 September 2014

In assessing the challenges facing Andrus Ansip, as Vice-President-designate for the Digital Single Market, and Günther Oettinger, as Commissioner-designate for Digital Economy and Society, Colin Blackman and Andrea Renda find that leadership and building real consensus among the member states will be the main keys to achieving what is, in their view, the most ambitious and important of the new Commission’s objectives. And, as they note further, their challenge is even greater, if one considers that, if successful, the Digital Agenda will have to be the last one. Five years from now, the ‘digital agenda’ will have become, simply, the agenda.

Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU’s new leadership. EPC Challenge Europe Issue 22, September 2014

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES WHICH ARE AVAILABLE ON THE ARCHIVE AS SEPARATE ARTICLES. There has been a lot of attention on the current transition of power taking place in Brussels. The new EU leadership will be confronted with a number of internal and external challenges. They will have deal with economic stagnation, the negative effects of fragmentation and the need to increase the Union's legitimacy. There is no better moment to take stock of the ‘state of the Union’ and to look ahead into the next European political cycle (2014-2019), focusing not on personalities but on content: what challenges do we face and what should the EU focus on in the coming years? These new beginnings will encounter new challenges, and who better understands the issues than some of the key players in European politics. Challenge Europe brings these players together and explores what social, political and economic challenges are facing Europe, and its’ citizens.

Will Crimea herald a new post-Cold War era world? EPC Commentary, 7 April 2014

The end of the Cold War twenty-five years ago brought about a difficult but manageable world in which Russia, the US, and European countries cooperated to manage common problems. There have been difficult times, with the break up of former Yugoslavia, the NATO intervention for Kosovo, and in 2008 when Russia’s intervention in Georgia’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkahzia nearly led to a head to head with the West. On the whole, the cooperation between old foes which framed the end of the Cold War, resisted these tests. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the agreement not to redraw the map of Europe was never so evidently ignored as today.