The EU’s re-engagement as a security actor: Fresh start or still sleepwalking. CEPS Commentary, 12 July 2012

By the end of the summer, the EU will launch new crisis management missions in the Horn of Africa, Niger and South Sudan. In this CEPS Commentary, Giovanni Faleg and Steven Blockmans question whether the new deployments will revive the EU’s persona as a global security actor. The authors point out that, without the backing of a comprehensive security strategy rationale, the EU’s re-engagement as a crisis manager that opts for small-scale operations will be seen as a continuation of its sleepwalking through a changing geostrategic landscape.

EU-US S&T Collaborations, Challenges and Opportunities for Development. Innovation Diplomacy, Special case in point: the Hellenic-American innovation bridge and its underlying dimensions. ACES Working Papers, October 2012

Developed and developing economies alike face increased resource scarcity and competitive rivalry. Science and technology increasingly appear as a main source of competitive and sustainable advantage for nations are regions alike. However, the key determinant of their efficacy is the quality and quantity of entrepreneurship-enabled innovation that unlocks and captures the pecuniary benefits of science enterprise in the form of private, public or hybrid goods (for instance, bio-entrepreneur-millionaires, knowledge for the public good - ie: public health awareness, and new public-private research centers funded partly by bio-entrepreneur-millionaires and monies levied as taxes on bio-ventures).

A proposal to revive the European Fiscal Framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/07 MARCH 2016

Pro-cyclical fiscal tightening might be one reason for the anaemic economic recovery in Europe, raising questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s fiscal framework in achieving its two main objectives: public debt sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. • In theory, the current EU fiscal rules, with cyclically adjusted targets, flexibility clauses and the option to enter an excessive deficit procedure, allow for large-scale fiscal stabilisation during a recession. However, implementation of the rules is hindered by the badly-measured structural balance indicator and incorrect forecasts, leading to erroneous policy recommendations. The large number of flexibility clauses makes the system opaque. • The current inefficient European fiscal framework should be replaced with a system based on rules that are more conducive to the two objectives, more transparent, easier to implement and which have a higher potential to be complied with. • The best option, re-designing the fiscal framework from scratch, is currently unrealistic. Therefore we propose to eliminate the structural balance rules and to introduce a new public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback, embodied in a multi-annual framework, which would also support the central bank’s inflation target. A European Fiscal Council could oversee the system.