4 resultados para network industries
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
Introduction. The internal market for services is one of the objectives set by the founding fathers of the EC back in 1957. It is only in the last ten-fifteen years, however, that this aspect of the internal market has seriously attracted the attention of the EC legislature and judiciary.1 With the exception of some sector-specific directives dating back in the late ‘80s, it is only with the deregulation of network industries, the development of electronic communications and the spread of financial services, in the ‘90s that substantial bits of legislation got adopted in the field of services. Similarly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court) left the principles established in Van Binsbergen back in 1973, hibernate for a long time before fully applying them in Säger and constantly thereafter.2 Ever since, the Court’s case law in this field has grown so important that it has become the compulsory starting point for any study concerning the (horizontal) regulation of the internal market in services. The limits inherent to negative integration and to the casuistic approach pursued by judiciary decisions have prompted the need for a general legislative text to be adopted for services in the internal market. This text, however, hotly debated both at the political and at the legal level, has ended up in little more than a complex restatement of the Court’s case law. It may be, however, that this ‘little more’ is not that little. In view of the ever expanding application of the Treaty rules on services, promoted by the ECJ (para. 1),3 the Directive certainly appears to be a limited regulatory attempt (para. 2). This, however, does not mean that the Directive is a toothless, or useless regulatory instrument (conclusion: para. 3).
Resumo:
In examining the long-awaited opinion given January 22nd by the CJEU in the case concerning the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), this Commentary argues that the ruling is important for the insights it yields into the modern understanding of the Meroni non-delegation doctrine. The authors, Jacques Pelkmans and Marta Simoncini, aim to extract the potential implications of the ESMA case for the place and significance of the Meroni doctrine in building up the single market. They demonstrate that the ESMA case is yet another manifestation of a slow process of “mellowing Meroni’, which is a critical condition for a new single market strategy aiming to end the remaining fragmentation of the single market – not only in financial markets but also in network industries – and to ensure its ‘proper functioning’.
Resumo:
The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.
Resumo:
Food policy is one the most regulated policy fields at the EU level. ‘Unholy alliances’ are collaborative patterns that temporarily bring together antagonistic stakeholders behind a common cause. This paper deals with such ‘transversal’ co-operations between citizens’ groups (NGOs, consumers associations…) and economic stakeholders (food industries, retailers…), focusing on their ambitions and consequences. This paper builds on two case studies that enable a more nuanced view on the perspectives for the development of transversal networks at the EU level. The main findings are that (i) the rationale behind the adoption of collaborative partnerships actually comes from a case-by-case cost/benefit analysis leading to hopes of improved access to institutions; (ii) membership of a collaborative network leads to a learning process closely linked to the network’s performance; and (iii) coalitions can have a better reception — rather than an automatic better access — depending on several factors independent of the stakeholders themselves.