Shifting Between Hegemony and Dominance? A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the EU as a Structural Foreign Policy Actor: The Singular Case of the Cariforum-EU Economic Partnership Agreement. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Paper 01/2014

The groundbreaking scope of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union (EU) and Cariforum (CF) irrefutably marks a substantive shift in trade relations between the regions and also has far-reaching implications across several sectors and levels. Supplementing the framework of analysis of Structural Foreign Policy (SFP) with neo-Gramscian theory allows for a thorough investigation into the details of structural embeddedness based on the EU's historic directionality towards the Caribbean region; notably, encouraging integration into the global capitalist economy by adapting to and adopting the ideals of neoliberal economics. Whilst the Caribbean – as the first and only signatory of a ‘full’ EPA – may be considered the case par excellence of the success of the EPAs, this paper demonstrates that there is no cause-effect relationship between the singular case of the ‘full’ CF-EU EPA and the success of the EPA policy towards the ACP in general. The research detailed throughout this paper responds to two SFP-based questions: (1) To what extent is the EPA a SFP tool aimed at influencing and shaping the structures in the Caribbean? (2) To what extent is the internalisation of this process reflective of the EU as a hegemonic SFP actor vis-à-vis the Caribbean? This paper affirms both the role of the EU as a hegemonic SFP actor and the EPA as a hegemonic SFP tool. Research into the negotiation, agreement and controversy that surrounds every stage of the EPA confirmed that through modern diplomacy and an evolution in relations, consensus is at the fore of contemporary EU-Caribbean relations. Whilst at once dealing with the singular case of the Caribbean, the author offers a nuanced approach beyond 'EU navel-gazing' by incorporating an ‘outside-in’ perspective, which thereafter could be applied to EU-ACP relations and the North-South dialogue in general.

Moments of Truth – A new neo-Gaullist Germany? EuropEos Commentary No. 3, 1 June 2010

The European process is based on compromises; when it comes to selling them to national electorates, countries behave differently. France feels compelled to declare victory; Germany has more often chosen to stress the concessions that it made, adding that they were painful but necessary for the sake of ‘Europe’. The reality is very different. In this new EuropEos Commentary, Riccardo Perissich, Executive Vice-President of the Council for the United States and Italy, describes that European reality, in unambiguous terms.

Analyser l’influence du syndicalisme agricole majoritaire: quelle utilité pour le modèle néo-corporatiste? Etude de cas à partir du «mini-paquet lait» = Analyze the influence of the majority agricultural trade unionism: what use to the neo-corporatist model? Case study from the "mini-milk package". Bruges Political Research Paper No. 35, August 2014

Cette recherche se propose de réfléchir sur la place des groupes d’intérêts dans le système politique de l’UE en partant de l’exemple de la filière lait. Dans un système généralement pluraliste, la PAC fait en effet figure de cas particulier puisqu’elle a fonctionné à partir des années 1960 sur une logique de co-gestion de la politique des marchés entre la Commission et la principale fédération agricole européenne, le Comité des Organisations Professionnelles agricoles (COPA) associé depuis 1962 au Comité Général de la Coopération agricole de l'Union européenne (COGECA). Néanmoins, du fait du processus de réforme de la PAC engagé depuis 1992, il paraît nécessaire d’analyser si la logique de co-gestion est remise en cause. Cette recherche conclue qu’il existe bien un rapport néo-corporatiste dans le secteur laitier, dans le sens où un acteur en particulier, le syndicat COPA-COGECA est parvenu à influencer de manière déterminante la procédure en obtenant de renforcer le pouvoir de négociation des producteurs sans revenir sur les réformes récentes de la PAC.