A bottomless pit: the costs of Crimea’s annexation by Russia. OSW Commentary No. 143, 29.07.2014

The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits. For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the region’s economy and will raise people’s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by Crimea’s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into question is the fulfilment of the Crimean people’s’ expectations concerning the improvement of their living standards, due to the tourist sector’s problems (small-scale tourist services used to be one of the local people’s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and finally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.

Europe on the Road to the Third Stage of EMU: Recent Evidence. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.2, 1996

The paper deals with Europe's effort to proceed to the thud stage of EMU and establish a common currency. It is argued that the success of the common currency experiment will greatly depend on the fulfillment of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria, on the adoption of the proper adjustment policies as well as on the political desirability of the project. The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 deals briefly with the index of criteria that define an OCA. Section 2 examines the extent to which Europe experiences common demand disturbances, while sections 3 and 4 focus on evidence about the mobility of factors of production across Europe, namely labor and capital. Section 5 examines the possibility of an increase in trade volume across the EU under fixed exchange rates or a common currency regime. Section 6 sheds light on the possibility of the EURO (the ex-ECU} to become a vehicle currency in the international financial system, and Section 7 is concerned with the benefits and costs of the establishment of a European Central Bank (ECB), paying special attention to seigniorage revenues. Section 8 deals with the necessity of establishing an EU federal mechanism facilitating adjustment. Section 9 sketches out a proper role for a hegemonic power in a common currency regime. Finally, section 10 examines EMU prospects during the transitional period. The paper closes with some concluding remarks, where the role of politics and coordination of economic policies are particularly emphasized as of cardinal importance on the road to the third stage of EMU.

Efficient taxation of multi-national enterprises in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 5/2003

Current arrangements for multi-national company taxation in EU are plagued by severe conceptual and administrative problems, leading to high compliance costs, considerable uncertainty and ample room for abuse. Integration is amplifying these difficulties. There are two possible approaches in designing an efficient trans-border corporate tax system for the European Union. The first is to consolidate the EU-wide operations of MNEs, using an agreed common base as the reference variable, and then to apportion this total tax base using some presumptive indicators of activity in each tax jurisdiction – hence, implicitly, of the likely benefits stemming from each location. The apportionment formula should respect requisites of neutrality between productive factors and forms of corporate financing. A radically different approach is also available that offers considerable advantages in terms of efficiency, simplicity and decentralisation, including full administrative autonomy of national tax authorities. It entails abandoning corporate income as the relevant tax base and taxing at a moderate rate some agreed measure of business activity such as company value added, sales or employment. These are the variables usually considered in formula apportionment, but they would apply directly without having first to go through the complications of EU-wide consolidation based on a common-base definition. Reference to a broad base, with no exemptions or deductions, would allow to set low statutory rates.