Monetary policy and banking supervision: coordination instead of separation. CEPS Policy Brief No. 286, 12 December 2012

Introduction. Following the June 2012 European Council decision to place the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM) within the European Central Bank, the general presumption in the policy discussions has been that there should be ‘Chinese walls’ between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal, in fact, is explicit on this account. On the contrary, however, this paper finds that there is no need to impose a strict separation between these two functions. The authors argue, in fact, that a strict separation of supervision and monetary policy is not even desirable during a financial crisis when the systemic stability of the financial system represents the biggest threat to a monetary policy that aims at price stability. In their view, the key problem hampering the ECB today is that it lacks detailed information on the state of health of the banking system, which is often highly confidential. Chinese walls would not solve this problem. Moreover, in light of the fact that the new, proposed Supervisory Board will be composed to a large extent of representatives of the same institutions that also dominate the Governing Council, the paper finds that it does not make sense to have Chinese walls between two boards with largely overlapping memberships. In addition, it recommends that some members of the Supervisory Boards should be “independents” in order to reduce the tendency of supervisors to unduly delay the recognition of losses.

Towards a new design of South American integration? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Special Issue January 2013

The design of South American integration is becoming different. This has been quite common in the trajectory of over six decades of initiatives aimed at generating institutional frameworks to facilitate regional integration. However, even when it has become apparent that the previous design is undergoing a new process of change, it would be difficult to predict for how long the one that is beginning to take shape will remain in effect. The experience of recent decades suggests great caution in forecasts that are optimistic about any eventual longevity. Several factors are contributing to this redesign. Some are external to the region while others are endogenous. The combination of these factors will influence the future design of South American integration. If past lessons are correctly capitalized and certain advantage is derived from the leeway provided by a decentralized international system with multiple options, we can anticipate that what will predominate in the region will be multidimensional integration agreements (with political and economic objectives at the same time) and with cross-memberships and commitments. If this were the case, the actual impact on regional governance, social and productive integration and the competitive insertion at a global scale will depend largely on the following factors: the quality and sustainability of the strategy for development and global and regional insertion of each country; the combination of a reasonable degree of flexibility and predictability in the commitments made and their corresponding ground rule, and the density of the network of cross-interests that can be achieved as a result of the respective regional integration agreements, reflected in multiple transnational social and production networks.