The known unknowns and the unknown unknowns of the EMU. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/18, October 2012

Extensive prior research on the economics of European monetary union highlighted some potential risks (the known unknowns) but overlooked others (the unknown unknowns). Asymmetries among participating countries, the potentially destabilising character of a one-size-fits all monetary policy, the weakness of adjustment mechanisms, the lack of incentives for fiscal discipline, the possibility of sovereign solvency crises and their adverse consequences were all known and understood. But policymakers often relied on a complacent reading of the evidence. • The potential for financial disruption was vastly underestimated. Economists generally did not consider, or underestimated, the possibility of balance of payment crises such as those experienced by southern European countries, or the risk of a feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. • Remedying EMU’s systemic deficiencies is on the policy agenda. Banking union would go a long way towards addressing the fault lines. The urgent question for economists is if it is going to be enough and, if not, what else should complement the ‘bare-bones’ EMU of Maastricht.

What Cameron should have known: Q &A. CEPS Commentary, 4 November 2014

The surprise revelation that the UK would be paying a surcharge to the EU budget of €2.1 billion sent Prime Minister Cameron into a rampage. How could this misunderstanding have arisen, as the resources mechanism of the EU budget uses a rather rigid method of calculation agreed by all member states? In this Commentary, CEPS budget specialist Jorge Núñez Ferrer has adopted a Q&A format to provide a straightforward technical explanation of how the surcharge came about in an attempt to dispel the Machiavellian phantasies it has inspired in journalists and eurosceptics alike.

Britain’s Future in Europe: The known Plan A to remain or the unknown Plan B to leave. CEPS Paperback 2nd Ed., March 2016

Following the agreement made by Prime Minister David Cameron with the EU on 18-19 February 2016, the day for the referendum for the UK to remain in or leave the EU is set for 23 June 2016. This will be the most important decision taken by the British people in half a century, and whose consequences will live on for another half century. The first edition of this book, published in March 2015, laid the foundations for any objective assessment of the workings of the EU and the UK’s place in it. It was widely acclaimed and rated as “a myth-breaking exercise of the best kind”. This second edition adds a substantial new chapter following Cameron’s agreement with the EU and announcement of the referendum. It reviews both the ‘Plan A’, namely the status quo for the UK in the EU as amended by the new agreement, and three variants of a ‘Plan B’ for secession. The key point is that the ‘leave’ camp have not done their homework or ‘due diligence’ to specify the post-secession scenario, or how the British government would face up to the challenges that this would bring. The authors therefore do the ‘leave’ camp’s homework for them, setting out three Plan Bs more concretely and in more depth than the ‘leave’ camp have been able or wanted to do, or any other source has done. The book is therefore unique and essential reading for anyone concerned with the fateful choice that lies soon ahead.