Member State BITS after the Treaty of Lisbon: solid foundation or first victims of EU investment policy? Research Paper in Law, 02/2012

[Introduction.] This paper discusses the uncertain future of Member State BITs with third countries in the light of the developing EU investment policy. The question will be examined on the basis of the proposed Regulation establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries presented by the Commission on 7 July 20101 and the European Parliament’s Position adopted at first reading on 10 May 2011.2 The proposed Regulation and the Commission Communication of the same day are meant to be the “first steps in the development of an EU international investment policy”.3 The first chapters present the legal framework relevant for this question and its evolution to better understand the particular challenges of this transition process. The second chapter examines the relationship of EU law and investment law, with a brief introduction of the notion of investment law and the scope of the EU’s new investment competence. The third chapter outlines the legal framework for the continuation and termination of treaties under international and EU law. The fourth chapter concerns BITs, first covering the particular nature of BITs and then the CJEU’s judgments in the BIT Cases of 2009. The fifth chapter consists of a step by step analysis of the different provisions of the proposed Regulation.

Il lavoro a termine nella giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia [Jurisprudence in the Court of Justice]. WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT - 93/2012

The paper analyzes the ECJ case law on fixed-term work, with specific regard to non-regression clause, measures to prevent abuses and the principle of non-discrimination. In particular, the Author points out that the principle of non-discrimination is to be regarded as being the core of the fixed-term work regulation; in this respect, especially in more recent judgments, the Court seems to maximize the scope of such principle.

The Case Law of the ECJ concerning the Free Provision of Services : 2000 - 2005. Research Papers in Law, 2/2006

Introduction. The present overview covers the period starting from 2000 until the end of 2005.1 This is the follow-up to our overview covering the 1995-1999 period.2 The first striking feature of the present contribution is that it has to deal with almost 3,5 times as many cases as the previous one. Hence, the ECJ has gone from deciding 40 cases in the five year period between 1995- 1999 to deciding over 140 cases based on Art 49 between 2000-2005. This confirms, beyond any doubt, the tendency already observed in our previous overview, that a “third generation” case law on services is being developed at a very rapid pace by the ECJ. This third generation case law is based on the idea that Article 49 EC is not limited to striking down discriminatory measures but extends to the elimination of all hindrances to the free provision of services. This idea was first expressed in the Tourist Guide cases, the Greek and Dutch TV cases and most importantly in the Säger case.3 It has been confirmed ever since. As was to be expected, this broad brush approach of the Court’s has led to an ever-increasing amount of litigation reaching Luxemburg. It is clear that, if indicators were used to weight the importance of the Court’s case law during the relevant period, services would score much higher than goods, both from a quantitative and from a qualitative perspective.4 Hence, contrary to the previous overview, this one cannot deal in detail with any of the judgments delivered during the reference period. The aim of the present contribution is restricted to presenting the basic trends of the Court’s case law in the field of services Therefore, the analysis follows a fundamentally horizontal approach, fleetingly considering the facts of individual cases, with a view to identifying the conceptual premises of the Court’s approach to the free movement of services. Nonetheless, the substantial solutions adopted by the Court in some key topics, such as concession contracts, healthcare services, posted workers and gambling, are also presented as case studies. In this regard, the analysis is organized in four sections. First we explore the (ever expanding) scope of the freedom to provide services (Section 2), then we go on to identify the nature of the violations and of justifications thereto (Section 3), before carrying out some case studies to concretely illustrate the above (Section 4). Then, for the sake of completeness, we try to deduce the general principles running through the totality of the relevant case law (Section 5). Inevitably, some concluding remarks follow (Section 6).5

With or without you...judging politically in the field of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Research Papers in Law, 3/2007

From the Introduction. The study of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law of the regarding the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) is fascinating in many ways.1 First, almost the totality of the relevant case law is extremely recent, thereby marking the first ‘foundational’ steps in this field of law. This is the result of the fact that the AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999.2 Second, as the AFSJ is a new field of EU competence, it sets afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its member states, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) measure of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions beg for answers which should take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.3 Third, and as a consequence of the above, the vast majority of the ECJ’s judgments relating to the AFSJ are a) delivered by the Full Court or, at least, the Grand Chamber, b) with the intervention of great many member states and c) often obscure in content. This is due to the fact that the Court is called upon to set the foundational rules in a new field of EU law, often trying to accommodate divergent considerations, not all of which are strictly legal.4 Fourth, the case law of the Court relating to the AFSJ, touches upon a vast variety of topics which are not necessarily related to one another. This is why it is essential to limit the scope of this study. The content of, and steering for, the AFSJ were given by the Tampere European Council, in October 1999. According to the Tampere Conclusions, the AFSJ should consist of four key elements: a) a common immigration and asylum policy, b) judicial cooperation in both civil and penal matters, c) action against criminality and d) external action of the EU in all the above fields. Moreover, the AFSJ is to a large extent based on the Schengen acquis. The latter has been ‘communautarised’5 by the Treaty of Amsterdam and further ‘ventilated’ between the first and third pillars by decisions 1999/435 and 1999/436.6 Judicial cooperation in civil matters, mainly by means of international conventions (such as the Rome Convention of 1981 on the law applicable to contractual obligations) and regulations (such as (EC) 44/20017 and (EC) 1348/20008) also form part of the AFSJ. However, the relevant case law of the ECJ will not be examined in the present contribution.9 Similarly, the judgments of the Court delivered in the course of Article 226 EC proceedings against member states, will be omitted.10 Even after setting aside the above case law and notwithstanding the fact that the AFSJ only dates as far back as May 1999, the judgments of the ECJ are numerous. A simple (if not simplistic) categorisation may be between, on the one hand, judgments which concern the institutional setting of the AFSJ (para. 2) and, on the other, judgments which are related to some substantive AFSJ policy (para. 3).

Current Problems of Social Europe. Research Papers in Law, 7/2007

From the Introduction. The main difficulty of Theology lies in the fact that the very existence of its subject-matter, God, may be put into question. Talking about Social Europe has something of a theological dimension. The aim of this article is to contribute into the debate, by putting into perspective some of the latest manifestations of social Europe. The need for the pursuance of social policies at the European level is now more pressing than ever (para 2). The EU, however, as it now stands, is the direct evolutionary result of the predominantly economic entity created back in 1957. This explains that the social policies pursued at the European level are piecemeal and often impregnated with market concerns (para. 3). From an instrumental point of view, EU social policy is being pursued concomitantly by secondary legislation (hard law) in the fields where the EU does have the relevant competences and by softer means of cooperation (soft law) in several other fields. Hard law has given the occasion to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in a series of recent judgments, of putting to the fore the concept of a ‘social market’ (para. 4). Soft cooperation has been formalised into the infamous Lisbon Strategy and has been the main object of experimentation with the open method of coordination (OMC) (para. 5). The advances achieved in the above ways, however, do not offer firm answers to basic questions concerning the future development of the European social identity (para. 6)

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.