30 resultados para joint action
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
In the EU circuit (especially the European Parliament, the Council and Coreper) as well as in national parliaments of the EU Member States, one observes a powerful tendency to regard 'subsidiarity' as a 'political' issue. Moreover, subsidiarity is frequently seen as a one-way street : powers going 'back to' Member States. Both interpretations are at least partly flawed and less than helpful when looking for practical ways to deal with subsidiarity at both EU and Member states' levels. The present paper shows that subsidiarity as a principle is profoundly 'functional' in nature and, hence, is and must be a two-way principle. A functional subsidiarity test is developed and its application is illustrated for a range of policy issues in the internal market in its widest sense, for equity and for macro-economic stabilisation questions in European integration. Misapplications of 'subsidiarity' are also demonstrated. For a good understanding, subsidiarity being a functional, two-way principle neither means that elected politicians should not have the final (political!) say (for which they are accountable), nor that subsidiarity tests, even if properly conducted, cannot and will not be politicised once the results enter the policy debate. Such politicisation forms a natural run-up to the decision-making by those elected for it. But the quality and reasoning of the test as well as structuring the information in a logical sequence ( in accordance with the current protocol and with the one in the constitutional treaty) is likely to be directly helpful for decisionmakers, confronted with complicated and often specialised proposals. EU debates and decision-making is therefore best served by separating the functional subsidiarity test (prepared by independent professionals) from the final political decision itself. If the test were accepted Union-wide, it would also assist national parliaments in conducting comparable tests in a relatively short period, as the basis for possible joint action (as suggested by the constitutional treaty). The core of the paper explains how the test is formulated and applied. A functional approach to subsidiarity in the framework of European representative democracy seeks to find the optimal assignment of regulatory or policy competences to the various tiers of government. In the final analysis, this is about structures facilitating the highest possible welfare in the Union, in the fundamental sense that preferences and needs are best satisfied. What is required for such an analysis is no less than a systematic cost/benefit framework to assess the (de)merits of (de)centralisation in the EU.
Resumo:
Turkish democracy today has lost much of its shine. As the Turkish government continues to backtrack on reforms and infringe on basic freedoms, the country is beginning to look more and more like an ‘illiberal democracy’ at best. Ironically, as one of the most important destination and transit countries for Syrian refugees, it is also still uniquely positioned to help the EU deal with the current refugee crisis. In November 2015, the EU and Turkey signed a Joint Action Plan to better manage the situation, but both parties have fallen short of their promises. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, one of the biggest supporters of closer EU-Turkey cooperation, had hoped that this would allow for the refugees to be admitted into Europe in a more controlled and orderly manner. But it seems she is standing alone in a Europe that is becoming increasingly more hostile towards newcomers, drifting further and further from the liberal values it stands for. In this Policy Brief, Kemal Kirişci discusses the ways in which Turkey, Germany and the EU in general could all benefit from closer cooperation on this issue: “With the right frame of mind and will, the current ‘illiberal Turkey’ could indeed help ‘liberal Europe’. In the long run this would be a ‘win-win’ for Germany, Turkey, and the EU – but most importantly, for the Syrian refugees.”
