Does the European Union create the foundations of an information society for all? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 11/2005

In order to increase the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the European Union Member States, the European Commission, on the initiative of Commissioner E. Liikannen, launched in December 1999 a bold programme called “eEurope”. Soon after its creation, the eEurope programme was integrated into the so- called Lisbon agenda for Europe to become the “most advanced knowledge based economy” in the world. We try to assess if the programme is successful in achieving its stated objective of promoting a knowledge based economy through the development of an “information society for all”. First, we conclude that eEurope, due to its origins and its procedures, has intrinsic limits both as regards its scope and effectiveness. Second, we show how Member States have adopted different trajectories towards the “knowledge based society”. To identify these heterogeneous paths of growth, we have selected a set of variables that, combined together, represent the institutional arrangements specific to a country or a group of countries. We found sharp differences between two advanced models that we label, respectively, as Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon. Without asserting the superiority of a model, we propose policy orientations to help Europe overcome those gaps hindering the move towards knowledge economies where information society technologies are widely diffused.

Informational Barriers to Energy Efficiency - Theory and European Policies. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 15/2009

This BEER addresses informational barriers to energy efficiency. It is a widely acknowledged result that an energy efficiency gap exists implying that the level of energy efficiency is at an inefficiently low level. Several barriers to energy efficiency create this gap and the presence of asymmetric information is likely to be one such barrier. In this article a theoretical framework is presented addressing the issues of moral hazard and adverse selection related to energy efficiency. Based on the theoretical framework, European policies on energy efficiency are evaluated. The article is divided into two main parts. The first part presents the theory on information asymmetries and its consequences on energy efficiency focusing on the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Having established a theoretical framework to understand the agency barriers to energy efficiency, the second part evaluates the policies of the European Union on energy efficiency. The BEER finds that problems of moral hazard and adverse selection indeed can help explain the seemingly low levels of energy. In both presented models the cost to the principal from implementing high energy efficiency outcome is increased with the informational asymmetries. The theory reveals two implications to policies on energy efficiency. First, the development of measures to enable contractual parties to base remuneration on energy performance must be enhanced, and second, the information on technologies and the education of consumers and installers on energy efficiency must be increased. This could be complemented with certification of installers and energy efficiency advisors to enable consumers to select good agents. Finally, it is found that the preferred EU policy instrument on energy efficiency, so far, seems to be the use of minimum requirements. Less used in EU legislation is the use of measuring and verification as well as the use of certifications. Therefore, it is concluded that the EU should consider an increased use of these instruments, and in particular focus on a further development of standards on measurability and verification as well as an increased focus on education of consumers as well as installers and advisors on energy efficiency.