The EU should tax in harmony. CEPS Commentary, 3 May 2012

Rather than expending unnecessary negative energy on the blunt and indiscriminate financial transaction tax (FTT), this commentary argues that the EU should give priority to its tax base harmonisation project. Progress on this front would advance several objectives at once: it would make an important step towards more economic union, it would promote the EU as a business location and it would succeed in appropriating tax income to the location where corporate activities are effectively exercised.

Financial Transaction Tax (FTT): Why the EU needs the FTT but the FTT does not need the EU. EPC Policy Brief, 17 June 2014

Through an Enhanced Cooperation Procedure (ECP) 11 eurozone countries (ECP-11) – among them the four biggest; Germany, France, Italy and Spain – have aspired to go ahead with the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax (EU-FTT). Apart from generating substantial revenues for tight fiscal budgets, an EU-FTT could also contribute to the reduction of transactions, which are harmful for the efficient functioning of financial markets and the real economy. However, the willingness to go forward with the finalisation of an ambitious proposal has lost some momentum recently; some of the envisaged compromises may even threaten the viability of the whole project.

Efficient taxation of multi-national enterprises in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 5/2003

Current arrangements for multi-national company taxation in EU are plagued by severe conceptual and administrative problems, leading to high compliance costs, considerable uncertainty and ample room for abuse. Integration is amplifying these difficulties. There are two possible approaches in designing an efficient trans-border corporate tax system for the European Union. The first is to consolidate the EU-wide operations of MNEs, using an agreed common base as the reference variable, and then to apportion this total tax base using some presumptive indicators of activity in each tax jurisdiction – hence, implicitly, of the likely benefits stemming from each location. The apportionment formula should respect requisites of neutrality between productive factors and forms of corporate financing. A radically different approach is also available that offers considerable advantages in terms of efficiency, simplicity and decentralisation, including full administrative autonomy of national tax authorities. It entails abandoning corporate income as the relevant tax base and taxing at a moderate rate some agreed measure of business activity such as company value added, sales or employment. These are the variables usually considered in formula apportionment, but they would apply directly without having first to go through the complications of EU-wide consolidation based on a common-base definition. Reference to a broad base, with no exemptions or deductions, would allow to set low statutory rates.

A Microsimulation of the Impact of Tax Reforms on Child Poverty: the Case of Italy. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 29/February 2014

Microsimulation models have been used in order to find efficient counteractive instruments to poverty. The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of fiscal policy on poverty, insisting on child poverty rates. Empirical analysis suggests that in fighting poverty, a mix of policies need to be in place, fiscal reforms increasing tax allowances such as child benefit granted to parents with dependent children, are not sufficient to reduce child poverty.

From Convergence to Diffusion: The EU's influence on national tax systems. ACES Cases No. 2011.2

In this article I investigate to what extent European Integration stimulates policy convergence and diffusion of various forms of tax policy. Using a mixed-methods design, I find that several causal mechanisms contribute to an EU-wide diffusion of tax policies: imposition, competition, harmonization and learning/communication. I show that these mechanisms have different effects on different forms of taxation. Even if the ultimate outcome of this influence only in few cases leads to unconditional convergence, the EU has markedly accelerated policy diffusion among its member states.

Corporate Taxation in Europe: Let's get it together! CEPS Commentary, 16 February 2015

More comprehensive cooperation in corporate taxation at European level could significantly advance the region’s socio-economic prosperity, but its potential contribution is unfortunately overlooked in the current search for growth and job creation. Lucrative tax niches established in some member states and the fear of losing fiscal autonomy prevent several countries from accepting the move towards an EU single market for taxation. If ‘Lux leaks’ and other revelations of tax avoidance and evasion can succeed in changing the dominant attitudes in the European tax debate, this commentary outlines the steps that need to be taken to allow tax policy to play a positive role in promoting economic prosperity.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.