Shifting Between Hegemony and Dominance? A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the EU as a Structural Foreign Policy Actor: The Singular Case of the Cariforum-EU Economic Partnership Agreement. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Paper 01/2014

The groundbreaking scope of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union (EU) and Cariforum (CF) irrefutably marks a substantive shift in trade relations between the regions and also has far-reaching implications across several sectors and levels. Supplementing the framework of analysis of Structural Foreign Policy (SFP) with neo-Gramscian theory allows for a thorough investigation into the details of structural embeddedness based on the EU's historic directionality towards the Caribbean region; notably, encouraging integration into the global capitalist economy by adapting to and adopting the ideals of neoliberal economics. Whilst the Caribbean – as the first and only signatory of a ‘full’ EPA – may be considered the case par excellence of the success of the EPAs, this paper demonstrates that there is no cause-effect relationship between the singular case of the ‘full’ CF-EU EPA and the success of the EPA policy towards the ACP in general. The research detailed throughout this paper responds to two SFP-based questions: (1) To what extent is the EPA a SFP tool aimed at influencing and shaping the structures in the Caribbean? (2) To what extent is the internalisation of this process reflective of the EU as a hegemonic SFP actor vis-à-vis the Caribbean? This paper affirms both the role of the EU as a hegemonic SFP actor and the EPA as a hegemonic SFP tool. Research into the negotiation, agreement and controversy that surrounds every stage of the EPA confirmed that through modern diplomacy and an evolution in relations, consensus is at the fore of contemporary EU-Caribbean relations. Whilst at once dealing with the singular case of the Caribbean, the author offers a nuanced approach beyond 'EU navel-gazing' by incorporating an ‘outside-in’ perspective, which thereafter could be applied to EU-ACP relations and the North-South dialogue in general.

Hegemony Without Stability: The fiscal and political vulnerabilities of monetary union. ACES Cases No. 2011.2

The crisis has forced the Euro area to establish an emergency fund that supports member states experiencing a sovereign debt crisis. The difficulties of coming up with such a fund for Greece and other Euro area members stands in marked contrast to the balance of payments support that non-Euro members like Hungary received, swiftly and quietly. In order to solve this puzzle, we first establish the difference between EU interventions and IMF programs and, second, trace the evolution of crisis management with France and Germany in the lead. The lens of hegemonic stability theory suggests that the Franco-German leadership is too weak to provide stability and the extensive use of conditionality is one symptom of this weakness. Providing incentives for cooperation "after hegemony" (Keohane) is the unresolved issues troubling the monetary union. Its dominant powers must acknowledge that markets perceive monetary union to be already politically more integrated than its lack of fiscal integration suggests.

The End of German Hegemony. CEPS Commentary, 16 October 2015

Without anyone quite noticing, Europe’s internal balance of power has been shifting. As Daniel Gros observes in this commentary, Germany’s dominant position, which has seemed absolute since the 2008 financial crisis, is gradually weakening – with far-reaching implications for the European Union.

Moldova: from oligarchic pluralism to Plahotniuc’s hegemony. OSW Commentary Number 208/07.04.2016

Moldova’s political system took shape due to the six-year rule of the Alliance for European Integration coalition but it has undergone a major transformation over the past six months. Resorting to skilful political manoeuvring and capitalising on his control over the Moldovan judiciary system, Vlad Plahotniuc, one of the leaders of the nominally pro-European Democratic Party and the richest person in the country, was able to bring about the arrest of his main political competitor, the former prime minister Vlad Filat, in October 2015. Then he pushed through the nomination of his trusted aide, Pavel Filip, for prime minister. In effect, Plahotniuc has concentrated political and business influence in his own hands on a scale unseen so far in Moldova’s history since 1991. All this indicates that he already not only controls the judiciary, the anti-corruption institutions, the Constitutional Court and the economic structures, but has also subordinated the greater part of parliament and is rapidly tightening his grip on the section of the state apparatus which until recently was influenced by Filat.

"Europe-as-hegemony" and discourses in Turkey after 1999: Dialogue with the Europeanisation literature

It is not a prophecy to say that one of the most common concepts that those working on "Europe" would encounter at various points in different capacities would be "Europeanisation". This buzzword has also been crucial in understanding and explaining for Turkey's European orientation path, which acquired a new dimension and has been carried to a more substantive and institutional level with the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 when Turkey was granted formal candidacy status in its application to join the EU. Especially after this date, the concept of "Europeanisation" and the literature attached to it have almost automatically been employed to assess the relationship between Turkey and different aspects of European integration. For this aim, firstly, I present a tri-fold picture of the European studies. According to this categorisation, the studies dealing with the notion of „Europe‟ could be categorised into three groups: the studies which takes "Europe" as a fixed concept ("Europe-as-fixity"), those which subscribe to a notion of "Europe" solely as a construct ("Europe-as-construct") and the studies which take "Europe" as a contestation ("Europe-as-contestation"). After critically locating the Europeanisation literature within this categorisation, I argue that there is both a historical and epistemological need for the Europeanisation literature to address to the conflictual nature of the notion by focusing on how the discourses on "Europe" hegemonised the Turkish political terrain after 1999 and I introduce the notion of "Europe-as-hegemony". The overall argument is that the hegemony of "Europe" does not originate from the automaticity of the relationship between the European and domestic level as stipulated by the Europeanisation literature, but rather from the power of discourses on "Europe" and their ability to hegemonise the political realm. In this respect, this paper offers a novel approach to the Europeanisation literature with a particular focus on the Turkish context where the political is not only given and constructed but is also reflexive and open to contestation and negotiation.

American Attitudes on European Political Integration — The Nixon-Kissinger Legacy. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2007

This paper concentrates on the Nixon-Kissinger view of European political integration. In contrast with the mainstream position of the American Administrations during the 1950s and 1960s, Kissinger was convinced that by encouraging European unity, the United States was in fact creating its own rival. The start of a new system of European foreign policy cooperation in 1970 was seen by Kissinger as a particularly important example of Europe’s attempt to challenge the American hegemony. Kissinger emphasized the need to maintain Western Europe in a subordinate role. Three main lines of action were pursued to keep the development of the European Community under control: maintaining bilateral contacts with key European allies, requesting a seat at the Community's decision-making table, and linking "obedient" European behavior to American military presence in Europe. The legacy of this policy still seems to influence the current American policy on the European Union. The Nixon-Kissinger term was, however, detrimental to rather than conducive of harmonious transatlantic relations. Tendencies to emulate it should therefore be discouraged.

A House Divided: Employers & the Challenge to Pattern Bargaining in a United Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.5, 1994

Recently, increasing numbers of new German firms have begun to break from tradition and refuse to join employers' associations. Simultaneously, an unprecedented portion of affiliates have begun to reconsider employers' association membership. The spectre of declining membership in German employers' associations-century-old pillars of organized capitalism-is particularly noteworthy because of the importance of these institutions to the German economy as a whole. Some observers have attributed this trend to the impact of German unification, yet a careful analysis reveals that its principal causes arose in the decade preceding it. The economic strain of unification, however, has accelerated "association flight'' and has provided dissidents with an unprecedented opportunity to challenge the hegemony of employers' associations over the regulation of wages and working conditions in the Federal Republic.

Modell Deutschland as an Interdenominational Compromise, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.3, 2000

Usually, Germany’s social market economy is understood to embody a compromise between a liberal market order and a corporatist welfare state. While this reading of the German case is certainly not entirely wrong, this paper argues that only if we account for the close intellectual correspondence between lutheran Protestantism and economic liberalism on the one hand and between Catholicism and welfare corporatism on the other, can we fully comprehend the nature of the German post-war compromise. In particular, this perspective allows to better explain the anti-liberal undercurrents of Germany’s soziale Marktwirtschaft. It was especially the role which Protestant Ordoliberals ascribed to the state in upholding economic order and market discipline which accounts for the major difference between ‘classic’ and ‘German-style’ economic liberalism. Yet, the postwar economic order did not represent a deliberately struck compromise between the two major Christian denominations. Rather, Germany’s social market economy was the result of the failure of German Protestant Ordoliberals to prevent the reconstruction of the catholic Bismarckian welfare state after the authoritarian solution, which Ordoliberals had endorsed so strongly up until 1936 and from which they had hoped the re-inauguration of Protestant hegemony, had so utterly failed. Since the ordoliberal doctrine up to the present day lacks a clear understanding of the role of the corporatist welfare state within the German political economy, its insights into the functioning logic of German capitalism have remained limit. The paper also claims that accounting for the denominational roots of the postwar compromise allows us to better understand the relationship between consociationalism and corporatism in ‘Modell Deutschland’.

Iranian-Saudi tensions: the energy dimension. EPC Policy Brief, 9 February 2016

Following the execution of Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr Baqer al-Nimr, the deep rooted rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia entered a new phase in January 2016. While the main objective for both countries still is regional hegemony, the Iranian-Saudi competition takes many different forms and shapes, and also extends into the field of energy. In this Policy Brief, David Ramin Jalilvand gives a detailed analysis of the energy-related aspects of the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and its possible consequences for Europe’s energy market; both countries hold giant hydrocarbon reserves, so European energy will probably be affected by their competition in several regards; increased oil supplies will be available for the European market, while the cycle of low oil prices will be prolonged. According to Jalilvand, this is a mixed blessing; Europe’s energy import bill will be reduced, but its indigenous production will suffer, while Russia’s role in European natural gas will only continue to grow.