Triangular Geopolitics in Europe’s Eastern Neighbourhood. CEPS Commentary, 2 December 2014

Over the last few months, Russia has employed a number of economic and security measures to derail the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) between the EU and Ukraine. Russia’s opposition to the Agreement was based on the argument that it would damage its economy and weaken its trade ties with Ukraine. Russia’s actions ultimately led to war in Ukraine, but did not succeed in reversing Ukraine’s EU integration policies; instead there are now trilateral negotiations between the EU, Ukraine and Russia on mere technical trade aspects of the DCFTA. The Kremlin is using similar rhetoric and, to some extent, similar coercive measures against the DCFTAs with Moldova and Georgia. But the small scale of Moldovan and Georgian trade with Russia is not a legitimate reason for the EU to replicate the Ukraine ‘trialogue’ on the DCFTAs in these countries. Instead, Moldova’s heavy dependence on Russia’s energy and the former’s transit role for the EU offers a greater possibility to set up trilateral negotiations, similar to the recently finalised gas trialogue between the EU, Ukraine and Russia.

The EU and Azerbaijan: Game on for a more normative policy? CEPS Policy Brief No. 329, March 2015

The contradictory interests of the EU and Azerbaijan have brought negotiations on their contractual relations to a halt. The EU’s dependence on Azerbaijan’s rich energy resources has weakened the normative dimension of its policy towards Azerbaijan, rendering it incapable of countering rejection of democratic reform by Azerbaijan’s authorities. While the EU’s current approach seems to favour a more pragmatic focus on energy cooperation, this policy brief argues that a combination of normative obligations and pragmatic interests is required − implemented through leverage over Azerbaijan and a better coordination of this policy across the EU member states and institutions.