The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 8/2004

The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.

Transatlantic MRAs: Lessons for TTIP? CEPS Special Report No. 101/March 2015

It is striking that there is little or no mention in the TTIP debate so far of the US-EU Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) concluded in 1998. At the time, expectations of the gains from the MRA were high. One should expect the MRA to be instructive for TTIP and entail some lessons to be learned for today’s attempt to lower technical barriers to trade (TBTs) across the North Atlantic. We offer an analysis of the 1998 MRA, the difficulties in the prior negotiations and those during the implementation phase, the subsequent and present status of sectoral approaches. The MRA experience revealed clearly how difficult it is to accomplish the acceptance of all relevant aspects of conformity assessment of the trading partner for the mere purpose of testing and certifying export goods on the requirements of the importing economy. The MRA has succeeded only in a few sectors. However, the ambition in TTIP with respect to TBTs is said to go so much further. It is therefore important for all those involved or interested in TTIP to learn the lessons of this early exercise in lowering TBT costs. This paper reaches two main conclusions: i) the US-EU MRA was only partially successful and only for some one-fifth of the export flows at the time: a disappointing outcome and a far cry from the expectations of business and political leaders; and ii) the EU’s attempt to ‘balance’ the negotiations in 1995 by bringing in three relatively competitive sectors did not work out – it was precisely there that problems accumulated. It is critical that domestic regulators must be satisfied during and after the negotiations that their pursuit of health, safety, environment and consumer protection objectives will not be watered down in any way. Lessons drawn include, among others: MRAs are not about regulatory change (by definition), but if initial regulatory cleavages between trading partners are too wide, conditions become so restrictive that parties may regard them as a denial of the very purpose of the MRA. There are incentives to opt for alternatives in the market for the formalised designation of conformity assessment bodies in the MRA and these are often cheaper and faster, while equally qualified. Even in heavily regulated sectors such as medicines and medical devices, the narrow MRA has been superseded by near-global forms of effective cost-reducing cooperative (i.e. not treaty-based) regulatory alignment, a confirmation of the OECD approach that governments should think in terms of an entire spectrum of forms of regulatory cooperation.

Continuous Off-the-Job Training in East Germany After Unification: Preliminary Results of an Evaluation of the Effects for Individual Workers, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.9, 19 July, 1995

Retraining the labor force to match the demands of a modem economy is seen as an important task during the transition process from a centrally-planned to a market economy. This need was particularly pressing in East Germany, because the transition process has proceeded much faster than in the rest of Eastern Europe. Therefore, substantial resources have been devoted to this purpose. This paper analyzes the impact of continuous off-the-job training in East Germany from the point of view of individuals who were part of the labor force before German unification in 1990. It tries to answer questions about the average gains from participating in a specific type of training. Typical outcomes considered to measure those gains are income, employment status, job security, and expected future changes in job position. The methodology used for the evaluation is the potential outcome approach to causality. This approach has received considerable attention in the statistical literature over the last fifteen years and it has recently been rediscovered by the econometric literature as well. It is adapted to allow for important permanent and transitory shocks, such as unemployment, which influence the decision to participate in the training as well as future labor market outcomes. The empirical part is based on the first four waves of the Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)-East (1990-1993). This panel data set has the advantage that the fourth wave contains a special survey on continuous training and that it allows keeping track of individual behavior on a monthly, respectively yearly, basis. The econometric analysis focuses on off-the-job training courses that began after unification and were completed not later than in early 1993. Although it is obviously too early to evaluate the long-term implications, the results suggest that there are no positive effects in the short run.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities for Consumer Protection. Paper No. 11 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 115/July 2015

This paper examines options for regulatory cooperation in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and assesses the challenges and opportunities posed by regulatory cooperation for consumer protection. It looks at existing approaches to regulatory cooperation by referencing a range of case studies. Based on established practice and on the European Commission’s recently published proposal on regulatory cooperation, we discuss a possible approach that could be adopted in the TTIP. Against the significant potential gains from improved regulatory cooperation, one must set the significant challenges of reconciling the different regulatory philosophies of the US and the EU as well as some differences in their respective approaches to cooperation. In broad terms, this analysis finds that regulatory powers on both sides of the Atlantic will not be significantly affected by the TTIP, but suggests that European and American legislators will need to ensure that their priorities shape the TTIP regulatory cooperation agenda and not the other way around.

20 years of the European single market: growth effects of EU integration. Policy Brief #2014/02

The ongoing European integration has increased the economic growth of participating national economies. Calculating the cumulative gains in the real gross domestic product per capita resulting from the integration of Europe between 1992 and 2012, every national economy under consideration realized income gains from the European integration. Denmark and Germany saw the greatest gains per resident. If the values from only 1992 and 2012 are compared, every country except for Greece has been able to achieve a higher per capita income due to the European integration.

Reviewing Member States’ Commitment to the European External Action Service. EPIN Working Paper No. 34, 20 November 2012

Based on interviews with diplomats from a representative cross-section of nine member states and members of the EEAS itself, the research findings of this EPIN Working Paper confirm long-standing traditions and member state perceptions of cooperation with European institutions. The paper also reveals new aspects of the intergovernmental method of foreign policy shaping and making in the European Union; in particular how different national positions can positively or negatively affect the consolidation of the EEAS and the role of the EU as an international actor. As such, the Working Paper makes an original contribution to the existing literature on one of most discussed actors in the European Union’s post-Lisbon architecture in the domain of EU external action.

The Euro: A Crisis of the Currency or a Failure of Politics? Paper from the Colloquium: The Politics and Economics of the Euro Crisis, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, 2 December 2011

Summary: Overall the monetary pillar of the EMU project has worked well so that it is incorrect to speak of a 'euro' crisis though it is at the epicentre of the present crisis. The origins of the problems it is facing have more to do with the economic component, particularly because of the breach of budgetary rules which points to a failure of politics. Hence the solution must be political, namely a strong commitment by governments to achieve balanced budgets and implement structural reforms so as to lay the basis for improved competitiveness, job creation and sustainable growth.

From Lampedusa to the Post-Stockholm Programme: Difficult European solidarity in the field of migration. European Policy Brief No. 24, March 2014

Solidarity is a founding principle of the European migration policy. To hold true, Member States must be faithful to their common commitment to European migration rules and implement fair burden sharing of the costs attached to border controls. However, solidarity among Member States appears altogether fragile and under threat, a situation that could jeopardise the founding principle of the free movement of persons in the European Union’s space. The recent solidarity crisis among Member States was solved by an increased externalisation of the European migration policy. Consequently, for the EU to live up to its values, it will have to prove itself generous towards third countries.

On Incentives in Technology Policymaking: What the EU Can Learn from U.S. Developments. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.7, 1997

This paper explores the incentives political and bureaucratic actors face in the institutional setting of EU technology policy. In examining the implications and assumptions of neoclassical and evolutionary theories of technological change, it tries to answer why certain theories do not obtain importance in the political wor1d. By focusing on the positive approach to policymaking, the paper examines why policy learning does not occur m certain institutional settings. In referring to EU technology programs, I show which conceptual and functional shortcomings limit the policies in question. As evaluation and oversight mechanisms have not been sufficiently developed and accepted within the institutional setting, there is much room for inefficiency. I discuss this setting within a simple agency model using two political actors and two firms performing R&D. It is easy to show that when asymmetric information applies, the firms receive positive rents and the political agent gains reputation. The outcome suggests changing the evaluation practices and embedding results in political decision making. Regarding this point, recent U.S. developments seem to have led to more efficiency. Moreover, the paper suggests delegating technology policy to other actors and discussing the empowerment of different principals on the political plane.

Who Benefits from a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement? Policy Brief #2013/04

From a purely economic standpoint, the US and the entire EU will profit from a dismantling of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers between both regions. The real gross domestic product per capita would increase in the US and in all 27 EU member countries. Also when one looks at labor markets, the positive effects on employment predominate: Two million additional jobs could be created in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) zone over the long run. The public welfare gains of these economies admittedly do stand in contrast with real losses in income and employment in the rest of the world. On balance, however, the beneficial effects on economic welfare prevail.