A Financial Markets Policy for the next 5 years. CEPS Commentary, 1 October 2014

Karel Lannoo prefaces his survey of the priorities for the new European Commission in the area of financial markets with a warning that the hangover from the past five years is huge and that public opinion on the role of the financial sector will continue to be critical for some time to come. Implementation and enforcement will need to be followed-up carefully, as any flaws could rapidly attract negative headlines. In this commentary, he finds that three themes stand out: moving back to normal in financial markets regulation, adequate implementation and enforcement, and access to finance. The latter, in particular, should be the overarching theme, in all its dimensions -- access to credit for SMEs, access to capital markets for new ventures and access to finance for households.

Performance Indicators in Agricultural Financial Markets. Factor Markets Working Document No. 43, May 2013

This study attempts to develop performance indicators for the financial markets based on the findings in an earlier Factor Markets Working Paper (No. 33, “Agricultural credit market institutions: A comparison of selected European countries”) and on FADN (Farm Accountancy Data Network) data. Two indicators were developed. One measured the long-term economic sustainability of agricultural firms since the financial characteristics of the firms were perceived as important factors when rejecting a loan applicant. If the indicator works, it should show that a low value in this indicator is related to the performance in the financial markets. The second indicator was the loan-to-value (LTV), or debt-to-asset ratio, the reasoning behind this indicator is that low values can point to credit constraints, and in WP 33 we saw that the interviewed experts expected LTVs to be much higher than what is actually the case. We find that the first indicator can’t be used to measure the performance of the financial institutions, since we can’t show any relationship between the indicator and activities in the financial markets. However, the indicator is valuable for its measurement of the long-term financial sustainability of the agricultural sector, or of the firms. The loan-to-value indicator does imply that most countries would have room to increase the credit.

The United States dominates global investment banking: does it matter for Europe? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2016/06, March 2016

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the market share of US investment banks is increasing, while that of their European counterparts is declining. We present evidence that US investment banks are on the verge of taking over pole position in European investment banking. Meanwhile, since 2015, Chinese investment banks have overtaken American and European investment banks in the Asia-Pacific market. Credit rating agencies and investment banks are the gatekeepers of the capital markets. The European supervisory institutions can effectively supervise the European operations of these US-managed players. On the political side, we suggest that the European Commission should continue to view its, albeit declining, banking industry as a strategic sector. The Commission, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England should jointly develop a strategic agenda for the EU-US Regulatory Dialogue. Finally, corporates rely on investment banks to issue new securities. We recommend that the big European corporates should cherish the (few) remaining European investment banks, by giving them at least one place in otherwise US- dominated banking syndicates. That could help to avoid complete dependence on US investment banks.

The changing landscape of financial markets in Europe, the United States and Japan. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/02, 18 March 2013

We compare the structure of the financial sectors of the EU27, Japan and the United States, looking at a set of 23 indicators. We find a large variation within the European Union in the structure of the financial sector. Using principal components analysis, we identify robust groups of EU countries. One group consists of the eastern European members that entered the EU more recently.These have substantially smaller financial sectors than the old member states. A second group can be classified as market-based (MBEU) and the third group is more bank-based (BBEU). We compare US, MBEU, BBEU, Eastern EU and Japan with the following main results. First, the groups within Europe are geographically related. Second, in many indicators, MBEU countries are closer to the (market-based) US, while BBEU countries more closely resemble Japan. Paradoxically, however, market-based EU countries also have large banking sectors. Banks in market-based countries have larger cross-border assets and liabilities, and derive a larger fraction of their income from fees, rather than interest income, than banks in bank-based countries. Finally, for most indicators, the ordering of groups of countries is quite stable over time, but while the crisis has had no impact on the relative ordering of the groups, it has slightly widened the gap between the US and all EU regions insome respects. We also find that during the crisis, substitution between market-based and bank-based sources of finance occurred in the US, and to a lesser extent in MBEU and BBEU countries.

The role of politicians in inciting financial markets to attack the eurozone. EuropEos Commentary No. 4, 21 June 2010

While acknowledging that the sustainability of sovereign debt is a serious issue that must be confronted, this EuropEos Commentary finds that financial markets have blown the problem completely out of proportion, leading to a full-scale confidence crisis. The authors present evidence suggesting that politicians’ public disagreements and careless statements at critical junctures may have added oil to incipient fire. By creating the impression that domestic political interests would take precedence over orderly management of the Greek debt crisis, they raised broader doubts about their ability to address fundamental economic divergences within the area, which are the real source of debt sustainability problems in the medium term.

The Euro blame game and its implications for policy and financial markets. ACES Cases No. 2012.2

The recent financial crisis in some of the eurozone member countries has received a great deal of attention by investors, policy makers and commentators alike. Often these events are interpreted as a failure of the euro and the sustainability of the eurozone is called into question. This paper shows that this analysis and its emphasis are flawed. Fiscal imbalances and financial market imperfections are at the core of the problem, and they need to be addressed directly to prevent future crises.

The debt, the stock market and the state-owned enterprises. The sources of chaos on the Chinese financial markets. OSW Commentary NUMBER 201/16.03.2016

The government’s extensive programme for stimulating the economy has enabled China to maintain high economic growth after the global financial crisis in 2008. However, this success has come at the price of a number of negative economic phenomena and the consequences they have had are the major challenge for the government today. The vast programme of investments in infrastructure, construction and fixed assets, which has been the main source of economic growth over the past few years, has caused a rapid increase in China’s debt from 158% of GDP in 2007 to 282% in 2014. Along with the local governments in charge of implementing the programme, the Chinese sector of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been heavily burdened by the stimulation policy. The sector’s profitability has fallen, its indebtedness has increased and management problems have been revealed.

Europe between financial repression and regulatory capture. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/08, July 2014

From the Introduction. In the long shadow of the euro-area crisis, the relationship between governments and their banks has been brought to the the centre of the policy debate in Europe by the implementation of regulatory reforms, the risks associated with financial fragmentation, and the fight to sustain the flow of credit to governments and corporates. The attempt to interpret the patterns of pressure and influence running between governments and their financial system has led commentators to rediscover and give new life to concepts originating from academic debates of the 1970s such as “regulatory capture” and “financial repression”. Government agencies have been frequently described as being at the mercy of the financial sector, often allowing financial interests to hijack political, regulatory and supervisory processes in order to favouring their own private interests over the public good1. An opposite view has instead pointed the finger at governments, which have often been portrayed as subverting markets and abusing the financial system to their benefit, either in order to secure better financing conditions to overcome their own financial difficulties, or with the objective of directing credit to certain sectors of the economy, “repressing” the free functioning of financial markets and potentially the private interests of some of its participants2

Achieving European Policy Objectives through Financial Technology. ECRI Commentary No. 17, 16 November 2015

Alistair Milne argues in this ECRI Commentary that ‘FinTech’ (newly emerging Financial Technologies) can play a crucial role in achieving European policy objectives in the area of financial markets. These notably include increasing access by smaller firms to trade credit and other forms of external finance and completing the banking and capital markets unions. He points out, however, that accomplishing these objectives will require a coordinated European policy response, focused especially on promoting common business processes and the adoption of shared technology and data standards.

Europe’s Untapped Capital Market: Rethinking integration after the great financial crisis. Final report of the European Capital Markets Expert Group. Task Force Report, February 2016

In December 2014, ECMI and CEPS formed the European Capital Markets Expert Group (ECMEG) with the aim of providing a long-term contribution to the debate on the Capital Markets Union (CMU) project, proposed by the European Commission. After an intensive, year-long research effort and in-depth discussions with ECMEG members, this final report aims to rethink financial integration policies in the European Union and to devise an EU-wide plan to remove the barriers to greater capital markets integration. It offers a methodology to identify and prioritise cross-border barriers to capital markets integration and provides a set of policy recommendations to improve its key components: price discovery, execution and enforcement of capital markets transactions.

International financial regulation: A role for the Eurozone? EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2012, October 2012

The deepest financial crisis to strike the global economy since the Great Depression has unceremoniously called into question the very foundations of the Western economic model. The liberalisation of capital flows and the growing internationalisation of financial markets outpaced global regulatory and supervisory efforts. The repercussions of the financial crisis have given new dynamism to the reform of financial regulation both globally and within the European Union (EU). The Eurozone, by way of its own failings, has emerged as a stronger conceptual and legitimate entity since the onset of the crisis, but to what extent does this equate to a greater external role, in particular in the reform of international financial regulation? This paper argues that the Eurozone is currently not in a position to play an important role in the reform of international financial regulation, as it is a weak actor in the context of the EU financial architecture, which is still largely characterised by differing national regimes, a prevailing influence from the UK and fragmented external representation. The key finding from this study is that internal tensions in the EU are at the very heart of the Eurozone’s difficulties in playing a role in the reform of international financial regulation. Surmounting these tensions is a pre-requisite for the Eurozone if it is to overcome its structural weakness in international financial politics. However, the implications of such evolutions to the Eurozone, as an entity, and to European integration are far-reaching.

Financial services and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. CEPS Policy Brief No. 302, 20 November 2013

Given the size of the financial markets on both sides of the Atlantic and the symmetry in the follow-up of the G-20 standards, Karel Lannoo argues in this Policy Brief that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) provides a good opportunity to put in place a more institutionalised framework. He finds that both blocs have reacted in similar ways to the financial crisis in strengthening their regulatory and supervisory frameworks and incorporating the G-20 recommendations into federal law. He also notes that consumer protection has been reinforced, certainly in the US, with the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. And on the EU side, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) will radically change banking supervision. In his view, inclusion of financial services could also be an opportunity to strengthen prudential rules and consumer protection provisions on both sides. Rather than leading to a reduction of consumer protection, as had been feared in the post-crisis environment, it could lead to an examination, exchange and recognition of best practices in regulation and enforcement. Finally, he concludes that inclusion of financial services would make it part of the permanent regulatory dialogue that will be established as a result of a successful TTIP.

Financial Transaction Tax (FTT): Why the EU needs the FTT but the FTT does not need the EU. EPC Policy Brief, 17 June 2014

Through an Enhanced Cooperation Procedure (ECP) 11 eurozone countries (ECP-11) – among them the four biggest; Germany, France, Italy and Spain – have aspired to go ahead with the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax (EU-FTT). Apart from generating substantial revenues for tight fiscal budgets, an EU-FTT could also contribute to the reduction of transactions, which are harmful for the efficient functioning of financial markets and the real economy. However, the willingness to go forward with the finalisation of an ambitious proposal has lost some momentum recently; some of the envisaged compromises may even threaten the viability of the whole project.

Discretion and Accountability: The ESMA Judgment and the Meroni Doctrine. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 30/2014

This paper assesses the effectiveness of the Meroni doctrine in the light of the recent judgment in the ESMA case. The first part explains in detail the problem of delegation of powers in the EU from the perspective of the principal-agent theory and complements it with the analysis of the trade-off between different levels of independence and accountability of agencies. A simple economic model is developed to illustrated the relationship between the independence and accountability of an agency. It shows that it is the accountability mechanism that induces the agent to act, rather than the extent of his independence. The paper also explains the inter-temporal interactions between the principal and the agent on the basis of the incentives in place for the different players. The second part is devoted to analysis of the functioning of ESMA in the context of its delegated powers. After the presentation of main aspects of the regulatory framework establishing ESMA, the paper continuous with an analysis and interpretation of the discretionary powers of ESMA. The rather rigid position of the Court of Justice in relation to the Meroni doctrine seems to be unsuitable to delegation of complex regulatory tasks. This is particularly evident in the case of financial markets. Finally, the judgment does not examine in any detail whether and how the principals - i.e. the EU and Member States - are best able to evaluate the quality of ESMA decisions and regulations and whether there are different but more effective accountability mechanisms.

Do we need a resolution fund paid for by financial institutions? EuropEos Commentary No. 2, 17 May 2010

In this EuropEos Commentary, Stefano Micossi reviews recent efforts to build a stronger and more coherent regulatory system for financial markets and finds the idea of a resolution fund at best a distraction, and at worst a harbinger of renewed financial instability.