The European Union’s Role in the Formation of India’s Climate Change Policy. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 2/2012, September 2012

This paper focuses on the role of the European Union (EU) in the formation of India’s climate change policy; an increasingly high profile issue area. It is based on an extensive study of relevant literature, EU-India policy documents and the execution of thirteen semi-structured interviews with experts; many of whom have experienced EU-India cooperation on climate change first-hand. A three-point typology will be used to assess the extent of the EU’s leadership role, supporting role or equal partnership role in India, with several sub-roles within these categories. Further, for clarity and chronology purposes, three time periods will be distinguished to assess how India’s climate policy has evolved over time, alongside the EU’s role within that. The findings of the paper confirm that the EU has demonstrated signs of all three roles to some degree, although the EU-India relationship in climate policy is increasingly an equal partnership. It offers explanations for previous shortcomings in EU-India climate policy as well as policy recommendations to help ensure more effective cooperation and implementation of policies.

Monetary policy and banking supervision: coordination instead of separation. CEPS Policy Brief No. 286, 12 December 2012

Introduction. Following the June 2012 European Council decision to place the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM) within the European Central Bank, the general presumption in the policy discussions has been that there should be ‘Chinese walls’ between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal, in fact, is explicit on this account. On the contrary, however, this paper finds that there is no need to impose a strict separation between these two functions. The authors argue, in fact, that a strict separation of supervision and monetary policy is not even desirable during a financial crisis when the systemic stability of the financial system represents the biggest threat to a monetary policy that aims at price stability. In their view, the key problem hampering the ECB today is that it lacks detailed information on the state of health of the banking system, which is often highly confidential. Chinese walls would not solve this problem. Moreover, in light of the fact that the new, proposed Supervisory Board will be composed to a large extent of representatives of the same institutions that also dominate the Governing Council, the paper finds that it does not make sense to have Chinese walls between two boards with largely overlapping memberships. In addition, it recommends that some members of the Supervisory Boards should be “independents” in order to reduce the tendency of supervisors to unduly delay the recognition of losses.