The long haul: managing exit from financial assistance. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2014/03, 20 February 2014

Countries can make a clean exit from financial assistance, or enter a new programme or a precautionary programme, depending on the sustainability of their public debt and their vulnerability to shocks. Ireland made a clean exit in December 2013, supported by significant budgetary and current-account adjustment and signs of economic recovery. But Irish debt sustainability is not guaranteed and prudence will be needed to avoid future difficulties. A clean exit for Portugal is not recommended when its programme ends in May 2014, because compared to Ireland it faces higher interest rates, has poorer growth prospects and has probably less ability to generate a consistently high primary surplus. A precautionary arrangement would be advisable. In case debt sustainability proves difficult to achieve later, some form of debt restructuring may prove necessary. It is unlikely that Greece will be able to exit its programme in December 2014. A third programme should be put in place to take Greece out of the market until 2030, accompanied by enhanced budgetary and structural reform commitments by Greece, a European boost to economic growth in the euro-area periphery and willingness on the part of lenders to reduce loan charges below their borrowing costs, should public debt levels prove unsustainable despite Greece meeting the loan conditions. Even assuming all goes well, the three countries will be subject to enhanced post-pro-gramme surveillance for decades. Managing such long-term relationships will be a key challenge.

New market conditions and "exit strategies" for the German arms industry. OSW Commentary No. 130, 12.03.2014

Due to changing internal and external conditions, the German arms industry is facing serious challenges as are its counterparts across Europe. The arms sales market in Germany is contracting – orders from the Bundeswehr are slowing down and the Federal Ministry of Defence is planning to change the way it cooperates with German arms producers. In addition, member states of NATO and the EU, major customers of German arms manufacturers, are reducing their defence spending, which will spell a fall in their orders for new armament and military equipment. In response to the new circumstances, the German arms industry is beginning to organise itself and increase its lobbying efforts in Berlin and, with the support of the federal government, it has been implementing specific measures in several areas. German companies are interested in securing new markets outside NATO and the EU and are also exploring opportunities for mergers and joint ventures with other German and foreign companies, and are seeking to create more conducive conditions for business on the EU and NATO markets.

The Role of Pluriactivity in Farm Exit and Labour Supply Decisions. Factor Markets Working Document No. 67, August 2013

EDITED VERSION TO BE PUBLISHED SOON Pluriactivity has been a topic of research in agriculture for the best part of a century. It is a term which has both broad and narrow definitions and hence is subject to multiple interpretations. This paper considers two forms of pluriactivity: within the farm gate pluriactivity, also commonly referred to as farm diversification, and beyond the farm-gate pluriactivity, also known as multiple job holding. Previous studies of pluriactivity have shown that it can inhibit the natural process of structural change in the farm sector, by allowing small and unprofitable farms to survive with the support of income from outside the sector. In this paper, two empirical models of pluriactivity are estimated using farm level data for Ireland. The first examines the impact of on-farm diversification on off-farm labour supply, while the second investigates the relationship between off-farm labour supply and farm exit which is specified in the context of retirement and non-succession. The result of the first model suggests that farms that engage in within the farm gate pluriactivity are less likely to engage in beyond the farm gate pluriactivity, in other words more diversified farmers are less likely to work off farm. The second model confirms previous findings in the literature that part-time farmers have a reduced probability of having a farm successor. While the model results are specific to the Irish case, they do provide some value insights into the impacts of pluriactivity on structural change in farming.

Fostering social cohesion: the missing link in the EU's exit strategy from the crisis. EPC Discussion Paper, 31 March 2015

In this Discussion Paper, Claire Dhéret argues that the EU should consider the level of social cohesion as a concrete policy priority in its long-term exit strategy from the crisis.

Exit from Brexit? Not likely but uncertainty prevails. EPC Commentary, 12 July 2016

Theresa May, who is set to become UK Prime Minister on Wednesday, has made it clear that “Brexit means Brexit”. Stating this so bluntly has become necessary as a number of voices have speculated that there may be a way back from the brink, claiming that the result of the referendum is not very decisive and that citizens have been misled by the lies of the Brexit campaign, not realising the magnitude of the decision. There certainly seems a wish in the Chancellery in Berlin and in some other capitals that Britain can be kept in, accompanied by a willingness to table compromises to smooth the process.

Free and Fair? A Challenge for the EU as Georgia and Ukraine gear up for elections. CEPS Commentary, 27 September 2012

In an important test for democracy, Georgia and Ukraine will go to the polls for parliamentary elections on the 1st and 28th of October, respectively. The political leaders of these two Eastern Partnership countries have committed themselves to European values and principles – rhetorically. In reality, the promise of their colour revolutions is unrealised and they have shifted further towards authoritarianism, albeit following different paths in their respective post-revolution periods.

The Greek debt trap: an escape plan. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/19, 7 November 2012

Without corrective measures, Greek public debt will exceed 190 percent of GDP, instead of peaking at the anyway too-high target ratio of 167 percent of GDP of the March 2012 financial assistance programme. The rise is largely due to a negative feedback loop between high public debt and the collapse in GDP, and endangers Greek membership of the euro area. But a Greek exit would have devastating impacts both inside and outside Greece. A small reduction in the interest rate on bilateral loans, the exchange of European Central Bank holdings, buy-back of privately-held debt, and frontloading of some privatisation receipts are unlikely to be sufficient. A credible resolution should involve the reduction of the official lending rate to zero until 2020, an extension of the maturity of all official lending, and indexing the notional amount of all official loans to Greek GDP. Thereby, the debt ratio would fall below 100 percent of GDP by 2020, and if the economy deteriorates further, there will not be a need for new arrangements. But if growth is better than expected, official creditors will also benefit. In exchange for such help, the fiscal sovereignty of Greece should be curtailed further. An extended privatisation plan and future budget surpluses may be used to pay back the debt relief. The Greek fiscal tragedy highlights the need for a formal debt restructuring mechanism

Too cold to handle: EU accession talks with Iceland. CEPS Commentary, 3 June 2013

Recent opinion polls suggest that most Icelanders are against joining the EU. By the same token, however, a majority of those polled are in favour of continuing accession talks. These results show that Iceland’s relationship with the EU is a deeply divisive issue within the country. Although no date for the referendum has been set, the new centre-right coalition may thus want to settle this matter as soon as possible. Should there indeed be a majority in support of continuing negotiations, then Iceland’s accession process will become a complicated and cool affair in the hands of an anti-EU membership coalition government.

Macroeconomic and Financial Crisis Management in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean: Diagnosis and Prospects. CEPS Paperbacks. December 2013

The global financial crisis, which started in the summer of 2007 and deepened in the aftermath of the Lehman failure in September 2008, has led to a virtual collapse in economic activity and increased financial volatility worldwide. For the developing countries, the main channel of transmission has been a drop in external transactions, such as trade, financial and capital flows, and remittances. The emerging economies in the southern and eastern Mediterranean have also faced declining economic activity, although there seems to be considerable variation in the relative magnitude and timing. Most of these economies have shown a delayed but more lasting response to the crisis, driven mostly by their close trade and investment ties with the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. This book explores the fiscal, monetary and financial effects of the crisis in the region and provides an in-depth analysis of the fiscal, monetary and banking policies in the post-crisis era, the viability of their exit strategies and the future of reforms in the region. These analyses not only provide a comprehensive comparison between the countries but also provide a solid basis for assessing future economic and financial developments and reforms in the region.

Scotland and the EU: What impact of the potential in-out UK referendum on the independence debate?1 EPC Discussion Paper, 4 September 2014

Fabian Zuleeg explores the likelihood of Scottish Independence, and its potential impact on the EU–UK relations. As the Scottish independence vote is inextricably bound to the potential UK in-out referendum (and thus a potential exit of the UK from the EU), there are some potential feedback loops to the independence debate which are set to be relevant regardless of whether Scotland becomes independent or not.

Turkey votes: Part III - President Erdoğan - A foregone conclusion? EPC Commentary, 10 July 2014

On 1 July, after months of speculation, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced he would run in the country’s first direct presidential elections on 10 August. Erdoğan, who has dominated Turkish politics for over a decade, is viewed as the clear favourite. With current polls suggesting he could take as much as 52% of the vote, an outright victory in the first round is possible. His main rival, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, is very much the underdog. Until recently, an international diplomat with no experience in politics, he is the joint candidate of Turkey’s two main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Selahattin Demirtaş, the Co-Chairman of the Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) is also in the race, but is not expected to make it into double digits. The Kurdish vote however, could prove to be crucial if the ballot goes to a second round on 24 August. With Erdoğan wanting to increase Presidential powers, the stakes are high. With his belief in majoritarian rule, and increasingly authoritarian style of governance there has been an erosion of democracy and civil liberties. Many observers fear this trend may increase.