24 resultados para ethnic discrimination
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
On 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared independence, ending its nine years unresolved status. The principal goal was, and remains, the need to involve different communities in the state structures. The new state, which aims to fulfil all the obligations set by the Ahtisaari plan, is trying to complete the decentralization process the implementation of which continuous to face obstacles in the two main communities: the Serbs and the Albanians. This article discusses matters related to community acceptance of the decentralization process, the functioning of the parallel structures, the situation in North Kosovo and the on - going talks between Pristina and Belgrade. The article provides evidences that while the implementation of the decentralization process is the best possibility for Kosovo, it must not follow only an ethnic line.
Resumo:
Following the research agenda introduced by Will Kymlicka, this qualitative study offers an interpretation of how the sub-national elites of Québec and South Tyrol police the integration of immigrants. For these national minority groups, which are constantly undergoing a process of redefinition of their collective identities by differentiating themselves from the Others who do not belong to the in-group, immigrants have progressively become the most significant Others as they are not part of the original system of compromises. This article questions how sub-national elites are handling this relatively new kind of ethnocultural diversity brought about by large-scale permanent immigration on two levels: first, the political narrative of the ruling sub-national parties, their electoral appeals, manifestos and speeches; second, the policy arrangements for the integration of immigrants in education, language and social policy. The initial approach of the article is pessimistic, as it assumes that sub-national elites will marginalize immigrants to please core nationalist supporters. In fact, the hypotheses to be tested are whether the national minority groups of Québec and South Tyrol engage in a process of reconstruction of their ethnic identity bounded by opposition to real or imagined Others – the newcomers; and whether they adopt practical measures that force newcomers to be assimilated into the group or to be marginalized. The comparison between Québec and South Tyrol provides a basic understanding of the impact of immigration in two sub-national polities that are very different, but still adopt similar political narratives and policy strategies with regard to the integration of newcomers.
Resumo:
The new constitution will come into force in Hungary on 1 January 20121. Its adoption is part of the state reform which the Fidesz party led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been implementing since it won the election in April 2010. Fidesz, along with the Christian Democrats which support it, has a qualified majority of two-thirds of the votes in parliament and may introduce solutions to facilitate its rule without support from other groupings and it is taking advantage of this opportunity. One example of this has been the amendment of the constitution ten times followed by a speedy adoption of a new constitution. The next step will be passing dozens of constitutional laws which regulate essential areas of the functioning of the state over the next few months. Both the way and the scope in which the changes have been made have raised controversies both at home and abroad. The regulations reinforce the position of the ruling camp on the Hungarian political scene, assisting it in passing the test of the next elections. Slovakia, which has criticised the practice of granting Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living in other countries, is opposing the promise of also granting them electoral rights. The constitutional reinforcement of the state’s ‘responsibility’ for the diaspora linked with the collective concept of national minority rights fostered by Hungary has already led to tensions in the region.
Resumo:
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no- discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.