The End of the Transitional Period for Police and Criminal Justice Measures Adopted before the Lisbon Treaty: Who monitors trust in the European Criminal Justice area? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 74, December 2014

This study examines the legal and political implications of the forthcoming end of the transitional period for the measures in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, as set out in Protocol 36 to the EU Treaties. This Protocol limits some of the most far-reaching innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon over EU cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs for a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (until 1 December 2014), and provides the UK with special ‘opt out/opt-in’ possibilities. The study focuses on the meaning of the transitional period for the wider European Criminal Justice area. The most far-reaching change emerging from the end of this transition will be the expansion of the European Commission and Luxembourg Court of Justice scrutiny powers over Member States’ implementation of EU criminal justice law. The possibility offered by Protocol 36 for the UK to opt out and opt back in to pre-Lisbon Treaty instruments poses serious challenges to a common EU area of justice by further institutionalising ‘over-flexible’ participation in criminal justice instruments. The study argues that in light of Article 82 TFEU the rights of the defence are now inextricably linked to the coherency and effective operation of the principle of mutual recognition of criminal decisions, and calls the European Parliament to request the UK to opt in EU Directives on suspects procedural rights as condition for the UK to ‘opt back in’ measures like the European Arrest Warrant.

Supporting the Revolution: America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989. ACES Working Paper (Report) No. 8, 2007

Early on the morning of December 13, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the leader of the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), declared martial law, ending the so-called "Polish Crisis," which began with the creation of the Independent Free Trade Union "Solidamosc" in August 1980. Over the next eight years, the Communist government and the opposition struggled over power, culminating in 1989 with the creation of a Solidamosc-led government which ended fifty years of Communist rule in Poland and led the way to further democratic revolutions throughout Eastern Europe. The purpose of this dissertation is to utilize newly available and underutilized archival sources as well as oral history interviews, from both international and American perspectives, to fully chronicle American policy toward Poland from the declaration of martial law until the creation of the Solidarnosc government. Rather than explaining Polish-American relations in bilateral terms, the dissertation illuminates the complex web of influences that determined American policy in Washington and affected its implementation within Poland. This includes descriptions of internal tensions within the Reagan administration, differences between American decisions in Washington and implementation in Warsaw, lobbying from Polish-American groups, clashes between Capitol Hill and the White House, coordination with American labor organizations to support Solidarnosc, disagreements with West European allies in NATO and international financial organizations, cooperation with the Vatican and the Polish Catholic Church, synchronization with American humanitarian organizations working in Poland, limitations caused by the realities of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, and complications caused by domestic Polish concerns. By taking a broad view of American policy and highlighting internal Polish decisions, with both the Communist government and the democratic opposition, the dissertation provides concrete examples of America's role in Poland's transformation, arguing, however, that this role was very limited. These conclusions are relevant to arguments about the end of the Cold War, the nature of American power, as well as current discussions about possibilities to promote democracy within hostile regimes.

Late Putin. The end of growth, the end of stability. OSW POINT OF VIEW #55, 2015-10-05

Since Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin as President in May 2012, the Russian system of power has become increasingly authoritarian, and has evolved towards a model of extremely personalised rule that derives its legitimacy from aggressive decisions in internal and foreign policy, escalates the use of force, and interferes increasingly assertively in the spheres of politics, history, ideology or even public morals. Putin’s power now rests on charismatic legitimacy to a much greater extent than it did during his first two presidential terms; currently the President is presented not only as an effective leader, but also as the sole guarantor of Russia’s stability and integrity. After 15 years of Putin’s rule, Russia’s economic model based on revenue from energy resources has exhausted its potential, and the country has no new model that could ensure continued growth for the economy. The Putinist system of power is starting to show symptoms of agony – it has been unable to generate new development projects, and has been compensating for its ongoing degradation by escalating repression and the use of force. However, this is not equivalent to its imminent collapse.