Gazprom's position on the Russian gas market weakening. OSW Commentary No. 70, 2012-02-23

As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fiscal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being taken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importance for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficulties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the government full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s recent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” (made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.

The Market for Tractors in the EU: Price Differences and Convergence. Factor Markets Working Documents No. 35, February 2013

This study evaluates the degree of segmentation of the market for agricultural machinery and equipment in the EU. We focus on agricultural tractors, the most common and biggest investment in machinery and equipment in the agricultural sector. By using country price data for individual tractor models, we test the law of one price, i.e. the existence of a common price for tractors across EU member states. We find that significant price differences exist, yet unlike most other studies we find that large price deviations are penalised within a short time. The study also shows that transport costs are an important source of price differences, as domestic production leads to lower prices on the domestic market and as price convergence is negatively correlated with distance. Finally, price differences should not solely be understood from a geographical perspective, as evidence supports the idea that farmers’ buying power is significant in explaining price differences within countries.

An aided economy: the characteristics of the Transnistrian economic model. OSW Commentary No. 108, 2013-05-14

The economy of breakaway Transnistria is a peculiar combination of the command-and-distribution model inherited from the USSR with elements of a free-market economy which is heavily dependent on Russian energy and financial subsidies. The main pillars of the region’s economy are several large industrial plants, built in the Soviet era, which generate more than half of its GDP (in 2012, Transnistria’s GDP reached around US$1 billion). As a consequence, the condition of each of these companies, whose production is almost exclusively export- -oriented, has a huge impact on the economic situation in Transnistria. This makes the region extremely sensitive to any changes in the economic situation of its key trade partners. This problem is additionally aggravated by the extremely low diversification of Transnistrian exports. The only major economic entity in Transnistria which regularly yields profits and is not so heavily dependent on the external situation is Sheriff. This corporation controls the greater part of the local wholesale and retail trade, as well as a major part of the services sector on the domestic market.

Shale Gas and the EU Internal Gas Market: Beyond the Hype and Hysteria. CEPS Working Document No. 369, September 2012

This paper analyses the interplay between shale gas and the EU internal gas market. Drawing on data presented in the 2012 International Energy Agency’s report on unconventional gas and additional scenario analyses performed by the Joint Research Centre, the paper is based on the assumption that shale gas will not fundamentally change the EU’s dependence on foreign gas supplies. It argues that attention should be shifted away from hyping shale gas to completing the internal gas market. Two main reasons are given for this. First, the internal gas market is needed to enable shale gas development in countries where there is political support for shale gas extraction. And second, a well-functioning internal gas market would, arguably, contribute much more to Europe’s security of supply than domestic shale gas exploitation. This has important implications for the shale gas industry. As it is hard to see how subsidies or exemptions from environmental legislation could be justified, shale gas development in Europe will only go ahead if it proves to be both economically and environmentally viable. It is thus up to the energy industry to demonstrate that this is the case.

Sales Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 14, February 2012

All agricultural markets are subjected to institutional regulations that – in one way or another –affect the functioning of these markets, and this is no different for the agricultural land market in the EU. In this paper, we describe the existing regulations in the sales markets for agricultural land in selected EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on three types of sales market regulations and institutions: quantity regulations, price regulations and transaction costs. The differences in the regulatory framework between land acquisition and ownership by domestic and foreign investors are analysed, as well as the taxes associated with land sales and ownership, zoning regulations and market imperfections.

Tackling barriers to trade in the Single Market. ACES Cases No. 2014.2

This paper focuses on the challenges operating in the single market due to continued persistence of regulatory barriers to trade, despite being considered one of the most integrated and successful areas of market integration. We use a unique data set on infringements to the free movement of goods to assess the types of barriers that firms encounter, their impact and variation across states and sectors, and their resolution method - through Court decisions or the pre-litigation, administrative means available within the infringement proceedings mechanism to restore compliance. We also resort to the Solvit dataset provided to the authors by the Commission to analyse some features and the effectiveness of this informal mechanism in dealing with discriminatory domestic trade and regulatory practices. We examine four key questions: What are the most problematic policy areas in terms of barriers to trade that undermine the single market? What different dispute resolution mechanisms are utilized to address trade barriers and thus improve the functioning of the single market? Under what conditions are different enforcement mechanisms and strategies more likely to be used to resolve barriers for businesses operating in the single market? How important and effective are the more informal strategies in improving market access? In doing so, our goal is to link the research on trade barriers to that of implementation and compliance to assess the diverse strategies undertaken to reduce regulatory barriers to trade.

20 years of the European single market: growth effects of EU integration. Policy Brief #2014/02

The ongoing European integration has increased the economic growth of participating national economies. Calculating the cumulative gains in the real gross domestic product per capita resulting from the integration of Europe between 1992 and 2012, every national economy under consideration realized income gains from the European integration. Denmark and Germany saw the greatest gains per resident. If the values from only 1992 and 2012 are compared, every country except for Greece has been able to achieve a higher per capita income due to the European integration.