Cities: The Juncker Commission should not miss this key to growth, jobs and the environment. CEPS Commentary, 3 October 2014

Cities, more particularly ‘smart’ cities, could become a catalyst for economic and social development. For this to happen, Europe will need a new type of integrated infrastructure, a new urban governance and policy structure, as well as new finance and business models. Successful smart projects will eventually develop into new business models and companies. While the European Commission cannot mandate or regulate this top down, it has a role to play in nurturing new initiatives to allow Europe the possibility of developing its own Google and Apple.

A House Divided: Employers & the Challenge to Pattern Bargaining in a United Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.5, 1994

Recently, increasing numbers of new German firms have begun to break from tradition and refuse to join employers' associations. Simultaneously, an unprecedented portion of affiliates have begun to reconsider employers' association membership. The spectre of declining membership in German employers' associations-century-old pillars of organized capitalism-is particularly noteworthy because of the importance of these institutions to the German economy as a whole. Some observers have attributed this trend to the impact of German unification, yet a careful analysis reveals that its principal causes arose in the decade preceding it. The economic strain of unification, however, has accelerated "association flight'' and has provided dissidents with an unprecedented opportunity to challenge the hegemony of employers' associations over the regulation of wages and working conditions in the Federal Republic.

Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.