The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy Responses to the Attacks in Paris: Towards an EU Security and Liberty Agenda. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 81/February 2015

This paper examines the main EU-level initiatives that have been put forward in the weeks following the attacks in Paris in January 2015, which will be discussed in the informal European Council meeting of 12 February 2015. It argues that a majority of these proposals predated the Paris shootings and had until that point proved contentious as regards their efficacy, legitimacy and lawfulness. The paper finds that EU counterterrorism responses raise two fundamental challenges: A first challenge is posed to the freedom of movement, Schengen and EU citizenship. Priority is being given to the expanded use of large-scale surveillance and systematic monitoring of all travellers including EU citizens, which stands in contravention of Schengen and the free movement principle. A second challenge concerns EU democratic rule of law. Current pressures calling for the adoption of measures such as the EU Passenger Name Record challenge the scrutiny roles held by the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU on counterterrorism measures in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting. The paper proposes that the EU adopts a new European Agenda on Security and Liberty based on an EU security (criminal justice-led) cooperation model that is firmly anchored in current EU legal principles and rule of law standards. This model would call for ‘less is more’ concerning the use, processing and retention of data by police and intelligence communities. Instead, it would pursue better and more accurate use of data meeting the quality standards of evidence in criminal judicial proceedings.

The EU and its Counter-Terrorism Policies after the Paris Attacks. Liberty and Security in Europe No. 84, 27 November 2015

This paper examines the EU’s counter-terrorism policies responding to the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015. It argues that these events call for a re-think of the current information-sharing and preventive-justice model guiding the EU’s counter-terrorism tools, along with security agencies such as Europol and Eurojust. Priority should be given to independently evaluating ‘what has worked’ and ‘what has not’ when it comes to police and criminal justice cooperation in the Union. Current EU counter-terrorism policies face two challenges: one is related to their efficiency and other concerns their legality. ‘More data’ without the necessary human resources, more effective cross-border operational cooperation and more trust between the law enforcement authorities of EU member states is not an efficient policy response. Large-scale surveillance and preventive justice techniques are also incompatible with the legal and judicial standards developed by the Court of Justice of the EU. The EU can bring further added value first, by boosting traditional policing and criminal justice cooperation to fight terrorism; second, by re-directing EU agencies’ competences towards more coordination and support in cross-border operational cooperation and joint investigations, subject to greater accountability checks (Europol and Eurojust +); and third, by improving the use of policy measures following a criminal justice-led cooperation model focused on improving cross-border joint investigations and the use of information that meets the quality standards of ‘evidence’ in criminal judicial proceedings. Any EU and national counter-terrorism policies must not undermine democratic rule of law, fundamental rights or the EU’s founding constitutional principles, such as the free movement of persons and the Schengen system. Otherwise, these policies will defeat their purpose by generating more insecurity, instability, mistrust and legal uncertainty for all.

U.S. Democracy Promotion from Bush to Obama. EUSpring Working Paper No. 1, April 2015

Throughout the twenty-first century the United States (U.S.) has attempted to balance its traditional national security interests, whilst also seeking to promote the long-term transformation of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) towards democracy based on liberal values. With the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks providing a catalyst for policy change, the U.S. has moved away from its twentieth-century policy of pursuing a regional status quo and instinctively balking at political change. Yet, the U.S. has not abandoned its reliance on autocratic regimes that cooperate on more immediate national security interests such as counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and the free-flow energy sources into the global market. Rather, U.S. democracy promotion in the MENA has become incremental by design and is characterized by its gradualist and often collaborative nature. U.S. foreign policy in the MENA is, therefore, depicted by a cautious evolutionary stance rather than supporting revolutionary shifts in power.

US Democracy Promotion from Bush to Obama. EUSpring Working Paper No. 1, 15 April 2015

Throughout the twenty-first century the United States (U.S.) has attempted to balance its traditional national security interests, whilst also seeking to promote the long-term transformation of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) towards democracy based on liberal values. With the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks providing a catalyst for policy change, the U.S. has moved away from its twentieth-century policy of pursuing a regional status quo and instinctively balking at political change. Yet, the U.S. has not abandoned its reliance on autocratic regimes that cooperate on more immediate national security interests such as counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and the free-flow energy sources into the global market. Rather, U.S. democracy promotion in the MENA has become incremental by design and is characterized by its gradualist and often-collaborative nature. U.S. foreign policy in the MENA is, therefore, depicted by a cautious evolutionary stance rather than supporting revolutionary shifts in power.

Oslo terrorist attacks: Analysis, consequences and lessons learned. Transatlantic Security Paper No. 4, August 2011

The attack in Norway, like every attack with a major impact, should and will be carefully analyzed, both by police and by terrorists. If the Norwegian authorities have officially called for a technical evaluation of Counter-terrorism (CT) and rescue national services, many sensitive aspects still remain unsure.

The EU Global Strategy: going beyond effective multilateralism? EPC Discussion Paper, June 2016

The ongoing consultation process on the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) presents an occasion for the European Union (EU) to redress the European Security Strategy’s (ESS) shortcomings and update its stance on multilateralism. As rule-based multilateralism remains deeply entrenched in the Union’s DNA, the EUGS is unlikely to represent ground-breaking innovations as to how the EU should act in international affairs. The key challenge in respect of the EU’s multilateralism is twofold. The first challenge lies in setting out clear priorities for the EU’s multilateral action to be pursued collectively by the member states; and the second in determining the form of multilateralism that would best suit the promotion of the priorities concerned. In this collection of six essays, policy analysts and academics are presented with the question: Over a five year horizon, what do you think should be the focus of the EU’s multilateral agenda? The answers dwell on the EU playing a proactive role in relation to emerging powers especially China, and Latin America as a whole; furthering the EU’s soft power through ‘science diplomacy’; and EU leadership in building a global energy and climate community, and counter terrorism measures.

From Lockerbie to Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab (Assessing the Destruction of Civilian Aircrafts by Terrorism). Transatlantic Security Paper N.1–April 2010

Data published by the Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.) in its "Annual report on the criminal acts against civil aviation" indicates that in the year 1960, there have been fifteen attacks on board planes leaving 286 dead; 44 in the year 1970 with 650 dead (mostly hijackings); and 26 in the 1980s leaving 1207 dead. In the 1970s, the record is established by the year 1976 (168 dead).The three years - 1985 (390), 1988 (287), and 1989 (278) - were more deadly than the 1960s all together. These casualties were largely provoked by IEDs. Since the end of 1980 - the deadliest decade, with the exception of September 11, 2001 -, it is however a rare practice. The reasons for the decline in big and politically motivated hijackings were varied. One could have been the improvement of the effectiveness of the safety response by States, airports and companies. The improvised explosive device (I.E.D.) posed a serious threat to the civil aviation industry in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the jihadi networks have regularly tried to target aircrafts using various types of IEDs.