Language, Identity, Politics-the Myth of Two Ukraines. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, April 2014

The narrative of two Ukraines – the existence of two separate cultural-political communities within one Ukrainian state – has accompanied the relatively short history of inde-pendent Ukraine from the very be-ginning. Articulated by Mykola Ryabchuk more than twenty years ago1 and seemingly logical and reasonable, it has become the fa-vourite narrative of many Ukrainian and international commentators and analysts. One of these Ukraines is pro-European, shares liberal democracy values, wants to join the European Union, “return to Europe” and, what is very im-portant, speaks Ukrainian. The symbolic centre of this Ukraine is Lviv. The other is nostalgic about the Soviet Union, has close rela-tions with contemporary Russia, is hostile towards the West and does not share “western” values. The language of this other Ukraine is Russian and its “capital” is Do-netsk. Taking on board this narra-tive simply means equating one’s region of residence, political views, and preferred language.

A summary of the politico-economic changes taking place during Vladimir Putin's first term in office; Chechnya and Russia: The significance of the Chechen problem for contemporary Russia. OSW Study 11/2003

Putin's first term in office: The most significant achievement of Vladimir Putin's team over the three years of his term of office is the realisation of legislative changes, which may constitute a base for further - more detailed - political and economic reforms. This is, to a certain degree, a return to the economic tasks set out by a team of reformists in the early 1990s, which were impossible to realise at the time due to conflicts between the Kremlin and legislative powers. Chechnya and Russia: The purpose of this analysis is to examine the significance of the Chechen issue for contemporary Russia. Part I discusses the history of the conflict from 1991 to date and the impact of developments in the republic on Russia as a whole. Part II is an attempt to indicate the areas of Russian reality that are most deeply affected by the Chechen problem.

In the shadow of history. Romanian-Moldovan relations. OSW Studies 53, September 2015

Romania and Moldova have developed very strong ties, resulting mainly from many years of common history (including joint statehood), language and cultural heritage. On the one hand, this closeness fosters bilateral relations, but on the other hand it places a serious burden upon them. This is because Moldovan statehood and identity has in some way been built in opposition to Romanian statehood and identity. Part of Moldovan society (especially the Russian-speaking minority) fears closer cooperation with Bucharest, seeing it as threatening a loss of independence and the declaration of unification with its western neighbour. Historic sentiment is also reflected in Bucharest’s policy towards Moldova. Officially, relations with Chisinau are considered as exceptional, and representatives of the Romanian political class are full of declarations of assistance and support for their eastern neighbour, appealing to the national, cultural and linguistic community. In practice, however, Romanian policy towards Moldova (and hence also the two countries’ bilateral relations) is most often shaped not by sentiment but by political pragmatism, resulting among others from a desire to win the support of the Romanian electorate.