EU Facilitated Dialogue: Another exercise in constructive ambiguity. CEPS Commentary, 28 August 2015

Under the auspices of the EU, Belgrade and Pristina have signed new agreements on how to further normalise their relations. Yet these agreements, including on the creation of an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo, are the continuation of an exercise in constructive ambiguity, argues Dusan Reljic in this CEPS Commentary. He makes the point that the proper implementation of these much heralded agreements will be something of a challenge.

EU Mission in Kosovo (EULEX): Constructing Ambiguity or Constructive Disunity? Transatlantic Security Paper No. 3, June 2011

In which skies should auspices about the future of EU foreign policy be looked for, Libya’s or Kosovo’s? Many commentators have been prompt in digging the grave for EU Security and Defense Policy after Member States’ discordance over taking military action against the Qaddafi regime1. However, as this paper will emphasize through the case of Kosovo, unanimity is not always an indispensable prerequisite – and should not be regarded as the sole criteria – to EU action in regional security. Overly focusing on the ‘speak with one voice’ mantra sometimes leads to stop short of assessing actual outcomes.

Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 205/31.03.2016

Russia’s increasingly aggressive policy and its enhanced military activity in the Nordic-Baltic region has led to revaluations in Sweden’s and Finland’s security and defence policies and a rethinking of the formats of their military co-operation. While remaining outside NATO, the two states have been developing closer bilateral defence co-operation and working more closely with the United States, while at the same time developing co-operation with NATO. Sweden and Finland perceive the United States as the guarantor of regional and European security. From their point of view, the United States is currently the country that has both the necessary military capabilities and the political will to react in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Nordic-Baltic region, in which both countries would inevitably become involved despite their non-aligned status. For Sweden and Finland, intensified co-operation with the United States offers an alternative to NATO membership, which is currently out of the question for domestic political reasons. Meanwhile, the US has also become increasingly aware of the strategic importance of the two states, which, for the purposes of contingency planning, are in fact an extension of NATO’s north-eastern flank.