The EU power sector needs long-term price signals. CEPS Special Report No. 135/April 2016

By 2030, half of the EU’s electricity demand will be covered by renewables and will need to be accompanied by flexible conventional back-up resources. Due to the high upfront costs inherent to renewables and the progressively lower running times associated with back-up capacity, the cost of capital will have a proportionately greater impact on total costs than today. This report examines how electricity markets can be designed to provide long-term price signals, thereby reducing the cost of capital for these technologies and allowing for a more efficient transition. It finds that current market arrangements are unable to provide long-term price signals. To address this issue, we argue that a system for long-term contracts with a regulated counterparty could be implemented. A centralised system where capacity or energy or a combination of both is contracted, could be introduced for conventional and renewable capacity, based on a regional adequacy assessment and with a competitive bidding system in place to ensure cost-effectiveness. Member states face a number of legislative barriers while implementing these types of systems, however, which could be reduced by merging legislation and setting EU framework rules for the design of these contractual agreements.

More Competitive, More Efficient? The 2013 European Commission Defence Communication. Security Policy Brief No. 49, September 2013

The European Commission has now released its 2013 Communication on defence-industrial policy. But does the latest set of policy ideas offer European defence-industrial cooperation any new impetus? This Brief argues that while the majority of the Commission’s initiatives are not new, some much needed ideas have made their way into the latest Communication.

How to keep a competitive edge in the talent game: Lessons for the EU from China and the US. CEPS Task Force Report, 13 June 2014

This report is based on discussions within the CEPS Task Force on “The Quantity and Quality of Human Capital in Higher Education: Comparing the EU, the US and China", chaired by Jan-Eric Sundgren, Senior Adviser to the CEO of Volvo, and former President of Chalmers University of Technology in Gothenburg. It aims to draw salient lessons from the successes and failures in higher education practices in the EU, the US and China by comparing key education indicators and policy trends. Against the background of the profound tectonic shifts affecting the talent distribution around the world, which is fundamentally changing the global ‘brain game’, the authors argue that it is important that the EU as a whole creates ‘virtuous circles’ of talent and innovation to sustain prosperity and growth, as well as to secure the long-term well-being and quality of life in Europe.

Has the European ICT sector a chance to be competitive? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 14/2006

In this paper we try to present the main trends of evolution of the ICT sector. Its dynamics, supported by a constant technical progress in ICs, compounded with “non convexities” such as network effects and high sunk costs, may either lead to a Schumpeter Mark I or Schumpeter Mark II competition regime. This means that in some segments, the market will be more competitive (Mark I), while in other it will be more monopolistic (Mark II). But a key trend is also the so called “convergence”. But digitization makes it cost effective to integrate different communications, information processing and entertainment systems and devices. Hence, Schumpeter Mark II grows at the core where software production dominates, while Schumpeter Mark I is established at the periphery. In this context, the European ICT industry is potentially smashed between two forces: the cost advantages of Asian countries on one hand, the inventiveness and dynamism of the US industry on the other hand. The way out of this very difficult situation is to create in Europe the conditions of restoring knowledge accumulation in a key sub-sector of ICT, that is software production. To do this, Europe can rely on its tradition of cooperation and knowledge sharing and on a set of institutions that have shown their ability to stimulate inter-regional cooperation. By concentrating on an ambitious project of open source software production in embarked systems and domestic networks, Europe could reach several objectives: to make freely accessible an essential facility, to stimulate competition, to help reaching the Lisbon objectives and to restore the European competitiveness in ICT.

Sustaining international competitive advantage through capability renewal: the case of CEMEX. ACES Working Papers, August 2009

In this paper we do not enter in the dispute of whether a new theory is needed to explain the factors that make it possible for EMNEs to give their initial steps beyond their home markets. Rather, we are interested in finding out how some of these firms have been able to sustain their international competitive edge for decades allowing them to become major players in their industry at the global level.

Competitive Representative Claimsmaking: Party Politicians and Institutional Factors in the Case of EU Budget Negotiations

This study provides an empirical comparative case study of representative claims-making in EU budget negotiations. Two questions are addressed in this paper. First, the paper asks what the role of elected or appointed partisan politicians is in comparison to other representatives. This question is relevant given the reported increasing importance of non-elected representatives. Secondly, the paper asks what the influence of institutional factors is on the practice of representative claims-making. As representative claims-making unfolds in the public sphere, the institutional factors of the public sphere may affect both the claimants it provides a platform for as well as constituencies represented. The paper finds that politicians continue to perform a crucial role in representation, both with regards to their prominence in the public sphere and with regards to the plurality of constituencies represented in their claims. Although institutional factors clearly affect claimants, there are much less pronounced – though noticeable – differences in the constituencies represented in different public spheres. The overall picture is one of a highly plural representative space in which multiple claimants compete with each other to get their message across. In doing so, claimants address the interests of multiple constituencies. It may well be the inherent competition among claimants, fostered by institutional factors, that ensures the plurality of the EU representative space.