Moldova – Heading into a hot autumn. EPC Policy Brief, 6 October 2014

After four years of negotiations, Moldova signed an Association Agreement (AA) including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) Agreement with the European Union (EU) on 27 June 2014. Ratified in the Moldovan Parliament on 2 July it came into provisional application on 1 September. While this development represents an important milestone in Moldova’s relations with the EU, the journey has not been easy. Russia has increased its presence and pressure in the region, as the country gets closer to bettering relations with the EU, Russia has increased its activities in Moldova, including in the autonomous region of Gagauzia and in the breakaway region of Transnistria. Alongside pressure from Russia, the next few months will be very politically challenging for Moldova, with internal and external developments continuing to shape Moldova’s future. Not only will Chisinau need to move ahead with the difficult and expensive implementation of the DCFTA, the ruling coalition simultaneously needs to campaign for the elections with very importantly, a united front. In this Policy Brief, Amanda Paul presents the state of play and the prospects of Moldova since signing the Association Agreement with the EU and explores the effects of Russian bans on exports and services, access to energy and trade as well as the role of the EU

EU Sanctions Policy towards Russia: The Sanctioner-Sanctionee’s Game of Thrones. CEPS Working Document No. 402/January 2015

Since Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the start of the conflict in the Donbass region, the EU has introduced three waves of restrictive measures against Russia, which are regularly updated. Having thus expanded from measures targeting individuals to entire sectors, the current EU sanctions policy impacts Russia’s financial markets, energy sector and defence industry. On top of this, new bans affect EU investments, services and trade in Crimea and Sevastopol. While they hurt the Russian economy, the EU sanctions also have a boomerang effect, especially in conjunction with the countersanctions imposed by the Kremlin on EU food imports. In this lose-lose situation, the usefulness of the EU sanctions has been called into doubt, in particular in those EU member states that are the most economically intertwined with Russia. How successful has the EU been so far in pushing its case with the Kremlin and what moves are left for the two main actors in the sanctioner-sanctionee ‘Game of Thrones’? This Working Document offers a SWOT analysis of the EU sanctions policy towards Russia and identifies the Strengths for the EU to cultivate, Weaknesses to minimise, Opportunities to seize and Threats to counteract.

The Effects of Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions on EU-Russian Trade Flows. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2016

After Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014 and then intervened, manu militari, in the Eastern part of Ukraine, the European Union wanted to show its disapproval and put pressure on Russia to change its behaviour. A wide variety of measures were taken, including the imposition of individual restrictions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, but also the suspension of development loans from the EBRD. But the EU (together with the United States) also took, in July and September 2014, a set of broader measures: limited access to EU primary and secondary capital markets for targeted Russian financial institutions and energy and defence companies; export and import bans on trade in arms; an export ban for dual-use goods and reduction of Russia’s access to sensitive technologies and services linked to oil production.