Developments in the Agricultural and Rural Capital Market of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 9, October 2011

The undeveloped rural capital market in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is constrained by an urban–rural development gap, with limited capacities for rural development and imperfections in the rural capital market. Among the most striking hindrances are the illegal status of a large share of agricultural buildings and other real estate in rural areas, particularly on the individual family farms that prevail in the country, and the insufficient knowledge and abilities of individual farmers in applying for credit. National, EU and other donor funds are being used to improve knowledge, skills and other human resources, and to address the illegal status of buildings and facilities. In recent years, government support for agricultural, rural and regional development has been introduced to promote good agricultural practices, production and economic activity in rural areas. The elimination of imperfections and improvements to the functioning of the capital market – making access to credit and funds easier, especially for small-scale family farms and for rural development – are seen as measures contributing to agriculture and more balanced rural and regional development.

Money for structural reforms in the eurozone: making sense of contractual arrangements. Egmont Paper 57, May 2013

Executive Summary. Both the Commission’s proposal for a ‘Competitiveness and Convergence Instrument’ and the ‘contractual arrangement’ presented by President Van Rompuy share a common concept: associating EU money with national structural reforms under a binding arrangement. The targeted ‘structural reforms’ are the labour market reforms and product and services market reforms in eurozone ‘peripheral’ countries facing the most severe external imbalances. Their implementation would speed up and facilitate the ‘internal devaluation’ process of these countries. In the worst case scenario, failure to adopt the necessary reforms and to adjust wages and prices downwards may lead the most vulnerable countries to leave the eurozone under social and political pressure. Contracts seek to reduce this risk by increasing compliance with the country-specific recommendations for structural reforms issued by the EU institutions within the European Semester, and in particular with the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). As for the financial support, it follows two different, albeit overlapping rationales. First, the perspective of obtaining EU funding would incentivize the governments of vulnerable countries to adopt reforms that would bear a high political and social cost in the short term. That is, without some form of incentive, it is unlikely that the necessary reforms would be undertaken and this could have significant negative consequences for the EMU as a whole. The second rationale amounts to outright solidarity: EU support is needed to cushion the inevitable socio-economic costs implied not only by the structural reform, but also by the internal devaluation taking place. To make sense of contractual arrangements, some points should be considered in future discussions: 1. Contracts on a voluntary basis only: Contracts cannot be mandatory unlike initially suggested in the Van Rompuy report. This stems not only from the inherent definition of a ‘contract’ – where mutual consent is key – but also from the non-binding nature of the preventive arm of the MIP. Making the country-specific recommendations issued by the EU institutions systematically binding would imply transfers of sovereignty from the national to the EU level that go well beyond the present discussion. Instead, contracts would introduce the possibility of making the preventive arm binding for some countries where corrections are most needed and urgent for the EMU as a whole.

Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media Sector. Research Papers in Law, 7/2006

From the Introduction. The Media Sector has experienced a technological revolution in the last 15 years. Digital encoding of television signals made possible a more efficient use of the radiospectrum. Digital terrestrial television (hereinafter, “DTT”) allows now for the reception of a significant number of free-to-air channels.1 Moreover, the use of new transmission platforms (hereinafter,“platforms”), namely cable and direct-to-home satellite (hereinafter, “DTH”) paved the way for the arrival in Europe of pay-TV operators, which finance their activities mainly via subscription fees. This changing technological landscape is subject to further evolution in the near future, as incumbent telecommunications operators become increasingly interested in making available broadcasting content2 as part of their broadband offer and 3G mobile handsets can be used for the reception of TV signals....The present paper seeks to ascertain whether the Commission “regulatory approach” towards the exclusive sale of premium content is a sound one, in particular in view of the constant technological evolution outlined above. The assumptions underlying landmark Commission decisions will be compared with recent developments of the media sector in Italy. In the NewsCorp./Telepiù case, decided in 2003, the Commission imposed very strict conditions to allow the merger giving birth to Sky Italia, on the assumption that the operation created a lasting near-monopsony in the different upstream markets for the acquisition of premium intervened against the media conglomerate Mediaset (which controls, inter alia, the main three private free-to-air channels in Italy) for an alleged abuse of dominant position.17 In fact, and contrary to the forecasts made by the Commission, Mediaset was in a position to acquire the broadcasting rights of the main Italian football teams, thereby excluding the incumbent (and near-monopolist) pay-TV operator, Sky Italia. This may go to show that the reality of the sector is more complex and evolves faster than one may infer from the Commission practice, thus putting into question its stance regarding exclusivity. The experience of the evolution of the Italian media sector will be used as the starting point for the evaluation of alternative regulatory options.

An Asian alternative? Russia's chances of making Asia an alternative to relations with the West. OSW Point of View, June 2008

Under Vladimir Putin's rule, Russia consistently and systematically expanded its activity in Asia, establishing closer political contacts with key countries in the region, rebuilding relations with former allies from Soviet times, and strengthening its presence in the Asian markets, in the energy sphere also. These activities were accompanied by intensive Russian propaganda, the message of which was that relations with the West can be restricted in favour of developing closer relations with Asian states. A justified question concerning the Russian Federation's realistic possibilities arises in this context: To what extent can it make Asia an alternative to theWest in geopolitical, economic and energy terms? Can Russia build an anti-Western alliance with Asian states? Is it able to reduce its dependence on the European market by developing its trade with Asia? Is it possible to redirect a substantial portion of Russian energy resource exports onto Asian markets? A presentation of the existing ties between Russia and theWest (here considered as the USA and the EU) will serve as a starting point for answering these questions. The following chapters will analyse Russia's opportunities in Asia in terms of geopolitical issues, the economy and energy

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market. OSW Study 50/2014

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.

A Contribution to The Study of Global Competition for Talent: the determinants of student mobility and its consequences for the internationalization of the labor market. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 27/2013

In a globalized economy the skills of the workforce are a key determinant of the competitiveness of a country. One of the goals of Higher Education is precisely to develop the students’ skills in order to allow them to match the increasing demand for highly qualified workers while it is simultaneously the best period of life to acquire multicultural skills. For this reason, the European Union has fostered student mobility through several programs: the Erasmus program and the Bologna process are the best known among them. Although student mobility is a growing phenomenon, publications and research on the subject remain relatively scarce. This paper aims to contribute to that literature through an empirical analysis which exploits a questionnaire submitted to university alumni and focuses on two research questions: what drives studies abroad and what drives expatriation of graduates. Our empirical analysis first shows that exposure to international experiences before entering tertiary education and family background are the main factors influencing student mobility. A second conclusion is that studying abroad increases the international mobility on the labor market. Both confirm previous studies. Moreover, by making a distinction between participating in the Erasmus program and in other exchange programs or internships abroad, we found that the Erasmus program and the other programs or internships have an equivalent influence on the international mobility on the labor market: they increase by 9 to 12.5 percentage points a student’s chance to be mobile on the international labor market. This result shows the legitimacy of the Erasmus program, but it also reveals the important impact of other forms of experience abroad. It provides support for policy makers to encourage mobility programs, in order to foster integration of the European labor market.

Interconnector Investment for a Well-Functioning Internal Market: What EU regime of regulatory incentives? Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 18/October 2010

Sufficient cross‐border electricity transmission infrastructure is a pre‐requisite for a functioning European internal market for electricity. Also, the achievement of the EU’s energy policy objectives – sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply – critically depends on adequate investment in physical interconnections between the member states. Mainly focusing on the “regulatory path”, this paper assesses different ways to achieve a sufficient level of interconnector investment. In a first step, economic analysis identifies numerous impediments to interconnector investment adding up to an “interconnector investment failure”. Reflecting on the proper regulatory design of an EU framework able to overcome the interconnector investment failure, a number of recommendations are put forward:  All congestion rents should be channeled into interconnector building. Unused rents should be transferred to a European interconnector fund supervised by an EU agency.  Even though inherently sub‐optimal, merchant transmission investment can be used as a means to put pressure on regulated transmission system operators (TSO) that do not deliver. An EU agency should have exclusive competence on merchant interconnector exemptions.  A European TSO organization should be entrusted with supra‐national network planning, supervised by an EU agency.  The agency should decide on investment cost reallocation for interconnector projects that yield strong externalities. Payments could be settled via a European interconnector fund.  In case of non‐compliance with the supra‐national network plan, the EU agency should have the right to organize a tender – financed by the European interconnector fund – in order to get the “missing link” built. Assessing the existing EU regulatory framework, the efforts of the 2009 “third energy package” to fill the “regulatory gap” with new EU bodies – ACER and ENTSO‐E – are acknowledged. However, striking holes in regulatory framework are spotted, notably with regard to the use of congestion rents, interconnector cost allocation, and the distribution of decision making powers on new infrastructure exemptions A discussion of the TEN‐E interconnector funding scheme shows that massive funding can be an interim solution to the problem of insufficient interconnection capacities while overcoming the political deadlock on sensible regulatory topics such as interconnector cost allocation. The paper ends with policy recommendations.

Making the most of Energy Union. CEPS Commentary, 16 December 2014

By elevating “Energy Union” to the status of a Commission mission statement, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker succeeded in forging a new EU consensus on energy and climate change at the October European Council meeting. In a move that was made possible by linking the internal energy market and climate change agendas to security of supply, solidarity and infrastructure, the initiative notably meets the interests of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the peripheral member states. This commentary by a team of energy specialists at CEPS applauds this new development, but cautions that the European Commission will soon need to give it real meaning and substance before Energy Union can become reality. With this objective in mind, the authors outline six priorities to which Commission Vice President Maroš Šefčovič should give immediate attention.

The Cultural Construction of Political Action: The Case of the European Community's Single Market Program. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.3, December 1993

Explaining the emergence of the European Community's Single Market Program requires making sense of how that institutional project carne onto the political agenda. I suggest that there are two features of the political process that have been not well understood. First, large-scale institutional projects usually require political opportunities to come to fruition. Second, they require strategic actors who can frame such projects in broad ways in order to attract a wide variety of groups. My basic argument is that the European Commission is an organization whose function is primarily to solve the bargaining game that characterizes interaction within the Community and act as a strategic actor. This does not suggest that they are always successful or are the only source of ideas, but instead that they are the collective actor responsible for trying to frame collective interests in new cultural ways. To illustrate this point, I document how the; Single Market program evolved within the Commission and how other important Community actors carne to sign on to its goals over time.

TRAC: a market-based tax on capital flight as an alternative to Grexit. CEPS Commentary, 7 May 2015

In this CEPS Commentary, Daniel Gros turns his attention to the main outstanding problem facing Greece today, namely capital flight. Fearful that the country will leave the euro, depositors are withdrawing cash from their bank accounts – thereby making this event more likely. He outlines a proposal in which outgoing payments from Greek banks in the form of cash or via the TARGET system would be limited to the amount of incoming payments, i.e. revenues from exports or tourism, via an auction system. Greece could remain formally a member of the euro area, but the price for cash withdrawals would encourage depositors to wait and stimulate exports.

What strategy for a genuine Single Market? CEPS Special Report No. 126/January 2016

This strategy paper focuses on making the most of the EU single market. The EU should pursue a genuine single market, and treat it as a common asset of all its citizens, economic operators and member states. The economic case to be made on behalf of the genuine single market is powerful and even more so due to the findings of recent empirical economic research. However, only the genuine single market can realise the expectations of such large gains. Weak, ‘feasible’ action plans cannot! The strategy is based, first of all, on a clear design of the genuine single market and subsequently concentrates on ‘what it takes’. Ten types of actions sum up ‘what it takes’: five at the EU level, four at the EU-member state interface, and finally, the realisation of legitimacy and acceptance.