Casual but Smart: The Court’s new clothes in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty. Research Papers in Law, 2/2008

Introduction. Unintended as it was, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court, the Court of the EU) has played an extremely important role in the construction of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999. The fact that this is a new field of EU competence, poses afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its Member States, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) extent of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions have prompted judicial solutions which take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.1 The ECJ is the body whose institutional role is to benefit most from this upcoming ‘depilarisation’, possibly more than that of the European Parliament. This structure is on the verge of being abandoned, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.2 However spectacular this formal boost of the Court’s competence, the changes in real terms are not going to be that dramatic. This apparent contradiction is explained, to a large extent, by the fact that the Court has in many ways ‘provoked’, or even ‘anticipated’, the depilarisation of its own jurisdictional role, already under the existing three-pillar structure. Simply put, under the new – post Treaty of Lisbon – regime, the Court will have full jurisdiction over all AFSJ matters, as those are going to be fully integrated in what is now the first pillar. Some limitations will continue to apply, however, while a special AFSJ procedure will be institutionalised. Indeed, if we look into the new Treaty we may identify general modifications to the Court’s structure and jurisdiction affecting the AFSJ (section 2), modifications in the field of the AFSJ stemming from the abolition of the pillar structure (section 3) and, finally, some rules specifically applicable to the AFSJ (section 4).

Carbon leakage: an overview. CEPS Special Report No. 79, 6 December 2013

Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on climate policy, given the confluence of issues that are currently being debated, including the 2030 Energy and Climate Framework and the review of the EU carbon leakage list by 2014. Carbon leakage is the result of asymmetrical carbon policies, especially carbon pricing, and the resulting carbon cost, which affects the international competitive position of some EU industry and could displace production and/or investment, and the emissions of the activities displaced. This paper identifies the difference between carbon price and carbon cost to leakage exposed industry as one of two fundamental issues to be understood and addressed; lack of visibility on future climate policies and anti-leakage provisions is the other key issue. While this is a global issue, most of the experience has been accumulated in the EU. Carbon leakage is only one of the factors that could affect the competitive position of sectors, but it is difficult to attribute the impact of carbon costs versus other variables such as energy costs, labour, etc. Studies have predicted the risk of a significant amount of production leakage in a number of energy-intensive industries. To address the danger, they were included in the EU ETS carbon leakage list, which gave them access to free allowances. However, a limited number of studies undertaken after the end of the second trading period (2012) show little evidence of production leakage and asks the question whether the issue has not been blown out of proportion. The paper argues that the past may not be a good representation of the future, as it was heavily influenced by a high level of free allocation, the exceptional economic downturn, CO2 prices significantly below what was anticipated, as well as the potential for changes in some fundamental variables such as the shrinking pool of allowances available for free allocation. It emphasises the need for a well-informed debate in the EU on measures to address carbon leakage post-2020, underpinned by a number of options, and objective criteria to evaluate those options. It emphasises that the debate should cover both investment and production leakage, caused by both direct and indirect carbon costs.

REACH: A killer whale for SMEs? CEPS Policy Brief No. 307, 9 December 2013

REACH is a very demanding system for any business either large or small, yet right from the start one of the more serious concerns was whether and how SMEs could cope with the Regulation. After all, some 27,600 companies in EU chemistry are SMEs (95% of all firms). Seven years down the line, many of these fears are materialising. Assuming no significant changes are introduced to REACH, this paper suggests the following recommendations: Above all, we strongly encourage SMEs to start early and develop a strategy for REACH compliance well before 2018. Address the potential competition law implications of current SIEF arrangements, e.g. through a Guidance document from DG Competition by 2014 (in time for 2018) Facilitate the exchange of information along the value chain by adopting pragmatic approach to the content and format of Safety Data Sheets. More can be done on the IT front as well, for instance by developing tools that generate compliant Safety Data Sheets. Improve the communication of REACH and its intended goals, that is, the health and environmental benefits, to the wider public. SMEs regret the unawareness of the public in the light of the enormous efforts they have to undertake. In the event of a later review of REACH, the logic should be risk-based rather than hazard-based.

Implementation of the Macroeconomic Adjustment Programmes in the Euro Area: State-of-Play. CEPS E-Book, 11 March 2014

Two of the four macroeconomic adjustment programmes – in Portugal and Ireland – can be considered a success in the sense that the initial expectations in terms of adjustment, both fiscal and external, were broadly fulfilled. A rebound based on exports has taken hold in these two countries, but a full recovery will take years. In Greece the initial plans were insufficient. While the strong impact of the fiscal adjustment on demand could have been partially anticipated at the time, the resistance to structural reforms was more surprising and remains difficult to cure. The fiscal adjustment is now almost completed, but the external adjustment has not proceeded well. Exports are stagnating despite impressive falls in wage costs. In Cyprus, the outcome has so far been less severe than initially feared. It is still too early to find robust evidence in any country that the programmes have increased the long-term growth potential. Survey-based evidence suggests that structural reforms have not yet taken hold. The EU-led macroeconomic adjustment programmes outside the euro area (e.g. Latvia) seem to have been much stricter, but the adjustment was quicker and followed by a stronger rebound.

Integrating Ukraine and Moldova in EU's energy security plans. EPC Commentary, 23 June 2014

Vulnerability in the EU’s internal energy market has been made starker since the Russia-Ukraine crisis, highlighting specifically the importance of upstream energy linkages. March this year saw the European Council calling for a comprehensive plan to reduce the EU’s energy dependence. The European Commission responded to this call with a communication on Energy Security published on 28 May, in time for another European Council at the end of June, at which a decision is anticipated.

The eastern ‘partnership’ of gas. Gazprom and CNPC strike a deal on gas supplies to China. OSW COMMENTARY No. 139, 2014-06-16

The CEOs of Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract concerning Russian gas supplies to China on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. The contract had been under negotiation for many years and was signed in the presence of the two countries’ presidents. Under this 30-year deal, ultimately 38 billion m3 of natural gas will be exported annually from eastern Siberian fields (Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye) via the Power of Siberia pipeline planned for construction in 2015–2019. The lengthy negotiation process (initial talks regarding this issue began back in the 1990s), the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract (it was signed only on the second day of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai, and the Russian president’s personal engagement in the final phase of the talks turned out to be a key element) and information concerning the provisions of the contract (the clause determining the contract price has not been revealed) all indicate that the terms of the compromise are more favourable for China than for Russia. This contract is at present important to Russia mainly for political reasons (it will use the future diversification of gas export routes as an instrument in negotiations with the EU). However, the impact of this instrument seems to be limited since supplies cannot be redirected from Europe to Asia. It is unclear whether the contract will bring the anticipated long-term economic benefits to Gazprom. The gas price is likely to remain at a level of between US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3. Given the high costs of gas field operation and production and transport infrastructure development, this may mean that supplies will be carried out at the margin of profitability. The Shanghai contract does not conclude the negotiation process since a legally binding agreement on gas pipeline construction has not been signed and not all of the financial aspects of the project have been agreed upon as yet (such as the issue of possible Chinese prepayments for gas supplies).

The Economics of State Aid for the Rescue and Restructuring of Firms in Difficulty: Theoretical Considerations, Empirical Analysis and Proposals for Reform. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 27/September 2013

State aid for rescue and restructuring (R&R) of companies in difficulty causes a significant distortion of competition. It prevents the market from eliminating inefficient companies. Because of this, the European Commission has to be specially strict when it assesses rescue or restructuring aid. This paper examines recent cases of corporate restructuring partly funded with public money. It explains the main aspects of the current guidelines which are applicable to R&R State Aid and establishes a theoretical framework for the economic assessment of R&R aid. It then analyses decisions adopted by the European Commission concerning R&R state aid during the period 2000-2013. It finds that there is little economic rationale in the granting of R&R aid. The paper concludes by applying the lessons drawn from the empirical analysis to the anticipated revision of the R&R guidelines in the context of the State Aid Modernisation process.

The Electoral Verdict and After: The Road Ahead for India. Asia Policy Brief 2014/04, June 2014

The convincing victory of the BJP in the 2014 Indian general elections came as a surprise to many. Most opinion polls, which had predicted a win for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that it leads, had not anticipated the scale of the party’s victory. The BJP alone won 282 seats and the NDA 336 out of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. Two things stand out in the verdict. This is the first time in 30 years that a party won a majority on its own; this is also the worst-ever showing by India’s grand old party, the Indian National Congress, which won a mere 44 seats, 70 less than its previous all-time low in 1999.

Vučić’s plebiscite almost slipped on arithmetics. EPC Commentary, 29 April 2016

As largely anticipated, the incumbent Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, secured another four years in power at the snap elections that took place on 24 April. However, the results suggest that Vučić has overplayed his hand with this personal plebiscite: simple arithmetics unmasked his exaggerated hope to wipe out the opposition and consolidate political dominance. This might bode well for political pluralism but voters’ preferences and the affixed party options caution against taking Serbia’s commitment to European integration for granted.

Towards an Effective EU Framework for Road Transport and GHG Emissions. CEPS Special Report No. 141 / July 2016

The adoption of the Paris Agreement at the end of 2015 and the EU’s intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) have confirmed the EU’s commitment to achieve decarbonisation by 2050. Transport accounts for about a quarter of EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, representing the second-largest source of GHG emissions in Europe after the energy sector. The transport sector will play a significant role in the EU’s efforts to decarbonise its economy in line with its international commitments. The purpose of this report is to examine different EU policy options to address transport emissions, with a special emphasis on passenger cars. It ‘thinks through’ the options that are currently assessed in the EU and considers how they could be put together in a comprehensive framework. The report concludes with a number of measures to lead EU transport decarbonisation policy. A distinction is made between i) no-regret options and ii) measures for consideration.