15 resultados para amplificatore lock-in labview strumento misura segnali rumore energy gap
em Archive of European Integration
In 1985 the energy situation in Europe will look different. Information [Energy I] 66/74. X/888/74-E
Resumo:
During Russian PM Dmitry Medvedevs working visit to Minsk on 18 July, Russia and Belarus signed a general contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Belarus. The signature brought to an end the complex negotiations which had been underway since January 2009 involving the leadership in Minsk, the Russian government and Atomstroyexport, the Russian company that will be the main contractor of the investment. However, the power plants future ownership structure, management arrangements and terms and conditions of profit sharing remain unclear. The Belarusian leadership hopes that with the launch of the nuclear power plant, it will be able to reduce gas imports from Russia, gas being the main resource used in producing heat and electricity in Belarus. This should in turn reduce the costs of energy generation. In addition, Minsk expects that the new investment will allow it to export electricity surpluses to the European Union, including Poland. Agreements concerning the power plant have been concluded over the last year or so and, according to these, Russia has acquired partial control of the Belarusian electricity grid, especially with regard to the transmission of energy to foreign markets. Russia is also the sole creditor and contractor for the investment, and the sole future provider of nuclear fuel. Therefore, implementation of the project will exacerbate Minsks already significant dependence on Moscow in energy and political terms.
Resumo:
One year after the events of Fukushima the implementation of the new German energy strategy adopted in the summer of 2011 is being verified. Business circles, experts and publicists are sounding the alarm. The tempo at which the German economy is being rearranged in order that it uses renewable energy sources is so that it has turned out to be an extremely difficult and expensive task. The implementation of the key guidelines of the new strategy, such as the development of the transmission networks and the construction of new conventional power plants, is meeting increasing resistance in the form of economic and legal difficulties. The development of the green technologies sector is also posing problems. The solar energy industry, for example, is excessively subsidised, whereas the subsidies for the construction of maritime wind farms are too low. At present, only those guidelines of the strategy which are evaluated as economically feasible by investors or which receive adequate financial support from the state have a chance of being carried through. The strategy may also turn out to be unsuccessful due to the lack of a comprehensive coordination of its implementation and the financial burden its introduction entails for both the public and the economy. In the immediate future, the German government will make efforts not only to revise its internal regulations in order to enable the realisation of the energy transformation; it is also likely to undertake a number of measures at the EU forum which will facilitate this realisation. One should expect that the German government will actively support the financing of both the development of the energy networks in EU member states and the development of renewable energy sources in the energy sector.
Resumo:
In all political systems there is a gap between the rhetoric of electoral programmes and the practical work of institutions, argues author Riccardo Perissich, but the vision thing is often a necessary prerequisite to reaching difficult decisions. When it comes to European institutions, which include the member states acting collectively, the desirable vision the goal of European unity has always been there and is still very much alive. Also, the existence of a broadly defined political goal has often facilitated agreements that were in fact purely necessary. However, because we lack a pan-European constituency to debate it, the narrative about this goal has been translated into different languages and is all but common. In fact, we have never seriously tried to unify it. Indeed, Europeans stopped debating what is desirable a long time ago: they simply react to events.
Resumo:
Introduction. Shale gas is an unconventional form of gas1 because its extraction is more difficult or less economical than that of conventional natural gas. It has become an important item of energy policy during the last years since new processes have allowed its extraction. In the medium term, shale gas should foster a reinforcement of the gas part in the worlds energy mix. In 2011, the IEA released an influential report entitled Are we entering a golden age of gas? This report suggests that shale gas could help substantially boost global gas use.2 It also warns at the same time that this success could bring into question the international goal of limiting the long-term increase in the global temperature to 2 C above pre-industrial levels. In the world economy, the impact of shale gas is increasing rapidly (especially in the USA, albeit apparently not as significantly as expected3). In the EU, its perspectives remain uncertain, for many reasons. Estimates are not reliable. Shale gas exploitation remains a controversial issue due to geology, lack of infrastructure and also fears for the environment and public health. The EU institutions seem to have a favorable attitude towards shale gas development while the Member States attitude seems to vary from enthusiasm to hesitation or opposition. Public opinion on the issue appears quite divided everywhere. This brief paper will examine various estimations of potential resources in the EU ( 1), the potential costs and benefits ( 2), the initiatives taken by the EU institutions ( 3) and the national authorities ( 4), and finally the emerging EU framework ( 5). The conclusion is, rather surprisingly, that whatever happens on this front, this will not modify the present structural challenges of the EU in the domains of climate and energy.4
Resumo:
Many European and American observers of the EC have criticized "intergovemmentalist" ac counts for exaggerating the extent of member state control over the process of European integra tion. This essay seeks to ground these criticisms in a "historical institutionalist" account that stresses the need to study European integration as a political process which unfolds over time. Such a perspective highlights the limits of member-state control over long-term institutional de velopment, due to preoccupation with shorHerm concerns, the ubiquity of unintended conse quences, and processes that "lock in" past decusions and make reassertions of member-state control difficult. Brief examination of the evolution of social policy in the EC suggests the limita tions of treating the EC as an international regime facilitating collective action among essentially sovereign states. It is ore useful to view integration as a "path-dependent" process that has pro duced a fragmented but still discernible "multitiered" European polity.