Simulation Results of AgriPoliS about Diminishing Capital Subsidies and Restrictions. Factor Markets Working Document No. 55, June 2013

This paper investigates the impacts of high interest rates for borrowed capital and credit restrictions on the structural development of four European regions. The method used is the model AgriPoliS which is a spatial-dynamic agent-based model. It is able to provide aggregated results at the regional level, but very individual results as well by considering farms as independent entities. Farms can choose between different investment options during the simulation. Several scenarios with different interest rates for borrowed capital on the one hand as well as with different levels of credit restrictions on the other hand are tested and compared. Results show that higher interest rates have less impact on declining production branches than on expanding ones. If they have the possibility farms invest in the most profitable production branch which relative profitability might have changed with high interest rates. Credit restrictions lead farms to choose smaller and cheaper investments than expensive and large ones. Results also show that income losses in both cases due to under-investment compared to the reference situation are partially compensated by lower rental prices. The impacts on structural change also differ depending on the region and the initial situation. In summary, credit subsidies or imperfections on credit markets might have indirect impacts on the type of dominant investment and therefore on the whole regional agricultural sector as well.

The European Commission and International Trade Negotiations: A Principal-Agent Approach. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2011

Starting from the concept of delegation of power in external trade policy, this paper aims to investigate the dynamics surrounding the European Union’s position in international trade negotiations. The analysis centres on the role of the European Commission (the agent), which by means of Treaty-based delegation and as mandated by the Council (the principal) acts as the sole trade negotiator in the international sphere on behalf of the European Union (EU). The broader negotiating process is thus conceptualised as a threelevel game, where the Commission holds an intermediary position between the European and international levels and also interacts with the Member States in the Council. After an insight into the European decision-making process for external trade, the paper further analyses the Commission’s role during the multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha Development Round. By applying the principal-agent theory to international trade negotiations in general, and subsequently to the controversial agricultural negotiations, this paper seeks to investigate some of the potential sources of autonomy that the Commission can draw upon while upholding an EU position at the international level, in addition to the “hardball” job of balancing the interests of the Member States with those of World Trade Organisation (WTO) partners. Along these lines, the paper finally aims to contribute to the literature concerning agency autonomy in EU external trade relations but also to provide a better understanding of inter-institutional relations within the EU as they may unfold in practice.