Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. CEPS Working Document No. 400, September 2014

While EU and US sanctions against Russia over its aggression in Ukraine, and Russia’s counter-sanctions, are much discussed due to their evident political significance, less attention has been given to Russia’s punitive sanctions against the three Eastern European states – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – that have signed with the EU Association Agreements (AA), which include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) provisions. This paper therefore documents these trade policy restrictions and embargoes imposed by Russia, and provides some first indications of their impact. The immediate impact on trade flows, especially for agri-food products, has been substantial, albeit with some leakage through Belarus. The main instrument for the Russian measures has been allegations of non-conformity with Russian technical standards, although the correlation of these allegations with movements in Russia’s geopolitical postures makes it obvious that the Russian technical agencies are following political guidelines dressed up as scientific evidence. These measures also push the three states into diversifying their trade marketing efforts in favour of the EU and other world markets, with Georgia already having taken significant steps in this direction, since in its case the Russian sanctions date back to 2006. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s threat to cancel CIS free trade preferences infiltrated trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia, leading on 12 September to their proposed postponement until the end of 2015 of the ‘provisional’ implementation of a large part of the AA/DCFTA. This was immediately followed on 16 September by ratification of the AA/DCFTA by both the Rada in Kyiv and the European Parliament, which will lead to its full and definitive entry into force when the 28 EU member states have also ratified it. However Putin followed the day after with a letter to Poroshenko making an abusive interpretation of the 12 September understanding.

Trading off sovereignty. The outcome of Belarus's integration with Russia in the security and defence field. OSW Commentary No. 107, 2013-04-25

Although the Republic of Belarus is constitutionally designated as a neutral country1, it is in fact closely connected with Russia’s own security and defence architecture. Within the Union State of Belarus and Russia, the armed forces are integrated to an extent unequalled in the world. A legacy of the Soviet division of labour, the Belarusian defence industry complex remains structurally dependent on Russia, which is its main raw material provider, outlet for exports and intermediary on world markets. Bilateral military cooperation also builds on the perception of common threats and partly shared security interests. Hence it unfolds regardless of the disputes that sporadically sour relations between Minsk and Moscow, standing out as the main achievement of the Union State – if not the only one.

The Russian economy under Putin: Growth factors and impediments to economic development. OSW Study 20/2005

After a dramatic economic decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial breakdown of 1998, the Russian economy has begun to emerge from its deep crisis. The years 1999-2004 were a period of dynamic development in all sectors of Russian economy, and saw a rapid growth in GDP of over 7 per cent per year. Russia owed the excellent macroeconomic results of that period to a combination of favourable factors. The key factors were: high hydrocarbon prices on the global markets; an increase in Russia's international competitiveness thanks to the "rouble devaluation effect" (following the 1998 financial crash); and the market reforms carried out within that period. In 2004, despite very high oil and gas prices on world markets, a slowdown of the GDP growth took place. Even though the economy is still developing fairly rapidly, we are able to say that Russia is exhausting those traditional mechanisms (apart from oil and gas prices) which have hitherto stimulated GDP growth. Moreover, there are no new mechanisms which could replace the old ones. In the longer term, these unsolved structural problems may seriously impede Russia's economic growth.

The Eurasian Economic Union: a time of crisis. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 195/27.01.2016

The Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), a project forced through by Russia which links it to Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, is currently struggling with serious problems. The economic crisis in Russia – mainly caused by the fall in the price of oil on world markets and exacerbated by sanctions imposed by Western countries in connection with the Ukraine conflict – is affecting these uncompetitive post-Soviet economies which are dependent on Russia. This has resulted in increased economic and political tension among the members of the EaEU. From Russia’s point of view, however, the EaEU project remains useful, because it is not economic integration that is Moscow’s priority. The Union remains its most important instrument for implementing the Kremlin’s geo-political objectives, in particular maintaining its sphere of influence and preventing post-Soviet countries from integrating with the West, as well as restricting their rapprochement with China. Moscow is pushing for the EaEU to include new countries, strengthening its tools for political dominance within the Union, and promoting its project on the international stage. However, the future of this project will depend on both the continued determination of the Kremlin, and whether the other countries can change the rules for integration by taking advantage of the current crisis.

Will improved access to capital dampen the need for more agricultural land? A CGE analysis of agricultural capital markets and world-wide biofuel policies. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 48, May 2013

This paper analyses the consequences of enhanced biofuel production in regions and countries of the world that have announced plans to implement or expand on biofuel policies. The analysis considers biofuel policies implemented as binding blending targets for transportation fuels. The chosen quantitative modelling approach is two-fold: it combines the analysis of biofuel policies in a multi-sectoral economic model (MAGNET) with systematic variation of the functioning of capital and labour markets. This paper adds to existing research by considering biofuel policies in the EU, the US and various other countries with considerable agricultural production and trade, such as Brazil, India and China. Moreover, the application multi-sectoral modelling system with different assumptions on the mobility of factor markets allows for the observation of changes in economic indicators under different conditions of how factor markets work. Systematic variation of factor mobility indicates that the ‘burden’ of global biofuel policies is not equally distributed across different factors within agricultural production. Agricultural land, as the pre-dominant and sector-specific factor, is, regardless of different degrees of inter-sectoral or intra-sectoral factor mobility, the most important factor limiting the expansion of agricultural production. More capital and higher employment in agriculture will ease the pressure on additional land use – but only partly. To expand agricultural production at global scale requires both land and mobile factors adapted to increase total factor productivity in agriculture in the most efficient way.

The world innovation landscape: Asia rising? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/02, February 2013

Highlights • Research and development spending has risen rapidly in Asia, particularly in China, which is now the world’s second R&D spender behind the United States.The increase in Korean and Chinese patent applications has been even more rapid, but Chinese patenting for exploitation on the main markets for innovation(the European Union, Japan and the US) is still marginal. • Asia's increased innovation spending is most prominently related to information and communication technologies. Overall, the Chinese and Korean economies are still not specialised in knowledge-intensive goods and services.Furthermore, China in particular is not (so far) capturing much value from its role as a manufacturer and exporter of high-tech goods; China remains mostly an assembler of goods, the value of which is created elsewhere. • It would be wrong to ignore China's innovation potential on the basis of its current performance. Its clear innovation ambitions are likely to drive its future growth. • Europe is struggling much more than the US to retain its place at the global innovation table. The EU should use Asia’s capacity building in innovation as an opportunity for value capture.

Labour Supply Curves for EU Member and Candidate States: An applied general equilibrium analysis. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 26, June 2012

This paper introduces a more sophisticated modelling of the labour market functioning of the European member and candidate states through the introduction of labour supply curves in an applied general equilibrium model. A labour supply curve offers a middle way in labour supply modelling, sitting between the two commonly adopted extremes of spare capacity and full employment. The first part of the paper outlines the theoretical foundation of the labour supply curve. Real world data is then used to derive labour supply curves for each member state, along with Croatia and Turkey. Finally, the impact of the newly specified labour markets on the results of an illustrative scenario involving reform of the common agricultural policy is explored. The results of computable general equilibrium analysis with the labour supply curve confirm the theoretical expectation that modelling the labour supply through an upwards-sloping curve produces results that lie between the extremes of spare capacity of the labour factor and fully employed labour. This specification captures a greater degree of heterogeneity in the labour markets of the member and candidate states, allowing for a more nuanced modelling of the effects of policy reform, including welfare effects.

Identifying Factor Productivity from Micro-data: The case of EU agriculture. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 34, January 2013

The classical problem of agricultural productivity measurement has regained interest owing to recent price hikes in world food markets. At the same time, there is a new methodological debate on the appropriate identification strategies for addressing endogeneity and collinearity problems in production function estimation. We examine the plausibility of four established and innovative identification strategies for the case of agriculture and test a set of related estimators using farm-level panel datasets from seven EU countries. The newly suggested control function and dynamic panel approaches provide attractive conceptual improvements over the received ‘within’ and duality models. Even so, empirical implementation of the conceptual sophistications built into these estimators does not always live up to expectations. This is particularly true for the dynamic panel estimator, which mostly failed to identify reasonable elasticities for the (quasi-) fixed factors. Less demanding proxy approaches represent an interesting alternative for agricultural applications. In our EU sample, we find very low shadow prices for labour, land and fixed capital across countries. The production elasticity of materials is high, so improving the availability of working capital is the most promising way to increase agricultural productivity.

RED vs. REDD: Biofuel Policy vs. Forest Conservation. Factor Markets Working Document No. 41, May 2013

This paper assesses the complex interplay between global Renewable Energy Directives (RED) and the United Nations programme to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD). We examine the interaction of the two policies using a scenario approach with a recursive-dynamic global Computable General Equilibrium model. The consequences of a global biofuel directive on worldwide land use, agricultural production, international trade flows, food prices and food security out to 2030 are evaluated with and without a strict global REDD policy. We address a key methodological challenge of how to model the supply of land in the face of restrictions over its availability, as arises under the REDD policy. The paper introduces a flexible land supply function, which allows for large changes in the total potential land availability for agriculture. Our results show that whilst both RED and REDD are designed to reduce emissions, they have opposing impacts on land use. RED policies are found to extend land use whereas the REDD policy leads to an overall reduction in land use and intensification of agriculture. Strict REDD policies to protect forest and woodland lead to higher land prices in all regions. World food prices are slightly higher overall with some significant regional increases, notably in Southern Africa and Indonesia, leading to reductions in food security in these countries. This said, real food prices in 2030 are still lower than the 2010 level, even with the RED and REDD policies in place. Overall this suggests that RED and REDD are feasible from a worldwide perspective, although the results show that there are some regional problems that need to be resolved. The results show that countries directly affected by forest and woodland protection would be the most economically vulnerable when the REDD policy is implemented. The introduction of REDD policies reduces global trade in agricultural products and moves some developing countries to a net importing position for agricultural products. This suggests that the protection of forests and woodlands in these regions reverses their comparative advantage as they move from being land-abundant to land-scarce regions. The full REDD policy setting, however, foresees providing compensation to these countries to cover their economic losses.

A Strong Europe in a Globalized World: From the Hungarian to the Polish presidency of the Council of the European Union. ACES Working Papers, 2011

On June 17, 2011, the Center for Transatlantic Relations – together with the Center for European Policy Analysis, the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw, and the Embassies of Hungary and Poland – hosted authors writing on the theme “A Strong Europe in a Globalized World,” and who offered in-depth, substantive reflections about how the United States and Europe can work together more closely in meeting global challenges. Drawing on the agendas of the outgoing and incoming EU Presidencies of the Council of the European Union – Hungary and Poland respectively – authors focused on the importance of a strong US-EU partnership in the face of mounting global challenges, from the current financial and economic crisis through the insecurities of energy markets and the promise of the Arab Spring. Authors explored in depth four key areas of shared interests: A Global Perspective (Transatlantic Partnership in a Globalized World); Achievements and Deliverables of Eastern Partnership; Euro-Atlantic Perspectives for the Balkans; and Common Challenges of Energy Security. Senior Hungarian and Polish government officials, subject matter experts, private sector actors, and think tank scholars participated.

The Importance of Foreign Language Skills in the Labour Markets of Central and Eastern Europe: An assessment based on data from online job portals. CEPS Special Report No. 129/January 2016

In a globalised world, knowledge of foreign languages is an important skill. Especially in Europe, with its 24 official languages and its countless regional and minority languages, foreign language skills are a key asset in the labour market. Earlier research shows that over half of the EU27 population is able to speak at least one foreign language, but there is substantial national variation. This study is devoted to a group of countries known as the Visegrad Four, which comprises the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Although the supply of foreign language skills in these countries appears to be well-documented, less is known about the demand side. In this study, we therefore examine the demand for foreign language skills on the Visegrad labour markets, using information extracted from online job portals. We find that English is the most requested foreign language in the region, and the demand for English language skills appears to go up as occupations become increasingly complex. Despite the cultural, historical and economic ties with their German-speaking neighbours, German is the second-most-in-demand foreign language in the region. Interestingly, in this case there is no clear link with the complexity of an occupation. Other languages, such as French, Spanish and Russian, are hardly requested. These findings have important policy implications with regards to the education and training offered in schools, universities and job centres.