Derisory Results or Reasons to be Cheerful? Evaluating the Implantation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Natolin Research Paper 01/January 2011

This paper considers the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The paper presents a portrait of the three neighbours in terms of their current political and socio-economic profiles, as well as the status of their relations with the European Union. Subsequently, it provides an overview of the development of ENP. A general set of conclusions are offered in relation to the key issue of good governance, where, the paper argues, ENP has delivered derisory results, with patchy effects across the region. Moreover, the paper identifies the democratic back-sliding in Ukraine and entenched authoritarianism in Belarus, which ENP has done very little to address. The EU’s willingness to provide better mobility options for ENP citizens to visit and work in the EU is a key test for the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in the coming year. This paper sees that whilst there are reasons to be cheerful here, with the EU’s recent offer of greater Visa Liberalisation for Ukraine and Moldova, there remains much to be done and in the meantime the EU remains a ‘Fortress Europe’. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for ENP, which include the need to finally tackle corruption in the region, bring more differentiation into ENP, soften the EU’s borders through more generous Visa regimes, develop a more robust Belarus strategy and to think more creatively about the use of ENP funds for regional and cross- border activities.

Financial Transaction Tax (FTT): Why the EU needs the FTT but the FTT does not need the EU. EPC Policy Brief, 17 June 2014

Through an Enhanced Cooperation Procedure (ECP) 11 eurozone countries (ECP-11) – among them the four biggest; Germany, France, Italy and Spain – have aspired to go ahead with the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax (EU-FTT). Apart from generating substantial revenues for tight fiscal budgets, an EU-FTT could also contribute to the reduction of transactions, which are harmful for the efficient functioning of financial markets and the real economy. However, the willingness to go forward with the finalisation of an ambitious proposal has lost some momentum recently; some of the envisaged compromises may even threaten the viability of the whole project.

The strength of the Christian Democrats, the weakness of the opposition. Germany before the parliamentary elections. OSW Commentary No. 114, 12.09.2013

The political campaign before Germany’s parliamentary elections to be held on 22 September has in all its glory reflected the trends visible during the last four years of the government of Chancellor Angela Merkel – the strength of the Christian Democrats, the weakness of the opposition and the increasing marginalisation of the coalition partner, the FDP. The CDU/CSU remains the most popular political choice in Germany, largely because Angela Merkel has consistently remained the most popular German politician. Everything indicates that the CDU/CSU will win the election, even though it has been running a passive campaign and the Chancellor herself has been avoiding confrontation, presenting herself as a kind of cross-party representative of the interests of all social groups. The Christian Democrats’ main competitors, the Social Democrats, have been unable to play to their strengths and present themselves as a serious alternative to the CDU/CSU. The Christian Democrats, despite their difficult cooperation with the liberal FDP, have declared their willingness to continue doing so during the next parliamentary term. If the numbers make that impossible, and the Social Democrats and the Greens have too few votes to be able to form a government, a grand coalition of the Christian Democrats and the SPD will be formed in Germany.

Holes in the skies over NATO's Central European member states. OSW Commentary No. 119, 22.10.2013

Over the past few months, four Central European states have made decisions which will determine the shape of their air forces over the next decade. On 11 October, Romania signed a contract under which it will buy twelve used US F-16A/B multi-role fighter aircraft from Portugal. In August, Slovakia signed contracts with Russia’s MiG for repairs and the limited modernisation of its twelve MiG-29 fighter aircraft currently in service. The Czech Republic entered into a preliminary agreement in July with Sweden on extending the lease of fourteen JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft (the new Czech government will hammer out the details following the parliamentary election). Bulgaria, which has been facing financial problems and political instability, in June postponed the purchase of new (non-Soviet) combat aircraft at least until the end of this year. If Sofia decides to buy any within the next few years, these will be not more than twelve relatively old and worn-out machines (most likely F-16A/B from Portuguese or Dutch army surplus). Given the fact that Hungary in 2012 made the same decision regarding its fourteen Gripen aircraft as the Czech Republic, there are good grounds to claim that the capabilities Central European NATO member states have to take action in airspace are durably limited. The region’s saturation with combat aircraft is the lowest when compared to the entire continent (with the exception of the Baltic states). Furthermore, the machines to be used in the coming decade will be the oldest and the least advanced technologically (all of them belong to the so-called “fourth generation”, the roots of which date back to the 1970s). The problem with gaining full interoperability within NATO has not been resolved in its Central European member states. By modernising its MiG-29 aircraft, Slovakia is to say the least postponing the achievement of interoperability once again. Bulgaria will gain interoperability by buying any Western combat aircraft. However, it is very unlikely to introduce new machines into service earlier than at the end of the present decade. Since the introduction of new fifth generation multi-role combat aircraft or transitional 4+ generation machines in the region’s air forces is unrealistic, the defence of the airspace of NATO member states in Central Europe can be termed an ever more porous sky.

Russia in Serbia – soft power and hard interests. OSW COMMENTARY No. 150, 2014-10-29

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Serbia on 16 October has demonstrated Moscow’s willingness to secure its interests in the Balkans and use Belgrade in its confrontation with the West. It seems, however, that Russia does not have much to offer to Serbia’s authorities, which are reluctant to make more concessions towards Russia. However, Moscow has already gained a strong position in Serbia, which is due to the country’s dependence on Russian natural resources and, in particular, strong support for Russian policy on the part of Serbian elites and society. The traditional pro-Russian attitudes have been strengthened as a result of a series of Russia-inspired, wide-ranging soft power initiatives which have proved so successful that a large part of society has begun to believe that Russia’s interests are consistent with Serbia’s. Russia’s increasingly active policy towards Serbia and the Serbian minorities in the neighbouring countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo – has been part of a larger plan aimed at hampering the integration of the Balkan states with the Euro-Atlantic structures and maintaining an area of instability and frozen conflicts in the EU’s near neighbourhood. Russia’s policy is also becoming increasingly effective due to the EU states’ diminishing support for Balkan countries’ European integration.

No more compulsory engagement. The emancipation of German security policy. OSW Commentary no. 57, 2011-07-18

Germany’s stance on Libya at the UN Security Council and its later decision not to take part in the military intervention gave rise to heated controversy both in Germany and abroad. At home, this was criticised as “an enormous mistake of historic impact”1; while abroad this raised questions about Germany’s willingness to co-operate with its key Western allies. With its decision on Libya, Germany sealed the process of making its security policy independent from the stances of the US and France. It thus ceased to feel any compulsion to provide not only military engagement but also political support for overseas operations initiated by its key allies, even if these are legitimised by the UN Security Council. Germany’s stance, apart from finishing off a certain process, is also setting a starting point for a discussion inside Germany about its military engagement in international security policy. This will bring about a more assertive and selective approach to cooperation with NATO and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.

Russia’s Middle East policy after the Arab revolutions. OSW Commentary No. 59, 2011-07-26

Russia’s policy towards the Middle East is instrumental. Its activity in the region has been growing since the middle of the last decade, and its aim is to help Moscow achieve its objectives in other areas, particularly in its policies towards the US and Europe, as well as its energy policy. The establishment of these political influences constitutes a bargaining chip for Russia in its relations with the US. Russia’s participation in resolving conflicts is aimed at building up its image as a supra-regional power. Russia’s Middle East policy is a key element in its contacts with the Muslim world. At the same time, Russia’s policy in the region remains cautious – despite its return to the region, Russia has not decided to ‘play’ for the Middle East, and its position and role in the region remain limited. The balance of power in the Middle East has been shifting in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions. However, it does not seem that they have opened up larger opportunities for Russian policy in the region. The Russian elite has been divided in its assessment of the consequences of these events. One part of it has displayed scepticism, treating the revolutions rather as a threat than a chance to strengthen their own position. The revolutions were not seen as democratisation processes, but rather as a destabilisation of the region and as posing an increased danger from radical Islam. For the other part of the elite, the revolutions were the natural consequence of the social changes occurring in the region. This internal dispute made it difficult for Russia to present a cohesive approach to the Arab revolutions, and its stance was reactive. The defensive position which Moscow adopted showed that Russia did not have the potential to mould the political situation, either in the region as a whole or its individual countries; neither did it display any willingness to do so. What Moscow is doing is positioning itself in such a way so as not to spoil relations with any other actor in the region, and to be able to exploit any possible emerging opportunities in case of further-reaching changes.

German companies strengthen their cooperation with Russian gas suppliers. OSW Commentary No. 64, 2011-10-24

Germany’s decision to give up the use of nuclear energy will force it to find a conventional low-carbon energy source as a replacement; in the short term, in addition to coal, this is likely to be gas. Due to their continued high debt and the losses associated with the end of atomic power, German companies will not be able to spend large funds on investing in conventional energy. First of all, they will aim to raise capital and repay their debts. The money for this will come from selling off their less profitable assets; this will include sales on the gas market. This will create opportunities for natural gas exporters and extraction companies such as Gazprom to buy back some of the German companies’ assets (electricity companies, for example). The German companies will probably continue to seek to recover the costs incurred in the investment projects already underway, such as Nord Stream, the importance of which will grow after Russian gas imports increase. At the same time, because of their debts, the German companies will seek to minimise their investment costs by selling some shares on the conventional energy market, to Russian corporations among others; the latter would thus be able to increase their stake in the gas market in both Western (Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries) and Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic). It is possible that while establishing the details of cooperation between the Russian and German companies, Russia will try to put pressure on Germany to give up competing projects such as Nabucco. However, a well-diversified German energy market should be able to defend itself against attempts to increase German dependence on Russian gas supplies and the dictates of high prices.

Systemic crisis in Alexander Lukashenko's regime. OSW Commentary No. 66, 2011-10-28

Measures undertaken by the Belarusian government in the areas of the economy, internal affairs and foreign policy in recent months have proven increasingly ineffective. Despite the deteriorating macroeconomic situation, Minsk is not implementing the reforms necessary to combat the crisis and its activity is limited only to feigned actions and administrative regulations. As a result, the economic situation is worsening but the chances of obtaining external loans as support, for example from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are decreasing. At the same time there is mounting fear among the regime of social unrest, therefore by raising salaries of the least well-off groups of citizens it is trying to compensate for the increased costs of living. On the other hand, the government is extending the scope of control over society and competences of enforcement bodies. Belarus’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy has also been diminishing substantially. Despite the EU’s declared willingness to reach an agreement and its encouragement, Lukashenko is not ready to make concessions in the political sphere (e.g. to rehabilitate political prisoners), and this is hindering the normalisation of relations with the West. Minsk furthermore feels a mounting pressure from Moscow, making the Belarusian negotiating position ever weaker. The lack of freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy, no possibility to maintain a costly economic model and the lack of support from the majority of society all prove that Alexander Lukashenko’s regime is in severe crisis. The system he established is no longer able to respond to current threats with adequate and effective strategies. This situation is challenging the regime’s stability and calls into question its viability in the longer term.