Azerbaijan-a growing problem for the West. OSW Commentary No. 146, 15.09.2014

Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the West, launched two decades ago, has helped it become a relatively strong and ambitious actor on the international stage. It has become a key country in the region from the Western (USA and the EU) and Turkish points of view, as well as an important partner in the energy sector. The strategic EU concept of the Southern Gas Corridor, also supported by the United States, is among the initiatives based on cooperation with Azerbaijan. Surprisingly, however, Azerbaijan’s increased ambition and importance have caused its policy to diverge ever farther from the expectations and plans formulated by the West. The changes in the balance of power in the South Caucasus, occurring in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, have forced Azerbaijan to revise its assessment of its position in the region. The main impetus for Azerbaijan’s actions is fear of Russia, as well as the weakness of the West which has become particularly apparent in the recent stages of the Ukrainian crisis. Azerbaijan’s actions so far have displayed its tendency to deepen its self-isolation in foreign affairs and consolidate its authoritarian system. This comes as a challenge to the West, whose ability to shape its relations with Azerbaijan has weakened considerably. This state of affairs poses the threat that in the current situation, the Southern Gas Corridor concept, which Azerbaijan amended in 2012 in its own favour, might become totally blocked.

Interconnector Investment for a Well-Functioning Internal Market: What EU regime of regulatory incentives? Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 18/October 2010

Sufficient cross‐border electricity transmission infrastructure is a pre‐requisite for a functioning European internal market for electricity. Also, the achievement of the EU’s energy policy objectives – sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply – critically depends on adequate investment in physical interconnections between the member states. Mainly focusing on the “regulatory path”, this paper assesses different ways to achieve a sufficient level of interconnector investment. In a first step, economic analysis identifies numerous impediments to interconnector investment adding up to an “interconnector investment failure”. Reflecting on the proper regulatory design of an EU framework able to overcome the interconnector investment failure, a number of recommendations are put forward:  All congestion rents should be channeled into interconnector building. Unused rents should be transferred to a European interconnector fund supervised by an EU agency.  Even though inherently sub‐optimal, merchant transmission investment can be used as a means to put pressure on regulated transmission system operators (TSO) that do not deliver. An EU agency should have exclusive competence on merchant interconnector exemptions.  A European TSO organization should be entrusted with supra‐national network planning, supervised by an EU agency.  The agency should decide on investment cost reallocation for interconnector projects that yield strong externalities. Payments could be settled via a European interconnector fund.  In case of non‐compliance with the supra‐national network plan, the EU agency should have the right to organize a tender – financed by the European interconnector fund – in order to get the “missing link” built. Assessing the existing EU regulatory framework, the efforts of the 2009 “third energy package” to fill the “regulatory gap” with new EU bodies – ACER and ENTSO‐E – are acknowledged. However, striking holes in regulatory framework are spotted, notably with regard to the use of congestion rents, interconnector cost allocation, and the distribution of decision making powers on new infrastructure exemptions A discussion of the TEN‐E interconnector funding scheme shows that massive funding can be an interim solution to the problem of insufficient interconnection capacities while overcoming the political deadlock on sensible regulatory topics such as interconnector cost allocation. The paper ends with policy recommendations.

Turkey and the Kurdish problem; new approaches in the face of the Middle East crises. Point of View No. 30, February 2013

From the Introduction. For almost a hundred years (since World War I and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire) stability – or rather, the permanent threat to stability – has been a key challenge for the Middle East. One of the central elements of this threat has been the so-called Kurdish problem, that is, the issues that continually arise between the states of the region and the Kurdish minority living in the area, as well as the tensions among the individual states caused by a range of issues related to local Kurds. The country most affected by the Kurdish problem is Turkey.

Ukraine on the financial front – the problem of Ukraine’s foreign public debt. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 178|05.08.2015

One of the key challenges that Ukraine is facing is the scale of its foreign debt (both public and private). As of 1st April it stood at US$ 126 billion, which is 109.8% of the country’s GDP. Approximately 45% of these financial obligations are short-term, meaning that they must be paid off within a year. Although the value of the debt has fallen by nearly US$ 10 billion since the end of 2014 (due to the private sector paying a part of the liabilities), the debt to GDP ratio has increased due to the recession and the depreciation of the hryvnia. The value of Ukraine’s foreign public debt is also on the rise (including state guarantees); since the beginning of 2015 it has risen from US$ 37.6 billion to US$ 43.6 billion. Ukraine does not currently have the resources to pay off its debt. In this situation a debt restructuring is necessary and this is one of the top priorities for the Ukrainian government as well as for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its assistance programme. Without this it will be much more difficult for Ukraine to overcome the economic crisis.