Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

How Social is European Integration? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 18/2007

The social dimension of the internal market or of the EU more generally has recently been under quite fundamental attack. Calls for 'Europe' to be 'more social' have been heard repeatedly. Witness the polarized debates about the services directive, the anxieties concerning several ECJ cases about what limitations of the free movement of workers (posted or not) are justified or the assertion of a 'neo-liberal agenda' in Brussels disregarding or eroding the social dimension. This BEEP Briefing paper takes an analytical approach to these issues and to the possible 'framing' involved. Such an analysis reveals a very different picture than the negative framing in such debates has it: there is nothing particular 'a-social' about the internal market or the EU at large. This overall conclusion is reached following five steps. First, several 'preliminaries' of the social dimension have to be kept in mind (including the two-tier regulatory & expenditure structure of what is too loosely called 'social Europe' ) and this is only too rarely done or at best in partial, hence misleading, ways. Second, the social acquis at EU and Member States' levels is spelled out, broken down into four aspects (social spending; labour market regulation; industrial relations; free movements & establishment). Assessing the EU acquis in the light of the two levels of powers shows clearly that it is the combination of the two levels which matters. Member States and e.g. labour unions do not want the EU level to become deeply involved ( with some exceptions) and the actual impact of free movement and establishment is throttled by far-reaching host-country control and the requirement of a 'high level of social protection' in the treaty. Third, six anxieties about the social dimension of the internal market are discussed and few arguments are found which are attributable to the EU or its weakening social dimension. Fourth, another six anxieties are discussed emerging from the socio-economic context of the social dimension of the EU at large. The analysis demonstrates that, even if these anxieties ought to be taken serious, the EU is hardly or not the culprit. Fifth, all this is complemented by a number of other facts or arguments strengthening the case that the EU social dimension is fine.

Economic Approaches of the Internal Market. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 13/April 2008

What is ‘the’ EU internal market, as economists see it? The present BEER paper attempts to survey and help readers understand various ‘economic’ approaches to the internal market idea. The paper starts with a conceptual discussion of what ‘the’ internal market is (in an economic perspective). Six different economic meanings of the internal market are presented, with the sixth one being the economic benchmark in an ideal setting. Subsequently, the question is asked what the internal market (i.e. its proper functioning) is good for. Put differently, the internal market in the EU Treaty is a means, but a means to what? Beyond the typical economic growth objectives of the Rome Treaty (still valid today, with some qualifications), other Treaty objectives have emerged. Economists typically think in means-end relationships and the instrumental role of the internal market for Treaty objectives is far from clear. The ‘new’ Commission internal market strategy of 2007 proposes a more goal-oriented internal market policy. Such a vision is more selective in picking intermediate objectives to which ‘the’ internal market should be instrumental, but it risks to ignore the major deficits in today’s internal market: services and labour! The means-end relationships get even more problematic once one begins to scrutinise all the socio-economic objectives of the current (Amsterdam/Nice) Treaty or still other intermediate objectives. The internal market (explicitly including the relevant common regulation) then becomes a ‘jack of all trades’ for the environment, a high level of social protection, innovation or ‘Social Europe’. These means/ends relationships often are ill-specified. The final section considers the future of the internal market, by distinguishing three strategies: incremental strategies (including the new internal market strategy of November 2007); the internal market as the core of the Economic Union serving the ‘proper functioning of the monetary union’; and deepening and widening of the internal market as justified by the functional subsidiarity test. Even though the latter two would seem to be preferable from an economic point of view, they currently lack political legitimacy and are therefore unlikely to be pursued in the near future.