An Italian job: the need for collective wage bargaining reform. Bruegel Policy Brief ISSUE 2016/11 - JULY 2016

Highlights: Since the mid-1990s, Italy has been characterised by a lack of labour productivity growth, combinedwith a 60 percent growth in labour costs, 20 percentage points above euro-area average consumer price growth. As a consequence, Italy has become less competitive compared to its euro-area partners, the profitability of its firms has dropped and real GDP-per-capita has flatlined. • At the root of the substantial discrepancy between wages and productivity is Italy’s system of centralised wage bargaining which, in many ways, is designed without regard for the underlying industrial structure and geographical heterogeneity of the Italian economy.This has fostered perverse incentives and imbalances within Italy. • Collective wage bargaining, and in particular the determination of base salaries, should be moved from the national to the regional level for all contracts, in the public and private sectors.The Mezzogiorno,which might superficially be seen as losing out from this policy, would actually gain the most in competitiveness terms. • Furthermore, measures should be taken so that, in the long run, the Italian industrial structure evolves into a less fragmented small-company-based economy. This firm consolidation would likely expand the use of firm-level agreements and performance payments, and would improve Italy’s productivity and competitiveness overall.

Do European Union fines deter price-fixing? Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/04, May 2013

The issue: Anti-cartel enforcement is the least controversial of competition policy themes. Agreements to restrict competition such as price fixing or market sharing have obvious negative effects on welfare. Within the European Union, however, industry representatives have increasingly voiced concern that the European Commission applies a too-strict fining policy to enforce anti-cartel law, particularly since the introduction of new guidelines on fines in 2006. Fines are said to be too high, disproportionate and liable to introduce distortions into the market, ultimately leading to higher prices for consumers. It is often argued that more lenient approaches should be followed in crisis times. Policy challenge: High fines for cartel activity could entail costs for society and might be difficult to implement. Nevertheless, there is no case for reducing current levels of EU anti-cartel fines. Fine levels already take the economic crisis into account, and the net present value of fines might prove to be too low to discourage collusion. We estimate that fines might even be not high enough to offset the additional profits yielded by collusion. Fines should be complemented with other measures to increase deterrence, in particular personal sanctions targeting company officers who are responsible for leading the company to commit infringements. In the short term, pressure on decision makers could be increased by reducing the expected duration of investigations.

Euro-area governance: what to reform and how to do it. Bruegel Policy Brief 2015/01 February 2015

The Issue Reform of the governance of the euro area is being held back by disagreement on what is at the root of the euro area’s woes. Pre-crisis, the euro area suffered from the built-up of financial imbalances, price and wage divergence and an insufficient focus on debt sustainability. During the crisis, the main problems were slow resolution of banking problems, an inadequate fiscal policy stance in 2011-13 for the area as a whole, insufficient domestic demand in surplus countries and slow progress with structural reforms to overcome past divergences. Policy Challenge Euro-area governance needs to move beyond the improvements brought about by banking union and should establish institutions to prevent divergences of wages from productivity. We propose the creation of a European Competitiveness Council composed of national competitiveness councils, and the creation of a Eurosystem of Fiscal Policy (EFP) with two goals: fiscal debt sustainability and an adequate area-wide fiscal position. The EFP should have the right in exceptional circumstances to declare national deficits unlawful and to be able to force parliaments to borrow more so that the euro-area fiscal stance is appropriate. A euro-area chamber of the European Parliament would have to approve such decisions. No additional risk-sharing would be introduced. In the short term, domestic demand needs to be increased in surplus countries, while in deficit countries, structural reform needs to reduce past divergences.

Wage inequality in Germany – What role does global trade play? Policy Brief #2015/03

Wage inequality in Germany has increased significantly since the mid-1990s. The intensification of international trade relations is a frequently cited cause for this issue. However, an empirical study revealed that global trade can only directly explain around 15 percent of the increase in wage inequality in Germany. Primarily, the growing heterogeneity among companies in Germany plays a greater role – especially within industries. The decline in collective bargaining is the primary company-specific driver of wage inequality. Nevertheless, protectionist measures would not be effective for achieving greater wage equality.

Compositional effects on productivity, labour cost and export adjustments. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/11, June 2012

Sectoral shifts, such as shrinkage of low labour productivity and the low-wage construction sector, can lead to apparent increased aggregate average labour productivity and average wages, especially when capital intensity differs across sectors. For 11 main sectors and 13 manufacturing sub-sectors, we quantify the compositional effects on productivity, wages and unit labour costs (ULCs) based and real effective exchange rates (REER), for 24 EU countries. Compositional effects are greatest in Ireland, where the pharmaceutical sector drives the growth of output and productivity, but other sectors have suffered greatly and have not yet recovered. Our new ULC-REER measurements, which are free from compositional effects, correlate well with export performance. Among the countries facing the most severe external adjustment challenges, Lithuania, Portugal and Ireland have been the most successful based on five indicators, and Latvia, Estonia and Greece the least successful. There is evidence of downward wage flexibility in some countries, but wage cuts have corrected just a small fraction of pre-crisis wage rises and came with massive reductions in employment even in the business sector excluding construction and real estate, highlighting the difficulty of adjusting wages downward.

Intra-Euro rebalancing is inevitable, but insufficient. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/15, August 2012

Greece, Portugal and Spain face a serious risk of external solvency due to their close to minus 100 percent of GDP net negative international investment positions, which are largely composed of debt. The perceived inability of these countries to rebalance their external positions is a major root of the euro crisis. Intra-euro rebalancing through declines in unit labour costs (ULC) in southern Europe, and ULC increases in northern Europe should continue, but has limits because: The share of intra-euro trade has declined. Intra-euro trade balances have already adjusted to a great extent. The intra-euro real exchange rates of Greece, Portugal and Spain have also either already adjusted or do not indicate significant appreciations since 2000. There are only two main current account surplus countries, Germany and the Netherlands. A purely intra-euro adjustment strategy would require too-significant wage increases in northern countries and wage declines in southern countries, which do not seem to be feasible. Before the crisis, the euro was significantly overvalued despite the close-to balanced current account position. The euro has depreciated recently, but more is needed to support the extra-euro trade of southern euro-area members. A weaker euro would also boost exports, growth, inflation and wage increases in Germany, thereby helping further intra-euro adjustment and the survival of the euro.

The euro crisis: ten roots, but fewer solutions. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/17, October 2012

Many factors have contributed to the euro crisis. Some have been addressed by policymakers, even if belatedly, and European Union member states have been willing to improve the functioning of the euro area by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty in some important areas. However, the most pressing issue threatening the integrity, even the existence, of the euro, has not been addressed: the deepening economic contraction in southern euro-area member states. The common interest lies in preserving the integrity of the euro area and in offering these countries improved prospects. Domestic structural reform and appropriate fiscal consolidation, wage increases and slower fiscal consolidation in economically stronger euro-area countries, a weaker euro exchange rate, debt restructuring and an investment programme should be part of the arsenal. In the medium term, more institutional change will be necessary to complement the planned overhaul of the euro area institutional framework. This will include the deployment of a euro-area economic stabilising tool, managing the overall fiscal stance of the euro area, some form of Eurobonds and measures to make euro-area level decision making bodies more effective and democratically legitimate.